S	1014	48

(14th Jacket)

SECRET

Legation

BRITISH ~~RESIDENT'S OFFICE~~

AMMAN

TRANS-JORDAN.

SUBJECT: Palestine.

GPP. 9731—1000– 11-2-40

CONNECTED FILES

NUMBER AND YEAR	SUBJECT
S/852/45	

Palestine

S	1014	48

(14th Jacket)

No. S.1014 48. (Vol XIII) FO 816/127

SUBJECT PALESTINE

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1327

AMMAN 73 SAVING (1)

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN

/CM. SAVINGRAM.

FROM : CAIRO.

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE.

NO. : 111 Saving.

DESPD: BY BAG.

DATED: 8.9.48.

Addressed Saving to Foreign Office No. 111, repeated Saving to Amman No. 73, Beirut No. 74, Bagdad No. 74, Damascus No. 79, Jedda No. 81, Jerusalem No. 21, Haifa No. 2 Ukdel New York No. 7 and Washington No. 8.

My telegrams Nos. 991 and 992 : Palestine.

Paragraph 2 below contains notes of points I read out to Minister for Foreign Affairs. I pointed out that they constituted urgent advice to prolong the truce so that Arabs should not expose themselves to charge of aggression, and so that opportunity should be provided for further discussion, in which Arabs would have a chance of improving their position. Prolongation of truce was therefore of greatest importance.

2. (a) Arguments in favour of accepting extension of truce.

(i) We do not know what Security Council would do in the event of resumption of fighting. In the last resort H.M.G., despite their sympathy for Arab point of view and their desire to maintain closest relations with their Arab allies, would feel bound to act in accordance with their obligations as a member of United Nations.

(ii) If fighting began again U.S. Government would be under strong domestic pressure to commit delivery of military supplies to the Jews while maintaining its arms embargo on other M.E. countries. These two dangers would be particularly great if Arabs were to take responsibility for a failure to extend the truce at a time when the Jews were still professing willingness to continue negotiation s with the Mediator. In that event Arabs would be represented as aggressors, the Security Council would probably treat them as such and generally and in particular American arms embargo would certainly be modified in favour of the Jews.

(iii) If it is pointed out that there seems no prospect that an independent Jewish State can be removed from the map by negotiation, our answer is that in the view of H.M.G. a Jewish State has come to stay in any event. Our attitude towards the present Jewish authorities in Palestine shows how deeply we should regret the establishment of such a state

/ without

without Arab consent. We must both be realistic. The object of Arab diplomacy at the present stage should be to secure the best possible terms by means both of territorial adjustment and of guarantees for the future in return for their acquiescence in Jewish independence in a part of Palestine.

(iv) We must make it absolutely clear that if fighting is resumed on the responsibility of Arab Governments the Security Council will undoubtedly condemn them and it might be impossible for H.M.G., who are bound by their obligations to the U.N., to resume delivery of arms to Arabs.

(v) If Arab Governments disregard these considerations and make themselves responsible to resume hostilities, all indications are that victory in the field is impossible for them. Indeed the possibility of serious reversals must be taken into account.

(vi) Jewish rejection of prolongation of truce is additional argument in favour of Arab agreement to prolong truce and gain credit.

(b) <u>Arguments in favour of continued negotiations with Mediator</u>.

(i) Some aspects of Mediator's proposals represent concessions to Arabs' point of view, and their general effect has been to make the whole situation more fluid and to throw open the door to further discussions. Both we and the Arabs have to deal with the situation as it is and not as it might have been. We have already been instrumental in averting a number of unfair decisions and may be still able to assist in holding the balance more evenly than it would be held otherwise. If Arab Governments act now with restraint and statesmanship, they may still be able to obtain a less unfavourable solution than at one time seemed inevitable.

(ii) Mediator's proposals open the way for a smaller Jewish State without Negeb, and with favourable proposals regarding Jerusalem and Haifa. The exchange of Western Gallilee for Negeb, although unfavourable economically, would together with inclusion of Jerusalem in Arab area, have the effect of re-establishing direct land communications between Cairo and the Asiatic Arab capitals.

/ (iii).

(iii) Jerusalem proposal in itself is obviously a step forward from Arabs' point of view. The Arabs are also offered the prospect of concessions in Haifa and at Lydda airport. If the Arabs were to secure the added safeguard of guarantees against expansion of frontier of this Jewish State, they would be in a better position than under any alternative which now seems at all possible.

(iv) The Mediator, in submitting his proposals, has shown that he believes peace can be re-established in Palestine only by means of a settlement, which departs from the plan adopted by the General Assembly last November, and one which is founded upon acquiescence, if not upon consent. He is ready to examine alternative proposals, and this gives the Arabs the opportunity to improve their position by negotiation. If they take this opportunity, it is Mr. Bevin's opinion that the results will be more favourable to them than would be the consequence of renewed fighting.

(v) The argument in paragraph (v) of note (a) is also applicable here.

CAMPBELL.

AMMAN 74 SAVING

(2)

/LMB. (30) Copy No.....

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN 16 JUL 1948

SAVINGRAM.

FROM : CAIRO DESPD: By Bag

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE

NO. : 113 SAVING DATED: 9th July, 1948.

WEEKLY APPRECIATION

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.113 Saving of 9th July, repeated for information Saving to Amman No.74, Baghdad No.75, Beirut No.75, Damascus No.80, Jerusalem No.22, Jedda No.82, Alexandria No.29, Port Said No.27, Addis Ababa No.2.

It was announced on July 5th that Abdel Meguid Ibrahim Saleh Pasha, Minister of Public Works, had formally tendered his resignation to Nokrashi Pasha on the grounds of ill-health and that the latter had accepted it. Ahmed Abdel Ghaffar Pasha has temporarily taken over the portfolio of Public Works in an acting capacity and it is reported that Heykal Pasha has been discussing with other leading members of the Liberal Party the candidature of another Liberal to replace the retiring Minister, with a view to maintaining the balance of parties within the Cabinet.

2. The Political Committee of the Arab League has held a further series of meetings in Cairo to discuss Count Bernadotte's proposals for a settlement of the whole Palestine question and Azzam Pasha has sent Count Bernadotte a reply expressing the Political Committee's regret that it cannot accept his suggestions as a suitable basis for discussion. In an annex to this reply, counter-proposals for the future of Palestine, resembling those put forward by the Arabs at the London Conference in 1946, are submitted as a basis for discussion. Subsequently the Political Committee received and discussed the Mediator's suggestions for an extension of the cease-fire agreement and the demilitarisation of Jerusalem and Haifa. Count Bernadotte himself paid a brief visit to Cairo on July 6th and was in contact with Azzam Pasha and Nokrashi Pasha. There have been frequent press reports of British and American efforts to persuade the Arabs and Jews to agree to an extension of the truce but in speaking to press reporters on July 7th Azzam Pasha denied any knowledge of international pressure to secure an extension. It is reported in the press that the Political Committee has also been discussing various administrative problems which have arisen in the occupied areas of Palestine. The Egyptian press has unanimously predicted and insisted that the cease-fire period should not be prolonged after July 9th since the agreement has operated to the advantage of the Jews; in addition, outspoken articles in various newspapers have called in question the mediator's impartiality. It seems evident that Count Bernadotte's prestige with the Arabs is far lower than it was a month ago.

3. The press has published a highly coloured account, written by King Farouk's press counsellor, of a visit paid by His Majesty to the Egyptian forces in Palestine. King Farouk went to Gaza and other localities in southern Palestine which had been the scene of operations against the Jewish forces. An order of the day was issued to the Egyptian Army expressing His Majesty's pride in the Army's valour and the sacrifices it had made in the service of right and country.

4/...

4. The "Journal d'Egypte" of 5th July has reported a statement by the newly-arrived Pakistan Ambassador to Egypt that Pakistan is an Arab power which seeks to defend its independence and to assist the Islamic world as regards Palestine.

5. Despite the publication of the terms of the Egyptian Government's reply to His Majesty's Government regarding the promulgation of the Sudan Executive and Legislative Assembly Ordinance, the Sudan question has, generally speaking, been largely eclipsed by the Palestine issue. The report of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on that subject came up again in the Senate on July 6th but, according to the press, further discussion was postponed owing to the fact that the Committee had been unable to meet to consider the Egyptian Government's notes to His Majesty's Government and the Governor-General of the Sudan and to report thereon. The Senate is reported to have agreed in those circumstances to postpone a further debate on that subject; as this was the final sitting before the summer recess, the matter stands adjourned until Parliament reassembles. There was, however, a question raised in the Senate on the previous day by Serag Eddin Pasha relating to another aspect of Sudanese affairs. The Pasha asked what measures had been taken to remove the grievances of railway workers in the Sudan and after the Prime Minister, according to the press, had stated that he had no information on the subject, Serag Eddin Pasha retorted that the Egyptian Government's conduct in this connection would have a very bad effect on the southern part of the Nile Valley, especially at a time when Egyptians were claiming unity between the Sudan and Egypt.

6. An unexploded gelignite time bomb was discovered on the premises of the Sudan Agency in Cairo on the afternoon of July 6th. According to press reports the bomb was set to explode shortly after it had been rendered harmless by the police who were summoned. It is not yet known who was responsible for this affair and no arrests have so far been made.

7. The Parliamentary Session closed with the usual rush to press forward at the last moment with important business. Among the measures which have to stand over until the next session is the law to amend the Income Tax. Tewfik Doss Pasha protested against the amendment and said that it would impose a tax of 14% on Company profits and an additional 14% on the dividends paid to shareholders, and that in effect this was "double taxation" and would hamper the development of local Companies. The 1948-49 State Budget - the highest on record with revenue estimates at £E.141,510,600 and expenditure at £E.183,435,100 - was however finally approved by Parliament before it adjourned for the Summer recess. It is understood that the expenditure estimate includes the £E.30 millions recently voted separately for the additional cost of military services because of Egypt's participation in the war in Palestine. The adverse balance of £E.41,924,500 is to be met from the Reserve Fund and an internal loan of £E.30,000,000.

8. According to press reports the police authorities are continuing to effect arrests of persons suspected of subversive activities and to seize allegedly incriminating literature and documents. It is suggested that these persons have communist connections. The subject of communism was referred to by Nahas Pasha in a speech to a deputation ofWafdists who welcomed him to Alexandria on July 4th. According to the press Nahas Pasha alleged that the present Government had endeavoured to

use/.....

use communism as a pretext for combatting the Wafd but the Wafd, he declared, had nothing in common with communism and fought against its principles.

9. The Press Bureau of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria has published the text of a telegram from the Patriarch of Alexandria to thePatriarch of Antioch requesting that the latter's delegation should represent him at the forthcoming quincentenary celebrations of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow, but without signing any decisions which may be taken by the Synod. There have been indications that the Patriarch of Alexandria was considerably embarrassed by the necessity of deciding whether or not to accept the invitation to attend those celebrations or to be represented by a delegation of his own.

10. The decree referred to in paragraph 11 of my telegram No.108(S) has now been published in the "Journal Officiel".

11. With reference to paragraph 11 of my telegram No.104(S), there was a further question in the Senate on July 6th about the decision of the English Mission College to dismiss Moslem pupils and the Minister of Education is reported to have intimated in reply that legal action would be taken against foreign schools which dismissed non-Christian students. The "Egyptian Gazette" reports that at a press conference at Alexandria on July 7th the Minister stated that once the explanatory regulations relating to the Free Schools Law were issued there would be no further objections on the part of private and foreign schools and that no obstacles would be put in the way of schools which co-operated with the Ministry. The Minister is reported to have added that the teaching of Arabic in foreign schools would only be compulsory for Egyptian children and that in the matter of religious instruction foreign schools would have liberty of action provided that they did not practise missionary work and did not force any child to have teaching in a religion other than its own.

CAMPBELL.

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BRITISH LEGATION
16 JUL 19
AMMAN

AMMAN 75 (S)

(3)

/CM. EN CLAIR TELEGRAM. (30) Copy No.

FROM : CAIRO. DESPD: 1740 hrs 10.7.48

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE.

NO. : 1017 DATED: 10.7.48

IMMEDIATE.

OPEN.

GIANT.

(40 (12th))

Addressed to Foreign Office No.1017 of July 10th repeated for information to Ukdel New York No. 8, Washington No. 8 , Saving to Amman No. 75, Bagdad No. 76, Beirut No. 76,Damascus No. 81 , Jedda No. 83, Jerusalem No. 23, Haifa No. 3. .

My telegram No. 1005 /of 9th July/.

Palestine.

Following is translation as published in the "Egyptian Mail" of official communiqué issued evening July 9th by Egyptian Ministry of Defence. Begins.

2. Our forces attacked the villages of Beit Effa and Adbis which had been occupied by the enemy during the period of the truce forcing them to be evacuated. Our troops pursued the enemy inflicting heavy losses on armoured vehicles. The enemy lost 40 killed and several prisoners and a large quantity of arms was captured.

3. The enemy had also occupied the village of Kaoukaba during the period of the truce. Our troops attacked and captured this village, putting the enemy to flight towards the south as far as Holaikat. Saudi Arabian contingents brilliantly assisted in this attack. The enemy left, apart from wounded, 65 dead on the battlefield.

4. The enemy, who had occupied the village of Beit Daras during the period of the truce, was attacked by our land forces and also by Sudanese volunteers. A battle in which bayonets and grenades were used took place in this area, during which we inflicted heavy losses, the enemy losing 100 dead.

5. The enemy attacked at 2 a.m. this morning - July 9th - that is to say six hours before the end of the truce - the village of Arak Suidan. The battle lasted four hours, and the enemy was repulsed after losing 50 killed.

6. This morning - after the end of the truce our forces attacked the colony of Kfar Caroum, following a heavy artillery bombardment. Our forces occupied this colony, over which the Egyptian flag now flies.

/ 7.

7. The enemy forces attempted to launch an attack against No. 69 Training Ground, known as Fanatis. They were repulsed after losing 70 dead.

8. Our forces attacked all points which had been occupied by the enemy during the period of the truce to the west of Majda and after having dislodged the enemy, these points were occupied.

9. Our light bombers attacked the aerodrome at Akir. High explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped near a hangar. Fires were started and five enemy planes were destroyed on the ground.

10. The port of Tel Aviv was bombed by our forces this afternoon and quays and port installations were hit. Many fires and columns of black smoke were seen coming from the target area. Our planes also machine-gunned two ships of which one was sunk.

11. Our planes also gave support to the land forces during their operations, bombed Majda where fires were started, and straffed enemy vehicles and armoured units north of Majda, Julis, Beit Derras, Holaikat and Bir Tufia. During all these operations 30 armoured vehicles were destroyed. A concentration of enemy forces in the region of Julis was also attacked.

12. Our land forces shot down an enemy Messerschmidt plane south west of Gaza. The pilot was killed.

13. From these operations all our planes returned safely to their base.

Ends.

The above is first official communiqué issued since suspension of military operations a month ago.

CAMPBELL.

4A

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

5th July, 1948.

(A 7775/118/25)
RESTRICTED

Dear Chancery,

We suggest that you might reply to Brigadier Baird's request for guidance on the position of British subjects volunteering for the Arab forces, which you passed on to us in your letter No. 341/182/48 of the 6th June, by referring him to the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870.

2. We are advised that any British subject, who accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the armed forces either of the Jewish or of the Arab authorities involved in the present hostilities will be liable to prosecution under the terms of Article 1 of this Act. We are also advised that the Act does not apply to persons already serving in such forces before the outbreak of hostilities. The effect of the 'cease fire' on the application of the Act is doubtful, since the truce is temporary and presupposes the existence of a state of war. It may safely be said, however, that even persons accepting or agreeing to accept a commission or engagement during the truce would run the risk of prosecution. Moreover, so long as the truce lasts, His Majesty's Government are bound by a resolution of the Security Council to prevent the departure from British territory of such persons. From the practical point of view, therefore, the truce makes little difference.

3. The legal complexities of the situation are such that we have not yet decided whether or not to make a public announcement about the applicability of the Foreign Enlistment Act. We consider, however, that

/Brigadier

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Jedda.

Brigadier Baird or any of His Majesty's Missions who may receive enquiries on this subject would be fully justified in replying on these lines.

We are copying this letter to the recipients of yours and to the Consulate at Haifa.

Yours ever,

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

"Le Journal d'Egypte" - 11th July, 1948.

Une administration civile provisoire en Palestine

Nous avons reçu du secrétariat général de la Ligue Arabe le communiqué suivant :

Au cours de sa réunion tenue dans la matinée du 8 juillet 1948, le Comité Politique de la Ligue Arabe a étudié le projet de création d'une administration civile provisoire en Palestine et, après consultations et accord avec les organisations palestiniennes responsables, le Comité a approuvé ce qui suit :

Iº — Création d'une administration civile provisoire en Palestine conformément aux dispositions suivantes :

1. — Il sera formé en Palestine une administration civile provisoire pour la gérance des affaires civiles publiques et les services nécessaires. Toutefois, les questions politiques ne seront pas de sa compétence pour le moment.

2. — La direction de cette administration est assumée par un Conseil composé d'un président et de neuf membres qui dirigeront et contrôleront respectivement :

La présidence et les questions administratives générales; la justice; les services sanitaires; les affaires sociales; les communications; les finances; l'économie nationale; les affaires agricoles; la sécurité publique et la propagande.

3. — La juridiction de ce Conseil d'Administration civile s'étend à toutes les régions occupées en ce moment par les armées arabes ainsi que celles qui le seront ultérieurement jusqu'à ce qu'elle s'étende à toute la Palestine arabe.

4. — Le Conseil recrutera ses fonctionnaires parmi les fonctionnaires arabes dont la durée de service aurait expiré à la fin du mandat britannique en Palestine.

5. — Les règlements et lois en vigueur à l'expiration du mandat britannique seront maintenus, exception faite de ceux qui sont en contradiction avec l'intérêt public arabe.

6. — Après le choix et la nomination de ses membres, le Conseil se réunit sur la convocation du Président et fixe au cours de sa première réunion son siège, son règlement intérieur ainsi que le mode de travail au sein du Conseil.

7. — La direction des affaires de l'administration se fera en veillant à l'intérêt de tous les habitants et des armées arabes d'occupation.

8. — Le Conseil de la Ligue ou les gouvernements des pays arabes compétents, fixeront les attributions du Conseil et de ses membres ainsi que celles des gouverneurs militaires que nommeraient les armées arabes d'occupation dans les diverses régions.

9. — Le Conseil de l'administration civile s'inspirera des décisions et des directives du Conseil de la Ligue ou de son Comité Politique.

10. — En cas de démission, de décès ou d'abstention de travail d'un membre du Conseil pour une raison quelconque, il sera remplacé avec l'approbation du Conseil de la Ligue ou de son Comité Politique.

11. — Le Conseil de la Ligue promulguera la constitution de ce corps administratif et en désignera les membres; et il est demandé à tous les habitants de la Palestine de l'appuyer et de lui faciliter sa tâche.

12. — Au cours de sa première réunion en Palestine, le Conseil de l'administration civile fixera son budget en veillant à la plus stricte économie et au fonctionnement des divers services nécessaires avec le minimum possible de fonctionnaires. Ses travaux et ses branches s'étendront quand ses ressources financières s'accroîtront.

13. Etant donné que ce corps administratif ne peut pas fonctionner sans disposer de l'argent nécessaire, et en attendant qu'il puisse percevoir les divers impôts, le Conseil de la Ligue ou son Comité Politique décidera d'accorder à cette Administration un prêt ou un don.

IIº — Le Conseil de l'Administration civile provisoire en Palestine est composé comme suit:

S.E. Ahmed Helmi pacha: Président et affaires administratives générales;

Jamal El-Husseini bey: Sécurité Publique intérieure;

Outy Abdel Hadi bey: Affaires Sociales;

Le Dr Hussein Fakhry El-Khaldi bey: Services sanitaires;

Soliman Toukan bey, Communications;

Michel Abkarious bey: Finances;

Aly Hosna bey: Justice;

El-Sayed Raga'i El-Husseini : Économie Nationale;

El-Sayed Youssef Sahyoun: Propagande et El-Sayed Amin Akl : Affaires Agricoles.

IIIº — En publiant cette décision, le Comité Politique espère qu'elle constituera le commencement d'une nouvelle ère où les Palestiniens pourront se charger de leurs propres affaires, et une préparation à leur jouissance de leur indépendance.

AMMAN

(6)

V

CYPHER TELEGRAM OTP (8) Copy No. 3

From Cairo Despd. 1905 hrs. 5.7.

To Foreign Office

No. 973 Dated 5.7.48.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET PALESTINE

As suggested in my telegram No. 960 I fear that impartiality of Mediator is seriously called in question by Arabs. This is largely due to his treatment of alleged breaches of truce by the Jews. I learn he was strongly attacked on this subject by Arab leaders at his meeting with them here, and that his reply was rather weak. This is most unfortunate. Arabs (a) always feared Jews would use truce to improve their position, but (b) were assured that Mediator would observe and duly report breaches and that these would influence United Nations Organisation against the guilty in its approach to whole problem. Not only that, but they have assumed that U.N.O. would interest itself in seeing at least that breaches were not repeated, if advantage gained by guilty could not be made good to other side. I have been unable myself to discover so far how far Mediator has rendered reports or regarded alleged breaches as serious matter. Arabs certainly doubt it, while believing that Jews have committed many and grave breaches, and that they have received important reinforcements in arms and material (including heavy bombers). (Have H.M.G., as member state, received any information from U.N.O. on the subject? Have they any independent information about illicit accretions of Jewish strength?). Time taken in collecting and posting adequate number of observers also made Arabs uneasy.

2. Unfortunate result is that Arabs view any suggestions by Mediator with suspicion and start with prejudice against them; they will continue to do so as long as they are not given evidence that he gives breaches due importance and takes steps not only to report but to prevent them. I understand that Mediator has been anxious to avoid declaring a breach of the truce by either side but rather to settle any as local incidents. But Arabs regard them more seriously particularly in view of great number (some of them of a major character) which they believe Jews have committed.

3. I have uncomfortable feeling that Mediator is not in touch with Arab sentiment and outlook, and what is more, has no means of remedying this so long as he operates in present manner and his office organisation remains chaotic, if not non-existent. He, or those immediately under him, seem not to have realised importance of this organisational side for the substance of their work which, I suspect, suffers increasingly as a result. Impression is that choice of coadjutors by Mediator and U.N.O. Secretariat has not always been very happy, businesslike or discriminating. Indeed it is thought to have been pretty haphazard. Local press, and through them other circles, have noticed apparent small calibre of the team (if it can be so dignified) and its lack of organisation, and this has not helped. Presence of names (and in some cases of features) which might well be Jewish has also made uneasy impression locally, and press is now openly alleging large percentage of Jews. All this incidentally has not enhanced reputation of U.N.O., quite apart from its Mediator.

4. U.S. Chargé d'Affaires mentioned to me this morning strength of Arab feeling over Jewish breaches of truce and their loss of confidence in Mediator.

5./

5. I feel you should be aware of foregoing (though part is perforce second-hand) both as background and for any independent enquiries you may think expedient or possible. Matter is not without importance.

CAMPBELL

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SAVINGRAM

OUT

BRITISH LEGATION
16 JUL 194
AMMAN

FROM: B.M.E.O.
TO: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No. 25 Saving.
12th July, 1948.

Addressed Saving to Foreign Office No. 25 of 12th July, 1948, repeated for information Saving to Bagdad No. 23, Beirut No. 17 Damascus No. 22, Amman No. 21, Jedda No. 24, Jerusalem No. 15, Haifa No. 2 UK Del New York No. 54 Misc, Washington No. 13, and Cairo No. 25.

Your telegram to Amman No. 642. PALESTINE.

1. With the exception of King Abdulla who, despite the public declaration which he made in Cairo on June 25 (Cairo tel. No. 926), has now informed the Mediator of his readiness to accept a Jewish state, all the Arab governments and leaders are at present determined to continue resisting its establishment. Nevertheless the time for negotiating on that basis may eventually come and I accordingly offer the following comments on the points raised in para. 6 of your telegram under reference.

2. As stated in para. 7 of my savingram No. 20 I do not think the Arabs would be greatly impressed by the offer of a guarantee of their frontier with a Jewish state because they would not believe in its effectiveness. They are already disillusioned by assurances that have been forgotten, starting with the statement in the Balfour Declaration that nothing would be done which might prejudice the civil rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and ending with such incidents as the disembarkation of Jewish immigrants in Haifa. They are fully aware that the Jews would always be clever enough to outwit them in the political field and for that reason would doubt our ability to protect their frontiers from Jewish aggression if it came to the point. If the guarantee were backed by the U.S. it might help a little - but not very much in view of the strength of Jewish pressure in the U.S. and the notorious uncertainty of American policy. Nevertheless I would not advise against offering the Arabs a guarantee and endeavouring to persuade the Americans to join in it, but for the reasons given I doubt whether it would cut very much ice. Its danger is that we might find ourselves unable to implement the guarantee if and when the time came for doing so, for much the same reason that we have had to stop deliveries of arms. If so our position in the Arab world might become worse than if the guarantee had never been given.

3. A fresh international initiative to solve the problem of displaced persons in Europe should certainly be helpful. One of the most legitimate of the Arab complaints is that Palestine has been expected to carry unaided the whole burden of a problem which owes its origin to the iniquitous behaviour of European powers.

4. Provision for equating outside financial assistance to the two states should also be helpful. It would probably in any case be essential to give some financial assistance. Even if Transjordan were to take over all or most of the Arab area of Palestine she would no doubt need a larger subsidy than she is receiving to-day, as the amalgamation of two non-viable territories, far from creating a single viable one, creates a territory still more non-viable than either of its component parts.

5./

5. You also invite other suggestions for making it easier to obtain Arab acquiescence in the existence of a Jewish state. The only one that occurs to me relates to the supply of arms. I believe the Arabs would inevitably remain distrustful both of the intentions of the Jewish state and of their likelihood of receiving assistance to defend themselves against it. They would also realise that the Jews, with their superior resources, would be able to create arms factories of far greater scope than anything that the Arabs could do unaided. I believe therefore it might be helpful if we could offer to assist them in building arms factories of their own. This would give them a greater sense of self-dependence than they feel to-day, relying as they do almost entirely on outside supplies which have failed them in the hour of need. Obviously they would never be able to supply all their needs, but the existence of even a few up to date factories on the spot should have a good psychological effect.

Distribution:

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12. CIO.RAF
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Copy No. 20

30 OCTOBER

8

BRITISH LEGATION
13 JUL 1948
AMMAN

TELEGRAM
OUT

Secret 1mgee

To: FOREIGN OFFICE
From: B.M.E.O.

14 JUL 1948

No. 26 SAVING
13.7.48.

D. Direct 13.7.48.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 26 Saving, repeated for information Saving to Bagdad No. 24, Beirut No. 18, Damascus No. 23, Amman No. 22, Jedda No. 25, Jerusalem No. 16, Haifa No. 3 U.K. Del. New York No. 55 Misc., Washington No. 14, and Cairo No. 23.

My Savingram No. 25. PALESTINE.

The following para. was omitted in error from Savingram No. 25.

6. Finally I would suggest that if we were able to tell the Arab states that we share their view about the existence of a Jewish state, the Arabs looking upon us as fellow sufferers might be more easily convinced of its inevitability. At present they are not certain what our views are in that respect.

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4. Mr. A. Maitland
5. Mil. Div.
6. RN CHQ (2)
7. SOILEM
8. C. of S. (for C. in C.)
9. A.C. in C. RAF MED/ME
10. B.G.S. (Plans and Ops.)
11. B.G.S. (I)
12. OID, RAF
13. Joint Intelligence Staff, M.E.

(MD)

(9A)

COPY/LMB.

MINISTERE
DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

No. 39 C.

N O T E

Faisant suite à sa Note No.20 C. du 15 Mai 1948, le Ministère Royal des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à la l'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne un Mémorandum exposant les raisons pour lesquelles l'Egypte et les Etats Arabes ont décidé de ne pas souscrire à la prologation de la trêve et de reprendre leur intervention militaire.

En priant l'Ambassade de vouloir bien le transmettre à Son Gouvernement, le Ministère saisit l'occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de très sa haute considération.

Le Caire, le 11 Juillet 1948

à l'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne,

Le C a i r e.

COPY/LMB.

MEMORANDUM

Dans son mémorandum du 15 Mai dernier le Gouvernement Egyptien a déja fait savoir les raisons qui l'ont amené à intervenie militairement en Palestine ensemble avec les autres Gouvernements des Etats Arabes. Grâce à cette intervention de nombreuses vios innocentes ont été sauvées, des actes de vandalismo ont été épargnés au pays et la paix et le règne de la loi ont pu être restaurés dans toutes les zones libérées par les armées arabes.

Nonobstant le fait que les armées arabes avaient le situation bien en main, le Gouvernement Egyptien et les Gouvernements des autres Etats Arabes ont accepté la décision du Conseil de Sécurité du 29 Mai dernier ordonnant la cessation du feu pour une durée de quatre semaines en Palestine.

Ils l'ont fait pour prouver, une fois de plus, leurs bonnes intentions et leur sincère désir de collaborer avec les Nations-Unies, afin de trouver une solution juste et pacifique au problème Palestinien, et ce, malgré le peu de confiance qu'ils avaient dans les sionistes pour le respect de la parole donnée.

Ce qu'ils craignaient ne s'est que trop réalisé. En effet, les sionistes ont violé la trève quelques minutes à peine après son entrée en vigueur. Le Gouvernement Egyptien avait eu l'occasion à plusieurs reprises, d'attirer l'attention du Mediateur des Nations-Unies sur les violations de la trêve et les divers actes d'agression commis par les Sionistes contre de nombreux localités et villages Arabes, rien que dans le seul secteur Egyptien.

L'attention du Mediateur avait été attirée particulièrement sur le danger que comporte ces violations répétées qui visaient manifestement à ébranles les positions Egyptiennes. Et le Gouvernement Egyptien avait demandé à plusieurs reprises le rétablissement de la situation telle qu'elle se trouvait au matin du 11 Juin, mais sans jamais obtenir à ce sujet aucun résultat positif.

Durant toute la période de la trève les bades brandes sionistes, recourant à tous les moyens et artifices, ont continué à introduire clandestinement en Palestine renforts, munitions et matériel de guerre de toutes sortes.

L'incident, entre autres, du bateau "Altalena" qui fut saisit en plein port de Tel-Aviv, transportant des munitions et des immigrants Sionistes et celui des tanks soustraits par les Sioniste-s aux forces Britanniques sont connus de tous. Ajouter à cela les multiples agressions dont furent victimes, les habitants Arabes, dans différentes localités de la Palestine, de la part des bandes Sionistes qui ont pillé et incendié les villages, enlevé ou bruler les récoltes, tuant les paysans dans leurs champs, emmenant d'autres comme prisonniers, les forçant à travailler pour leur compte, leur faisant ériger des fortifications, creuser des tranchées ou accomplir d'autres travaux de cette nature.

Aussi le Gouvernement Egyptien ne peut-il souscrire à l'assertion du Médiateur des Nations-Unies, dans sa Note

relative/....

relative à la prolongation de la trêve, que la cessation du feu aurait été exécutée, généralement, d'une manière satisfaisante et que le 9 Juillet aucune partie n'aurait réalisé aucun avantage militaire sensible par suite de la mise en application de la dite trêve.

Cette assertion est on contradiction manifeste avec la déclaration du Chef du Gouvernement du prétendu Etat d'Israel qui, à l'occasion du départ du dernier soldat britannique du port de Haifa a déclaré publiquement, le ler Juillet, que les forces Sionistes augmentent de jour en jour et qu'à l'heurs actuelle (c'est-à-dire vers la fin de la trêve) elles se trouvent de beaucoup supérieures à ce qu'elles étaient au début de la lutte en Palestine.

Par ailleurs, la cessation du feu n'est pas une fin en soi, mais un moyen pour trouver une solution juste et pacifique au problème Palestinien.

Les Etats Arabes ont déclaré, à maintes reprises, que cette solution ne peut se trouver en dehors de la création d'un Etat Palestinien unitaire au sein duquel vivront, en tant que citoyens égaux, arabes et juifs.

Il n'y a dans cette attitude de la part des Etats Arabes, ni injustice ni obstination. Il est manifeste, en effet, que la création d'un Etat Juif en Palestine destiné à servir de refuge aux immigrants juifs de tous les pays du monde ne pe ut se réaliser qu'au détriment des Arabes. La Création de cet état par la force et l'oppression au centre des Nations Arabes, où les sentiments sont violemment hostiles à tout morcellement de la Palestine, ne peut être qu'une source perpétuelle de troubles et de désordres dans cette partie du monde, et menacer ainsi la paix dans tout le Moycn-Orient.

On ne peut en toute justice demander aux Nations-Arabes, établies depuis des siècles, sans interruption, dans cette partie du monde et qui ne demandent qu'à vivre en paix, afin de pouvoir développer leurs propres institutions et de collaborer sincèrement avec les autres nations à l'établissement d'une paix mondiale, de rester immobiles devant l'agression Sioniste qui les menacent dans leur existence même.

Cette menace ne ferait que s'accroître inévitablement avec le progrès de l'immigration Sioniste qui amène en Palestine tant d'éléments dangereux et indésirables.

Les inquiétudes des Etats Arabes se trouvent également accrues par le fait que le prétendu Etat d'Israel, que les Sionistes ont proclamé le 14 Mai dernier, n'a été constitué que par la coalition de bandes terroristes qui se sont unies pour résister à la puissance mandatrice et qui conjuguent présentement tous leurs efforts contre les Arabes de Palestine aux fins de les déposséder et de les déloger pour prendre ainsi leurs lieux et place.

Malgré l'échec, par suite de l'opposition Sioniste, de toutes les tentatives faites jusqu'ici pour solutionner le problème Palestinien, les Etats Arabs neurrissaient néanmoins l'espoir de voir le Médiateur des Nations-Unies trouver une solution pacifique susceptible d'être acceptée par les deux parties sur la base juste et équitable sus-rappelée, sauvegardant ainsi l'unité politique de la Palestine et donnant en même temps aux Juifs, dont l'immense majorité est étrangère au pays, tous les

droits/....

droits du citoyen.

Cette lueur d'espoir s'est complètement dissipée des qu'il s'est avéré que les solutions prévues par le Médiateur visaient manifestement à prendre comme base l'idée du partage et la situation de pur fait existant en Palestine et qui n'est que le résultat de l'action terroriste Sioniste - et devant l'obstination des Juifs et leur détermination à crôer, à tout prix, un Etat Sioniste en Palestine grâce aux armes clandestines qu'ils ont su accumuler et aux milliers de combattants qu'ils ont entrainés et équipés pour la lutte.

Il échet de souligner, dans cet ordre d'idées, que les Sionistes ont exploité la trêve pour donner une apparence de légitimité à leur prétendu Etat en essayant, entre autres, de faire participer ce prétendu Etat à des Congrès Internationaux et en faisant admettre par certaines puissances le principe de l'échange des Missions Diplomatiques; Et il es regrettable que certains Etats ont déja décrété cet échange alors qu'il était beaucoup plus conforme à l'esprit de la décision du Conseil de Sécurité du 29 Mai dernier d'attendre, pour ce faire, la fin de la trêve. L'échange des Missions Diplomatiques avec le soi-disant Etat d'Israel ne peut en effet que consolider la position de celui-ci au détriment de la position de l'autre partie.

Ainsi le cours des évènements, depuis le 11 Juin, commencement de la Trêve, a démentré à suffisance que celle-ci n'a été aucunement dans l'intérêt des Arabes, alors que les Sionistes, par contre, en ont réalisé des profits réels et certains grâce à l'aide qu'ils ont obtenu de l'étranger, aux avantages militaires et stratégiques qu'ils ont acquis par leurs violations successives de la trêve au détriment des Armées Arabes, et par les renforts en hommes qu'ils ont reçu par suite de l'immigration Sioniste, qui, durant les quatre semaines de la Trêve a battu tous les précédents records. Ceci est confirmé du reste par les propres déclarations du soi-disant Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du prétendu Etat d'Israel.

Aussi la prolongation de la trêve ne servirait-elle que les intérêts des seuls Sionistes. Elle ne pourrait avoir par contre que les conséquences les plus graves pour les Arabes si, par suite de l''echec définitif des efforts déployés pour résoudre pacifiquement le litige, les hostilités venaient à reprendre. Les échecs répétés auxquels ont abouti jusqu'ici ces efforts et la volonté arrêté de la minorité Juive de Palestine de ne renoncer, ennaucune façon, à ses visées politiques, ne laissent malheureusement aucun doute quant à l'issue finale.

Les Etats Arabes épris de paix et de justice, pacifiques par nature ne demandent pas mieux que d'éviter toute effusion de sang et voir solutionner par les moyens pacifiques, leurs litiges.

Ils ont fait preuve, dès le début de la question Palestinienne, de patience et de bonne volonté. Mais la détermination des Sionistes de dicter leur volonté par la force aux Arabes de Palestine, qui constituent l'immense majorité de la population du pays, leur exploitation perfide de la trêve et le peu de respect qu'ils ont témoigné pour ses clauses et conditions, - tous ces faits ne laissent au Gouvernement Egyptien ni le choix des moyens ni la liberté d'action.

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN

Amman 68 (10)

To Hugh A

En clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 1910 D. 4.30 p.m. July 9th, 1948.
July 9th, 1948. R. 6.10 a.m. July 10th, 1948.

Repeated Saving to Haifa, Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, British Middle East Office Cairo and Washington.

IMPORTANT
GIANT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 1910 July 9th repeated for information Saving to Haifa, Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, British Middle East Office Cairo and Washington.

My telegram No. 1875. 115

Palestine.

Following is text of reply from Provisional Government of Israel to Mediator's proposals for future settlement of Palestine (circulated to Security Council as document S/870).

[Begins]

On behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, I have the honour to offer the following observations on the suggestions presented by you under cover of your letter of June 27th as a possible basis for discussion in discharge of your task to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".

1. The Provisional Government of Israel noted with surprise that your suggestions appear to ignore the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29th, 1947, which remains the only internationally valid adjudication on the question of the future government of Palestine. The Provisional Government also regrets to find that, in formulating your suggestions, you do not appear to have taken into account fully the outstanding facts of the situation in Palestine, namely, the effective establishment of the sovereignty of the State of Israel within the area assigned to it in the Assembly's resolution, and other territorial changes which resulted from the repulse of the attack launched against Israel by Palestinian Arabs and by the neighbouring Arab States.

2. The Provisional Government of Israel begs to recall that the Jewish people accepted the settlement laid down in the General Assembly's resolution as a compromise entailing heavy sacrifices on its part, and the territory assigned to the Jewish State as an irreducible minimum. It is indeed the conviction of the Provisional Government of Israel that the territorial provisions affecting the

/Jewish State now stand

Jewish State now stand in need of improvement, in view both of the perils revealed by Arab aggression to the safety and integrity of Israel and of the results achieved by Israel in repelling this aggression. In this connexion, the Provisional Government of Israel desires to point out that the territorial settlement laid down in the resolution was based on partition of western Palestine between the Jewish people and the Arab population of Palestine. Inclusion of the Arab portion of Palestine in the territory of one of the neighbouring Arab States would fundamentally change the context of the boundary problem.

3. The Provisional Government of Israel cannot agree to any encroachment upon or limitation of the free sovereignty of the people of Israel in its independent state. While it is the basic aim and policy of Israel to establish relations of peace and amity with her neighbours on the basis of closest possible collaboration in all fields, international arrangements which may be necessary to give effect to this policy cannot be imposed upon Israel, but can only be entered into as a result of an agreement negotiated between the interested parties as free and sovereign States.

4. The Provisional Government of Israel would be ready to accept the provisions concerning economic union as formulated in the Assembly's resolution if all their basic premises were to materialise. This is not, however, the eventuality envisaged in your suggestions. The partner state whom the Israelis are invited to join in a union is both in its political identity and in its geographical dimensions wholly different from the Arab State provided for in the resolution. Jewish consent to economic union in the context of the resolution cannot therefore be binding in the new situation. It must now be left to the free and unfettered discretion of the Government of Israel in the exercise of its sovereign rights to determine what arrangements should govern Israel's relations with her neighbour or neighbours in the field of economic co-operation.

5. The Provisional Government of Israel must be particularly emphatic in its opposition to any infringement of Israel's independence and sovereignty as regards her immigration policy. Complete and unqualified freedom to determine the size and composition of Jewish immigration was the very essence of the Jewish claim to statehood. Recognition of the moral validity and the practical urgency of that claim in connexion with the issue of immigration lay at the roots of its acceptance by the international world. There can be no question of any Israeli Government accepting the slightest derogation in favour of any joint or international body from Israel's sovereignty as regards control of her immigration policy.

6. The Provisional Government of Israel was deeply wounded by your suggestion concerning the future of the City of Jerusalem, which it regards as disastrous. The

/idea that the relegation

idea that the relegation of Jerusalem to Arab rule might form part of a peaceful settlement could be conceived only in utter disregard of history and of the fundamental facts of the problem which are:

(a) The association of Judaism with the Holy City.

(b) The unique place occupied by Jerusalem in Jewish history and present-day Jewish life.

(c) Jewish inhabitants constituted a two-thirds majority in the City before the commencement of Arab aggression, and this proportion has greatly increased since then as a result of Arab evacuation.

(d) The whole of Jerusalem with only a few minor exceptions is now in Jewish hands.

(e) And not least, the fact that after an exhaustive study of the problem and as a result of the overwhelming consensus of Christian opinion in its midst, the General Assembly resolved that Jerusalem be placed under an international regime.

The Provisional Government of Israel must make it clear that the Jewish people in the State of Israel and the Jews of Jerusalem will never acquiesce in the imposition of Arab domination over Jerusalem, no matter what formal municipal autonomy and what right of access to Holy places the Jews of Jerusalem might be allowed to enjoy. They will resist any such imposition with all the force at their command. The Provisional Government of Israel regrets having to say that your startling suggestion regarding Jerusalem, by encouraging false Arab hopes and wounding Jewish feelings, is likely to achieve the reverse of the pacifying effect which you undoubtedly had in mind.

7. The Provisional Government of Israel does not find it necessary at this stage to comment upon the other points raised in your suggestions as it hopes that examination of its present observations on the major aspects of the scheme for a settlement tentatively outlined by you may cause you to reconsider your whole approach to the problem.

[Ends]

Please repeat Saving to Haifa, Jerusalem, Cairo, British Middle East Office Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda as my telegrams Nos. 24, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 3, 3, 14.

[Repeated Saving as requested]

sssss

(W/T)

TELEGRAM.

11

No.S/1014/48.
Cypher (M/OTP)
Code
Cheax

From:— H.M. Minister, BEIRUT *To:*—H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 23.7.48 (11.15) Received 23.7.48 (11.15)

No. 114 of 23.7.48.

SECRET.

Addressed to F.O. telegram No.541 of 21.th July repeated for information to Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Jerusalem, Cairo, Jedda, B.M.E.O.

LIGHT.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

(Transferred to Folio 1 of S/1082/48)

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

(S/1014/48)

TELEGRAM.

12

Cypher (M/OTP)

~~Code~~

~~Clerk~~

From:— S.ofS. F.O. LONDON. *To:*—H.M. Ministr, AMMAN.

Despatched 24.7.48 (09.28) Received 24.7.48 (09.35)

No. 734 of 23.7.1948.

SECRET.
GIANT.

Following received from UKDEL N.Y. telegram No.1998 of July 22nd.

BEGINS. Repeated for information B.M.E.O., Jerusalem, Beirut, Amman, and SAVING to Washington Embassy, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jedda, Haifa (1)

Palestinian Arab Refugees.

(Transferred to File No.S/1082/48)

Wt. 45504. D1691. 30m 8/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

13

Cypher

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To:*— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 24/7/48 (13.00) **Received** 24/7/48 (12.30)

No. 603 **of** 24th July, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 603 of 24th July.
Repeated for information to

Baghdad	No. 133
Beirut	No. 132
Cairo	No. 176
Damascus	No. 115
Jeddah	No. 102
B.M.E.O.	No. 168
Jerusalem	No. 151

11

SECRET.

I would like to associate myself with Beirut telegram No. 541 to you (of 21st July, 1948).

Not only has our "stock" with the Arabs seldom stood lower than at present owing to the arms embargo and in the case of Transjordan, the withholding of the subsidy the necessity for which will never be understood by the Arab public, but the refugee problem is proving beyond the competance of the Arab Governments. In Transjordan and the Arab occupied areas of Palestine the refugees are rapidly becoming desperate and appear to be largely dependent on appeals to the charity of local merchants whose resources are not inexhaustable.

An act of generosity by the British public at the present juncture would be timely both politically (from the point of view of Anglo-Arab relations) and financially.

Foreign Office please pass to Jeddah and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 102 and 151 respectively.

(CMPG/HLM/HA).

Wt. 44976. D'880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

14

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M. Ambassador, BAGHDAD *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 24/7/48 (22.10) Received 25/7/48 (08.45)

No. 137 of 23rd July, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 806 of July 23rd.
Repeated for information B.M.E.O., Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Saving to Jedda and Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 796.

Internal Situation.

All three parties and(1) the Journalists association took part this morning in the silent demonstration (gp.undec.) with the Iraqi Government's opposition to accepting the Cease Fire in Palestine. The Governments(1 permission had been obtained and no incidents have been(1) reported.

2. The ultimate intention of the parties in staging this orderly procession may be to get the public "demonstration - minded" again so that popular feeling over Palestine may be exploited against the Government later. It is significant that the parties are now showing signs of closer co-operation than during recent months.

(HLM/IL/HA).

Wt. 44976. D1680. 14m in 2 sorts 4/43.

8. 15

SECRET

(S/1014/48.)

BRITISH LEGATION,

AMMAN.

25th July, 1948.

My dear Burrows,

I write to give you the background of our local worries during the last fortnight. Please forgive me if it involves too much recapitulation of what you already know.

2. When Tewfiq Pasha and Fawzi went off for the Political Committee of the Arab League meeting in Cairo at the beginning of July the Prime Minister stated he was going to work for the prolongation of the truce and at that time there did not seem much doubt that it would duly continue. Egypt was known to be anxious about its own military position, and the Iraqi General here had no illusions either about the strength of the Iraqi forces or the overall ability of the Arab armies as a whole. It was only after the Committee had been sitting for some days that disquieting rumours of impending warlike decisions started to percolate through to Amman. As however both the King and the Prime Minister had been fully and frequently apprised of the gravity of the Arab Legion's supply position, we could not believe that Tewfiq Pasha would allow himself to be committed by his colleagues to an apparently suicidal step without at least giving the King plenty of warning which way the wind was blowing. He did not however do so and on July 7th when the King realised he was liable to go to war again in thirty six hours he sent the message reported in Sir Alec's telegram No.339 of 8th July, 1948, which resulted in Tewfiq Pasha's offer of resignation. Tewfiq did not in fact return and describe what had happened until the evening of July 8th and the truce was due to come to an end early the following morning.

f 11
S/1014/48
(12

3. After the Prime Minister had recounted how he found himself to his surprise in a minority of one and explained, in my opinion correctly, that an open admission of the fact at that juncture could do nothing but harm if Transjordan was not also in a position to leave the League and make a separate peace, he succeeded in provisionally re-establishing his position with the King whose conscience was most uneasy at the recollection of various belligerent statements on his own part during his trip to Riad and Baghdad.

Some damage had been done to Tewfiq's authority by the intervention of the former Prime Minister Samir Rifai who, taking advantage of Tewfiq's absence, indicated to the King in a private conversation that with a few amendments the Bernadotte proposals offered King Abdullah all he had ever asked. He also pointed out that it showed possibly excessive zeal for Arab unity on the part of Tewfiq to issue a statement condemning the Bernadotte proposals "in toto"

(which/...2

R.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

(which inter alia gave the King the city of Jerusalem) when the King, who was absent in Riad at the time, had not even been given a chance of seeing them. Samir also made some capital of the fact that Tewfiq had agreed without reference to Amman to the establishment of a civil administration in Palestine directly responsible to the Arab League, thereby further diminishing the King's chances of obtaining the Arab areas of Palestine.

It was also partly on Samir's suggestion as well as from other more responsible sources that when the King realised that he was irrevocably committed to continue the war, he sent urgently for Bernadotte to discuss the situation and the meeting reported in Sir Alec's telegram No.546 of 9th July, 1948, took place which eventually resulted in the Security Council's resolution of July 16th.

4. In the meantime the King and Prime Minister having both been reminded of the fact that the Arab Legion had shells and mortars sufficient for a few days only, each claimed credit for arranging for a further session of the Political Committee which was originally to have met at Alley on July 12th or 13th with the object of reconsidering the position and if necessary discussing ways and means of making good this deficit. In the event this meeting took place in Amman. Azzam arrived here on July 12th representing not only himself but also the Egyptian Government, full of suspicions as to what plots the King might have been making with Bernadotte and determined to ensure that the "good work" done at Cairo was not reversed in a moment of panic. Jamil and Riad duly joined the party the next day and Syria and Egypt having made some offhand promises to provide the necessary shells, it was decided to continue with the fighting as originally agreed. The Committee then dispersed pending receipt of some communication from the Security Council.

5. The loss of Ramleh and Lydda occurred on July 12th and was followed by streams of refugees making their way over to Transjordan as best they could. The fact that Glubb had repeatedly warned both King and Government that these towns could not possibly be held in the event of fighting being resumed, was considered in some quarters as evidence that Glubb had deliberately lost them from malice, acting in accordance with instructions from this office to ensure that Transjordan accepted a truce at all costs. Demonstrations against the Arab Legion took place in Nablus and Es Salt and Glubb was sent for to attend an unpleasant interview with the King and Council of Ministers during which it was made clear that his stories of ammunition shortages were disbelieved as being part of British propaganda. The King took the opportunity of openly telling Glubb that there was no need for him to remain in office, unless he wished. Full details of this meeting were known throughout the Amman "Suq" the same day, presumably having been circulated by the junior members of the Cabinet with quotations of the "official view" that Glubb and the British officers were purposely leading the Arab Legion to destruction in the interests of the "policy" of His Majesty's Government. Having prudently thrown the blame on those in no position to reply the Ministers doubtless felt themselves suitably insulated against public criticism in the all too probable event of a military collapse.

Further/...3

6. Further demonstrations took place the next day against Glubb personally and the British in general on account of the news of withholding the subsidy by His Majesty's Government and were accompanied by wild talk in the town of impending reprisal assassinations of individuals among the Arab Legion officers and British residents in Amman. Glubb informs me that on that day while he was visiting the Front, the inhabitants of every village he passed through on the road both in Palestine and Transjordan appeared to be in a state of hysteria, spitting at him and calling him a traitor.

7. The Political Committee was by now again in session, this time at Alley, considering the Security Council's order to cease fire. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister being away at the meeting there was, as is usual in Amman on these occasions, no one left behind who was either able or willing to take decisions or to give any guidance to the public, who were getting into a dangerously truculent frame of mind. The vilification of the British direction of the Arab Legion continued unchecked and a situation was clearly developing where the result of further military reverses might become serious.

8. The loss of Ramleh and Lydda had had the effect of lengthing the front west and north of Jerusalem which was being held by the Arab Legion obliging Glubb to put his only reserve regiment into the line and consequently leaving nothing over which could be used to check any major Jewish break through which might occur.

Unfortunately it proved to be just on this front that the bulk of the Jewish pressure was exerted so that not only was Ramallah, and with it the entire Arab line, in danger if the Jews broke through but the dwindling supplies of ammunition at the disposal of the Arab Legion began to be used up at an alarming rate. The Syrians and Egyptians who had promised supplies proved broken reeds. The former first of all offered some very old Belgian ammunition which fitted no artillery now in the field, and when an Arab Legion officer was sent to Damascus at the suggestion of the Syrian Government to discuss the problem, he was first of all held up six hours at the frontier and when eventually received by the Prime Minister was bluntly told to go away and that no help would be forthcoming. The interview was conducted by the Syrian Prime Minister with a degree of discourtesy rare among Arabs. The Egyptians with a parade of generosity returned from the supplies they had previously stolen from the Arab Legion on the "Ramses" a total of four hundred shells delivered over a period of six days. The daily expenditure at this period was five hundred shells so that the assistance was not substantial.

9. On the morning of Saturday July 17th Glubb informed me that he had sufficient artillery ammunition to hold the line until the evening of the following day, after which there was nothing that could be done. As he had written orders from the King in no circumstances to retreat there appeared, unless there was a truce, no obvious alternative to the total isolation of the Legion in the Area of Bab el Wad.

On the/...4

On the Sunday morning there were further demonstrations in Salt and Amman against the British and the rumours then current, that a truce was going to be accepted at the Alley meeting. Glubb informed me that the Jews were attacking heavily north of Latrun and confirmed that his artillery ammunition would give out that evening, or next day.

I visited the King later in the morning and found he needed no convincing as to the gravity of the situation. He assured me he was doing all he could. This consisted apparently of sending a telegram to the Prime Minister at Alley regularly every hour urging him to insist on the acceptance of the truce. He sent an extra one in my presence as a make-weight and a sign of good faith. The regular arrival of these telegrams was latter confirmed to me by Tewfiq Pasha in terms of some exasperation.

10. The eventual happy outcome and acceptance of the cease fire arrived none too soon. In the event the Arab Legion defeated all Jewish attacks on July 18th, and maintained all their positions. They could not have continued to do so, however, as ammunition was almost exhausted. Up to the present, the indignation thwarted "patriotism" in the town, though still intense and bitter against the British, has not caused any explosion. With the cease fire it will be possible to strengthen the security forces in the capital which had previously been dangerously thin on the ground, and provided fighting does not break out again we can safely say that we have survived this particular crisis.

11. Although British "stock" has never stood lower in Transjordan than at present and we are for the first time in this country universally unpopular, these phases of opinion will not necessarily prove durable, and the crisis has at least had the advantage of bringing the King and the Prime Minister a lot closer to reality than they had previously reached.

I am sending copy of this letter to British Middle East Office Cairo.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) C. M. PIRIE-GORDON

CMPG/HA.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

17

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To:*— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 25/7/48 (12.45) Received 25/7/48 (13.00)

No. 605 of 25th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 605 of 25th July.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No. 118
Washington No. 77
Baghdad No. 134
Beirut No. 133
Cairo No. 178
Damascus No. 116
Jeddah No. 103
B.M.E.O. No. 169
Jerusalem No. 153

SECRET.
Your telegram No. 654 (of 8th July, 1948).

The Prime Minister has asked if in the light of the acceptance by the Arab League of the Security Council's order to cease fire it will now be possible for you to pay the instalment of the Grant-in-Aid which fell due on July 12th. He again made the point that the Arab Legion had still not penetrated into any areas allotted to the Jews under the Partition Scheme and that Transjordan had obeyed all orders from Lake Success.

I pointed out the difficulties of the position but the Prime Minister insisted that if it was not possible to make the grant now he must ask some indication of the future circumstances in which you would feel able to resume payments.

I told the Prime Minister it was not reasonable to expect you to bind yourself to a set of hypothetical circumstances. I feel however that clarification of policy as to the payment of the grant would be most helpful.

Nothing was said about supplies of arms and ammunition

F.O. please pass Important to UKDEL New York, Washington, Jeddah and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 118, 77, 103 and 153 respectively.

(CMPG/HLM/HA)

Wt. 44976. D'880. 14m in 2 scres 4/48.

Chfs. S/8773/46. S/1058/48.

(W/T) FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, BAGHDAD. ***To:—*** H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN.

Despatched 26/7/48 (09.28) **Received** 26/7/48 (09.30)

No. 138 **of** 24th July, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.809 of July 24th. Repeated for information Cairo, B.M.E.O., Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda and Saving to Jerusalem, Washington and UKDEL New York.

My telegram No.794: Palestine.

I saw the Prime Minister this morning and expressed my surprise at the attitude he had adopted at ALEY. He had previously given the Ambassador the impression that he was in favour of accepting the cease fire.(1) He replied when, he realized that the majority were in favour of acceptance he saw and seized an opportunity for increasing his political STATURE in Iraq, where public opinion was strongly in favour of continuing the fighting. I said that if the Security Council insisted on receiving a more specific reply than the interim reply that Iraq had already sent, he would be placed in an awkward situation. He said that Iraq need send no further reply because they were covered by the Arab League reply which had accepted the Truce.

2. The Prime Minister professed to believe that the Palestine question could now be safely left on one side and he would be able to turn his attention to internal affairs. He himself did not intend to represent Iraq at further Arab League discussions on Palestine.

3. It is difficult to assess the Prime Minister's real attitude. He has twice given us the impression that he would urge moderation at the Arab League meetings,(1) and has twice acted in the opposite sense. On the other hand at a secret meeting of both the Houses of Parliament held on July 15th to discuss Palestine he is reliably reported to have spoken moderately and realistically.

4/...2

Wt. 44976. D.880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/43.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

4. The Prime Minister would not be drawn on the Regent's personal attitude. It appears however from other sources that the latter is adopting an intransigeant line and has carried this to the point of open disagreemen with King Abdullah. I sounded the Prime Minister this morning on Iraqi-Transjordan relations, which I hoped would not suffer from the disagreement at Aley. He assured me that this apparent disagreement would not widen into a serious split(1).

F.O. please pass Saving to Washington and UKDEL New York as my telegrams Nos.14 and 11.

192

(HLM/PW/HA).

Wt. 44976. D.880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/43.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1000/47.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

Code

Clear

From :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To :—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 26/7/48 (10.27) Received 26/7/48 (10.30)

No. 740 of 24th July, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Amman telegram No.740 of July 24th.
Repeated for information B.M.E.O., Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and Saving to Washington UKDEL New York, Angora and Haifa.

Transjordan Government having complied with the Security Council's demand for a cease fire there is no reason why we should suspend payment of the financial assistance payable to them under the terms of the treaty. Arrangements are therefore being made to pay forthwith the instalment of the subsidy due on July 12th and to make payment out of the equipment grant for lorries ordered from Messrs. ROOTES. Please inform Transjordan Government that this is being done.

Copy to:- S/1014/48.

(IL/HA).

Wt. 44976. D1880. 14m In 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1000/47. TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 26/7/48 (10.07) Received 26/7/48 (10.30)

No. 741 of 24th July, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Please telegraph as soon as possible how much of the subsidy should be remitted to Amman, how much to the Transjordan(l) Agents, and how much to(l) War Office (see my despatch No.68 of May 12th).

(PW/HLM/HA).

Copy to:- S/1014/48.

Wt. 44976. D:880. 4m in 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1000/47. TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

Code

Clear

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched m26/7/48 (10.18) Received 26/7/48 (10.30)

No. 738 of 24th July, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Addressed to Washington telegram No.81(1)83 of July 24th.
Repeated for information UKDEL New York and Amman.

Financial(1) assistance to the Transjordan Government

In the course of his speech in the Security Council on May 27th the United Kingdom Delegate Acting on instructions stated that the next instalment of the subsidy payable to the Transjordan Government under the Anglo-Transjordan treaty fell due for payment on July 12th and that this financial obligation would be reviewed before that date in the light of the decisions taken by the United Nations.

2. On July 12th the situation in Palestine was obscure and was under consideration by the Security Council. Payment of the next instalment of the subsidy was accordingly not made on that date.

3. Since then the Transjordan Government have complied with the demand of the Security Council for a cease fire. There is therefore no justification for withholding further the financial assistance payable to them under the terms of the treaty of alliance. Arrangements are therefore being made to resume payment.

4. I am anxious that the United States Government should be aware of our action before it becomes public. Please therefore inform the state Department of the above

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COPY TO: S/1004/48.

(HLM/PW/HA).

Wt. 44976. D1880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— H.M.Minister, BEIRUT. ***To:—*** H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 25/7/48 (17.40) **Received** 26/7/48 (09.03)

No. 118 **of** 25th July, 1948.

RESTRICTED.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.547 of June 25th.

Repeated for information Jerusalem, Cairo, Jedda, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus and New York Delegation.

The Mediator arrived in Beirut at one p.m. Saturday. He was invited to the Lebanon by the President at the (request of)(2) AZZAM Pasha who did not wish to accept an invitation of the Mediator's to go to Rhodes. The Mediator is expected to see the President of the Republic during the week end and to return to Rhodes on Tuesday.

Foreign Office pass UKDEL New York as my telegram 66.

(IL/HLM/HA).

Wt. 44976. D1680. 14m In 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

20

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— H.M. Con-General, JERUSALEM.

To:— H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 26/7/48 (20.35) **Received** 27/7/48 (08.30)

No. 174 **of** 26th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.318 Important of July 26th.
Repeated to Cairo, B.M.E.O.,Cairo, UKDEL New York Important and to Amman(1), Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Jedda.

MARROUN, former Arab District Officer in BETHLEHEM who is carrying on the civil administration under many (forces - Sic), has told a member of my staff that the inhabitants of Bethlehem and BEIT JALAH are anxious that these towns be included in the demilitarized area of Jerusalem.(1) Apart from the question of the Holy places the vast majority of the inhabitants are Christians. Marroun has approached the APOSTOLIC delegate, the Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchs the custodian of the Holy land all of whom support the idea. the three former have promised to make a joint approach to the Mediator and are meeting tomorrow to discuss it. The precise extent of the demilitarized area to be added to the town planning area of Jerusalem needs further discussion. Marroun thinks it should include ARTAS, containing SOLOMONS pools one of Jerusalem's water supplies, and the sole water supply of Bethlehem, and AIN KARIM containing the Christian Holy places.

2. Apart from the Christian interests there are obvious advantages in extending the area of(1) demilitarization and unless I receive contrary instructions I propose to support the present suggestions when the opportunity offers. I saw the Armenian Patriarch this morning and found him well disposed to the suggestion made to him by Marroun.

3. A prominent Moslem told a member of my staff that the two essentials for demilitarization of Jerusalem were that the Arabs who have left their homes e.g. in KATAMO(M - Sic), be allowed to return and that those whose property

has been/...2

Wt. 44976. D1880. 4m in 2 sorts 4/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

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of

has been looted under Jewish occupation receive compensation. The latter condition did not cover those whose property had been destroyed in the course of military action.

Foreign Office please pass UKDEL New York Important and to Jedda as my telegrams 66 and 39 respectively.

Cairo please pass B.M.E.O. Important as my telegram 38.

(CJB/IL/HA).

Wt. 44976. D1880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/43.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

8. 21

K 6

Cypher

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires AMMAN. ***To:—*** S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 27/7/48 (16.52) **Received** 27/7/48 (13.00)

No. 611 **of** 27th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.611 of 27th July.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.119
Washington No. 78
Baghdad No.136
Beirut No.135
Cairo No.181
Damascus No.117
Jeddah No.105
B.M.E.O. No.171
Jerusalem No.154

SECRET.

Unconfirmed reports from various sources indicate that considerable supplies of arms and ammunition either have or are about to arrive at Basra and that the Iraqis have plans for starting the fighting again as soon as they feel themselves satisfactorily re-equipped. Some colour is lent to these reports by the fact an additional Iraqi battalion passed through Amman yesterday and further convoys are going through this morning.

It would be interesting to know if His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad has any confirmation of supplies arriving at Basra or of further warlike intentions of the Iraqi Government.

Foreign Office please pass Important to UKDEL New York, Washington, Jeddah and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos.119, 78, 105 and 154 respectively.

Copy to:- S/1058/48.

(CMPG/HA).

Wt. 44976. D1890. 14m in 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

22

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M. Ambassador, BAGHDAD *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 27/7/48 (18.30) Received 28/7/48 (08.10)

No. 139 of 27th July, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.814 of July 27th. Repeated for information UKDEL New York, Washington, B.M.E.O., Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Beirut and Saving to Jedda, Jerusalem and Haifa.

UKDEL New York telegram No.1996 to Foreign Office.

S.S. BARDISTAN and DERRYHEEN left United Kingdom on April 16th and April 27th and arrived at Basrah on June 6th and June 14th respectively. Both ships therefore left(1) the United Kingdom before the end of the Palestine mandate.

2. The Shipping Agents(1) cannot confirm that these two ships carried warlike stores, but the Ministry of Defence have told the Military Attaché that(1) the two ships did in fact land warlike stores from the United Kingdom at Basrah during the truce.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams 49 and 68 respectively.

Copy to:- S/1058/48.

(JFS/HLM/HA)

Wt. 44976. D.880. 4m in 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

(S/1014/48)

TELEGRAM.

27

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Cipher~~

From:— H.M. Charge d'Affaires AMMAN.

To:— F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 27.7.48 (22.38)

Received (27.7.48 - 22.20)

No. 613 of 27th July, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.
TOP SECRET.

The Prime Minister has requested that the following message be sent from him to Mr. Bevin.

BEGINS. "The military position of the Arab Legion is desperate owing to the exhaustion of equipment and of all ammunition both for artillery and small arms. Neither His Majesty nor myself nor any eventual successor to me in the office of the Prime Minister have any intention of resuming fighting. Should a majority decision of the Arab League in the future demand a resumption of the war we intend as a pre-requisite to our cooperation to insist on supplies of money and war material from the other Arab States with which we know full well they will never be able to comply. If the other Arab States should nevertheless still wish to continue fighting Transjordan will stand alone in compliance with the orders of the United Nations unless our requests are met by the Arab States.

2. In the meantime if we should ourselves be attacked by the Jews we are defenceless, and not only would we be unable to maintain ourselves in Palestine for a single day but we would have difficulty even in protecting the road to Amman. We are faced with the danger not only from the official forces of the so-called State of Israel butalso from the irresponsible and unofficial formations of the Irgun and the Stern who may well fall upon us independently if any suspicion of our helpless situation were to reach them.

I therefore /

Wt. 44976. D1880. 14m In 2 sorts 4/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

3. I therefore implore you to provide us with the means of saving our joint interests in the Middle East and the very existence of Transjordan.

4. If your undertaking to the United Nations will not permit of your supplying us direct then we at least demand that sufficient war material to enable us to repel Jewish attacks be made immediately available to us in case of need at the R.A.F. Camp in Amman." ENDS.

For my comments please see my immediately following telegram. —— 24

(CMPG/CJB/MH).

Wt. 44976. D'880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/48.

(W/T)

(S/1014/48)

TELEGRAM.

24

Cypher

~~Cypher~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M. Charge d'Affaires *To:*— F.O. LONDON.
AMMAN.

Despatched Received

No. 614 of 27th July, 1948.

23

IMMEDIATE.
TOP SECRET.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Tewfiq Pasha's description of the dangers of the military situation is not repeat not overdrawn and is fully confirmed by Glubb.

38

2. I agree that the Arab League would never produce adequate supplies of arms and money and I believe the Prime Minister to be sincere when he states that Transjordan would then take an independent stand in the event of the Arab League still deciding to resume hostilities. It is however not now possible to say whether Tewfiq Pasha or any subsequent Prime Minister would in fact be able to withstand public opinion in such an event. In this connection I would refer you to paragraph 2 of Sir Alec Kirkbride's telegram No.547 (of 9th July, 1948) and although Glubb has since told me that he is more sanguine as to the Arab Legion accepting such circumstances it is obvious that the local reactions to a public defection from the Arab cause by the King and Government would be considerable.

3. I do however believe that there is real danger of an attack by some of the Jewish dissident groups on the Arab Legion front as there is now some reason to believe that the lack of ammunition is known to the other side and I therefore ask as a matter of urgency that the decision to refuse Sir Alec Kirkbride's earlier request for supplies to be available at the R.A.F. be reconsidered.

4. If you are able /

Wt. 44976. D!880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched	Received
No.	of

4. If you are able to agree to emergency supplies being held at the R.A.F. Station Amman for use in the event of an unprovoked attack by Jews on the Arab Legion's positions, I assume that the Group Captain would be instructed to accept my authority to release them to the Arab Legion should the necessity arise. I should obviously take no steps without your prior authority.

Ref: S/1058/48.

(CMPG/HDLM/MH)

Wt. 44976. D'880. 14m in 2 sorts 4/48.

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 735

Cipher Office Serial No. [redacted]

& 21

Date 29/7

To: A	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
		1005
From: Cairo	Originator's No. Shuttlf.	Number of Groups 130

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority
Pro	Important

1	21129	added Haifa tel 84	29 July		4
2	refld for info to Amman. For MARRIOTT				8
3	from AIR ATTACHE please pass				12
4	to captain MORRIS for UNITED				16
5	NATIONS MEDIATOR begins. Subject				20
6	austers for U.N. observers. Royal				24
7	air force have arranged to				28
8	make available 4 repeat 4				32
9	Auster aircraft with		UN		36
10	markings on same bases as				40
11	during previous travel. Aircraft				44
12	ferried by Royal air force pilots				48
13	will land at Amman midday				52
14	31st July. complete with necessary				56
15	spares for daily overhaul for handing				60
16	over to UN pilots. Request UN pilots				64
17	report to officer commanding				68
18	RAF communication flight				72
19	Amman who has full administrative				76
20	and operational details. Campbell.				80
21					84
22					88
23					92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To* :— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 29/7/48 (18.15) Received 29/7/48 (18.05)

No. 618 of 29th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT.

SECRET.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Bernadotte is arriving in Amman on Sunday and will stay the night. I expect he will almost certainly call at this office during his visit. Are there any particular points that should be "put across" to him if opportunity offers.

(CMPG/CJB/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

CIC 26

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To :—* S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 29/7/48 (21.52) Received 29/7/48 (19.00)

No. 617 of 29th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.617 of 29th July.
Repeated for information to

UKDEL New York	No.120
Washington	No. 79
Baghdad	No.137
Beirut	No.138
Cairo	No.182
Damascus	No.118
Jeddah	No.106
B.M.E.O.	No.173
Jerusalem	No.158

SECRET.

Further to my telegram No.611 (of 27th July, 1948).

Further reinforcements to the Iraqi Army continue to pass through Amman and it is estimated by the Arab Legion that there must have been between three and four thousand since the beginning of the truce.

Many of the Iraqi Army personnel in the town are vociferously hostile to both branches of the Hashimite House whom they accuse of being in the pay of the British and even working with the Jews.

Foreign Office please pass Important to UKDEL New York, Washington, Jeddah and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos.120, 79, 106 and 158 respectively.

(CMPG/CJB/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

CJC
K & L
27

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:—H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, BAGHDAD. *To:*— H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN.

Despatched 29/7/48 (09.00) Received 29/7/48 (09.35)

No. 140 of 28th July, 1948.

SECRET.
Addressed to F.O. telegram No.(1) 818 of July 28th.
Repeated for information to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, B.M.E.O., Jeddah, Jerusalem, Washington and UKDEL New York.

27

Amman telegram No.611 to you:

The Iraq Army and Palestine.

I cannot (gp.undec. ? believe intended) that warlike supplies have(1) recently arrived(1) in Basrah or are(1) expected shortly(1)? but I am making enquiries. I should have thought that any considerable shipment would be of United Kingdom origin and I am not aware that any warlike stores likely to be consigned to Basrah have been purchased elsewhere. Since therefore the consignments in addition to those reported in my telegram No.8(1)14 left the United Kingdom before the suspension of the (2 gps.undec.)s and are still at sea, I should regard reports contained in the Amman telegram under reference as pious hopes designed to raise morale.

2. It is true that the fifth Brigade group has recently been despatched to Palestine. The intentions of the Iraqi Government are now obscure, probably thanks(1) to its members. But on the present showing it seems unlikely that they intend to resume fighting(1) in the near future. At the same time unless there is a real threat of international military sanctions it is difficult to see how(1) they will dare to abandon the fight finally, by a withdrawal of their(1) forces(1) from Palestine. (Their)(2) stand at ALEY has made REALISTIC action more(1) difficult for them than ever.

F.O. please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.50 and 69.

Copy to:- S/1058/48.

(CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

CJC 28

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN.

Despatched 30/7/48 (12.20) Received 30/7/48 (12.25)

No. 753 of 29th July, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.
CONFIDENTIAL.
MANDATE.
Addressed to Cairo telegram No.1306 of July 29th. and to Tehran, Jedda, Baghdad, Beirut, Addis Ababa, Amman, Damascus and Khartoum.

My telegram No.1239. — 74 13th

It is more than ever desirable to combat in advance the growing hostility of Arab opinion against H.M.G. as a result of the action by the United Nations over Palestine and our attitude to this. This hostility is likely in the first instance to centre round the non provision of arms(1) and the accusation that we have broken(1) faith and our treaties. We should(1) point out that in all our recent treaties with the Arab States there is a clause showing that other clauses are subject to any overriding decisions taken by the United Nations of which we are a member and supporter. While in the old treaties similar clauses exist with regard to League of Nations which has now given way to the United Nations. In any case when(1) nations(1) signed the charter of the United Nations they assumed obligations overrunning all their other previous obligations.

Where possible irresponsible reporting by local press on military operation in Palestine should be critisized and it should be shown up as having created a false picture in the minds of the Arabs of victory while the true state of affairs was very different. Indeed our advice to the Arab states (gp.undec.) assisted in arriving at the present Cease fire may have saved them(1) from considerable(1) losses both politically and(TW) materially. Had they been branded as the aggressors by the Security Council a flow of

Wt. 45504. D.891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

arms might have been obtained by their opponents which might have included airplanes on a scale which would have threatened the Arab cities with most WOEFUL damage and loss of life(1) and this danger still exists if hostilities are resumed.(1)

You should(1) endeavour by all means to counter any suggestions that our arms embargo was instituted in pique and as a reprisal for any Arab attitude agreements new treaties or negotiations over the Sudan (? gp. omitted) (mut.gps.) (? .N.P.)

Finally you could recall the statements made at Lake Success showing support for or sympathy with the Arab point of view and especially anything which Sir A.Cadogan may(1) say with regard to the plight of the Arab refugees from Palestine and that in the case of Transjordan the instalment of the subsidy due on July 12th is being paid.

(Gp.undec.) the opportunity offers, and at your descression, it might be possible to review the steps in the negotiation to date and to recapitulate the assistance(we have - Sic)gained in following our advice and what they have(1) lost by ignoring it.

Cairo please pass KHARTOUM as my telegram 19229 and Personal SMITH-ROSS. GHQ., MELF.

(JFS/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

(29)

~~Cypher~~

~~Code~~

Clear

From :— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To* :— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 30/7/48 (12.40) Received 30/7/48 (12.30)

No. 620 of 30th July, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for Bunche United Nations Rhodes from Shamsee - Begins.

Transjordan Government informed the Jews are preparing attack on Latrune and Jerusalem. Request you alert observers on both sides. Ready to receive Mediator Sunday noon.

Foreign Office please pass Most Immediate to Rhodes.

(/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From :— H.M. Con. General, JERUSALEM. ***To :—*** H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 30/7/48 (13.18) **Received** 30/7/48 (16.35)

No. 176 **of** 28th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office(1) telegram No.328 of July 28th
Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, B.M.F.O., UKDEL New York.

My telegram No.318.

The demilitarization of Jerusalem.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the Mediator's ill-judged suggestion that Jerusalem should be given to the Arabs rendered vastly more difficult the task not only of internationalising but even of demilitarizing the city. The suggestion has given to the Arabs a renewed impetus to revive the rights which, as reported in my telegrams 196 and 203, they were showing some readiness to forego. The attitude of local Moslems ~~KNOW~~ now appears to be that they should cling to these "rights" oblivious of the facts of their military position. On the other hand the Jews as the truce Commission have stated (see UKDEL New York telegram No.1968 to you), fearing Arab domination in Jerusalem, are now more than ever prepared to do their best to overcome it by force of arms. It is not, indeed, to be excluded that in order to accomplish this without (gp.undec.)ing the entire sympathy of the United Nations, the "provisional Government" may deliberately weaken the HAGANAH in Jerusalem and the liability of the I.Z.L. to fight for the City(1) while lamenting their inability to control these "(? gp. omitted)s" whose concentration in Jerusalem is one of the most sinister factors(1) in the situation. Like MARIA-THERESA with the partition of Poland the "provisional(1) Government" will rather weep but they will take.

2. In these circumstances it will obviously be both

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

both (beforehand - Sic) and unfair for me to carry further the suggestion in my telegram 318 to encourage the Jerusalem Christian minorities to make common cause and lead a movement for the demilitarization and internationalisation of the city, since, if(1) the movement failed, they would be exposed to a basic risk of persecution by either side and more particularly by Moslem(1) Arabs for their betrayal of the "essentially Arab characteristic"(1).

3. At the same time the possibility of the situation deteriorating is very real and (gp.undec.) inevitable early presence of the Mediator here and the prompt despatch of the Security Forces of the United Nations suggested by the Mediator (UKDEL telegram No.1944 paragraph 5).

4. News broadcast by various Middle Eastern and Continental Radio Stations that the Mediator(1) is to return to(1) Sweden (or Switzerland)(1) early August for a prolonged visit is disquieting. If this is not true it should be promptly contradicted since it would argue a somewhat cynical appreciation of the relative importance of his functions as Mediator and as(1) head of the Swedish Red Cross.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.39.

Foreign Office please pass to Jedda and UKDEL as telegrams 40 and 70 respectively.

(JFS/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D189i. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M.Minister, BEIRUT. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 31/7/48 (09.36) **Received** 31/7/48 (09.45)

No. 122 **of** 30th July, 1948.

SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office 560 of July 30th.
Repeated for information Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Jerusalem, Jedda, Cairo, B.M.E.O., Washington and UKDEL New York.

AZZAM Pasha came to see me yesterday before embarking on his return to Egypt by sea as he "wanted at least one long night's rest". He seemed to be very tired and depressed.

2. Foreseeing the rejection by the Jews of the Mediator's Jerusalem proposals he said that if the Arab Legion still persisted in their refusal to fight even if they were to be attacked by the Jews (whom he expects to attempt to make the Arabs (? gp.omitted) from Jerusalem by force) the Arab position would become precarious indeed. The Iraqi Army in the North had been reinforced and was now in a position to hold its ground or even advance! The Egyptian forces in the South had learned a lot from their experience and were better than they had been. But the weak spot was the Arab Legion in the centre(1). When I enquired what King Abdullah thought about this he said "the King is a difficult man to deal with: one day he wants to march to TEL AVIV and the next he wants to withdraw from the fight". As for Brigadier GLUBB he had said they were short of munitions. Then he remarked that it should be borne in mind that some of the Arab regular armies (from which he specifically excluded the Arab Legion whom as you know he tends to regard now as "foreign troops") had only after May 15th had their first taste of active operations in the course of which they had all learned a good deal. He went so far as to say that up to date the guerillas had rendered far more valuable services than any of the regular troops. He elaborated the all too familiar theme that by accepting the advice of His Majesty's Government and accepting the

first/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

first truce the Arabs had seen victory snatched from them ! Now their position had been made infinitely worse by the refusal by their British allies to supply(1) them with arms. The Arabs were in fact without a friend in the world. All the states were young and inexperienced: Syriax and the Lebanon for example were only(1) three years old and even Egypt found herself for the first time for hundreds of years responsible for more than she had ~~done(1)~~ grundec to undertake.

3. I did my best to comfort him and induced him to see xx the value of giving(1) the Mediator a chance to arrive at some constructive conclusion of the whole matter and when he said the Jews were not really so strong as they were popularly supposed to be handed him a copy of the "Cyprus Mail" of July 25th containing a sensational but sufficnetly alarming article by Sydney Smith ((1) Daily Express) on the strength of the ISRAELITE Air Force and Military potential (my telegram No.377 to Foreign Office only(1)). Azzam admitted that the Arab intelligence service was lamentable that their security was nil and that they were at a great disadvantage in having no unified command. He said too that his own position was exceedingly difficult because(1) he had no executive authority and had to devote so much of his time to patching up quarrels between the Arab leaders.

4. On leaving me he deplored the impending retirement of Brigadier CLAYTON as a "real calamity" as he was a man in whom he himself had the most profound confidence.

F.O. please pass Washington and UKDEL New York as my telegrams 63 and 69 respectively.

Cairo please pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram 181.

(JS/IL/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

MESSAGE FORM

(3)

W/T Office Serial No. 758

Cipher Office Serial No. [redacted]

Date 3/7

To: A	BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN 5/10/48 TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT 1935
From: Jerusalem	Originators No.	Number of Groups 30

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority
Pro	Most Immediate

1	17831	addsd	Most Immediate		4
2	Amman	at No 178 July 31st			8
3	reptd	to Private. FO. FO at			12
4	5pm to	me. I shall arrive in			16
5	Amman	about 1130 tomorrow			20
6	August	first.	Consul-general.		24
7					28
8					32
9					36
10					40
11		(Phoned HK Peric Garden			44
12		2000.			48
13					52
14					56
15					60
16					64
17					68
18					72
19					76
20					80
21					84
22					88
23					92
24					96
25					100

33

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

(S)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

33

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. ***To:—*** H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN.

Despatched 31/7/48 (18.05) **Received** 31/7/48 (18.20)

No. 760 **of** 31st July, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Jerusalem telegram No. 575 of July 31st. Repeated for information to Amman, UKDEL New York, Washington, Beirut(1), Baghdad, Damascus, Jedda, Cairo and B.M.E.O.

The Mediator is arriving at Amman tomorrow August 1st and will stay the night. I do not know whether he intends to go to Jerusalem afterwards. Unless you are certain that he will do so and that you will have an opportunity of talking to him there, I think it would be most desirable for you to go to Amman and put certain points to Count BERNADOTTE there.

30

2. I am worried at the evidence of the apparent deterioration of the situation in Palestine, particularly as regards Jerusalem (your telegram No. 328) and the two or three(1) reports of breaches of the truce elsewhere particularly in the South.

3. You should inform the Mediator of my anxieties in regard to Jerusalem on the lines of paragraphs 1 and 3 of your telegram under reference and emphasize the importance I continue to attach to the Mediator establishing himself in Jerusalem and to his securing the necessary security force from the United Nations. What progress can be report in this matter.

4. As regards the observance of the truce you should say that while I realise that Count Bernadotte is using every effort to set up an efficient organisation the delay in dealing with the allegations of past and present infractions of the truce will shortly have the most dangerous effect of destroying the confidence of both sides in the ability of the United Nations to see the

U.N./...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. **of**

United Nations instructions are carried out. We hope that he will be able to convince both sides of this in the very near future.

5. In general while we have seen the advantage in his apparent intention of lowering the tension and slackening the tempo in Palestine by leaving the country for a time and not presenting any more proposals for a month or so, we are sure that he will realize that these advantages will be gained only if he has meanwhile been able to make some progress in regard to Jerusalem and to the setting up of really legal machinery for supervising the truce. Otherwise he may find that(TW) when he is ready to take the next step the situation has meanwhile deteriorated to such an extent that no one is ready any longer to listen to him.

6. You should also inform the Mediator of the statement to be made by Sir A. Cadogan in the Security Council on Palestine in regard to refugees.

7. If for any reason you are unable to proceed to Amman, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires Amman should speak on the above lines(TW) to the Mediator.

(IL/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 750

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

L (R) (34)

Date 31/7

To: A—	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
		1720
From: Beirut	Originators No. Sta 4 Sec AMMAN	Number of Groups 45

Special Instructions Pro

Indication of Priority

1	12330	Addsd to FO tel No		4
2	561 of July 30th reptd for			8
3	info to Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman			12
4	Baghdad, Jedda Damascus,			16
5	BMEO. Unadel. Jerusalem Tel			20
6	No 338 para 4. I endorse			24
7	this views which is widely			28
8	shared here HMMIN			32
9				36
10				40
11				44
12	30			48
13				52
14				56
15				60
16				64
17				68
18				72
19				76
20				80
21				84
22				88
23				92
24				96
25				100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

(S)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

~~Cypher~~

~~Code~~

Clear

From :— H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To :—* H.M. Ambassador, CAIRO.

Despatched 1/8/48 (13.03) Received 1/8/48 (12.58)

No. 184 of 1st August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for Doctor Azcarate U.N. Shepheards Hotel Cairo from Count Bernadotte - Begins.

Heard U.N. Dakota missing on way Haifa to Cairo please wire news immediately to Amman Haifa and Rhodes. If plane missing try to organise search party. Radio said plane crashed near Gaza. Please verify.

(/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

~~Cypher~~

~~Code~~

Clear

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To* :— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 31/7/48 (16.42) Received 31/7/48 (16.30)

No. 623 of 31st July, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Please pass following to Rhodes.

Following from Shamsee to Bunche United Nations Rhodes.

Your cable of twentyeight received.

Governments approval of Mediator's visit Sunday noon already cabled via British and Public Channels. Arrangements made for Seventeen. Attention Barnes Government has no objection to correspondents coming with Mediator but reminds that their messages subject to censorship and Jerusalem trip easy through Arab Legion on their arrival. But no overnight accommodation possible because refugees flood Amman repeat no accommodation available Personal risk end.

Chargé d'Affaires.

(/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

Code

Clear

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. ***To:—*** H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN.

Despatched 1/8/48 (11.15) **Received** 1/8/48 (11.35)

No. 759 **of** 30th July, 1948.

Following sent to Haifa - Begins.

SECRET.

Addressed to Haifa telegram No.352 of July 29th. Repeated for information Baghdad, Washington, Paris, Jerusalem and B.M.E.O.

The plans outlined in my telegram No.223 are no longer practicable in view of the developments of the last few days. It now seems evident that the Jews will insist on the operation of the refinery as a condition of any scheme(1) for the resumption of oil supplies from Haifa. On the other hand the prospects of Iraqi agreement to any scheme(1) whatever have precumably been diminished by the action of the Jews in seizing the crude oil stocks left in Haifa and they will almost certainly not agree to any plans which would(1) not provide(1) direct benefit for the Arab countries.

2. Stocks of crude petroleum lying at Haifa will(1) of course(1) be exhausted in a few days. The companies concerned could raise obstacles in the way of replenishment by the Jews from other sources of their stocks of either crude or refined petroleum, but since they do not have a monopoly of supply they are not in a position to prevent the imports altogehter. If the companies do not co-operate in reopening the refinery the Jews will suffer the disadvantage that they will have to pay considerably higher prices for their oil, but otherwise(1) they are not (like - Sic ? likely intended)to be seriously effected.

3. The companies therefore recomment that they should make a virtue of necessity and attempt to negotiate both a resumption of the flow of oil through the pipeline and the reopening of the refinery under their own control They suggest that this should be done under certain conditions of which the most important are the following.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

(a) The Arab Governments would be given the assurances that the refined petroleum products adequate to meet their normal requirements would be placed at their disposal(1) in Beirut,(1) being taken there by tanker from Haifa(1).

(b) The Jewish authorities would be required to guarantee the safety of European personnel in the REFINERY and at the terminal. They would also be required to respect the freedom of exports clauses in the ~~xix~~ existing agreements concluded(1) with the previous Palestine administration.

(c) As an additional safeguard for the Arabs in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Palestine the companies would guarantee not to hold reserves above an agreed maximum figure either in crude oil tanks at terminal and Refinery or in tanks containing refined products. The Mediator would be asked to supervise the execution of the guarantees.

4. The companies will approach the Jewish authorities and the Iraqi Government on this basis in the near future. When you learn that they have done so, you should speak to the Mediators' representative informing him of the suggestions which the companies are making and asking for his co-operation in accordance with paragraph 3(c) above.

5. I am not repeat not very helpful of Iraqi acceptance for this plan. But if His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Baghdad sees no objection he should support I.P.C(1)'s representations after they have been made with the following arguments.

(a)/...3

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

(a) The Jews cannot in any event be prevented from obtaining all their oil requirements from other sources. Moreover oil imports are nót prohibited or réstricted by the two resolutions of the Security Council.which at present govern the situation in Palestine.

(b) While it is true that the same applies to the Arab countries(l) it would be very much more convenient for some of them to obtain oil from Haifa rather than by import from elsewhere. I understand that Syria and the Lebanon have recently purchased (gp.undec. ? a) quantity of (Roumanians - Sic) oil but that they have had to pay (gp.undec. ? a) prohibitive price for it. If the pipeline and Refinery where reopened the companies would supply the Arab countries through Beirut and would(l) also be able to send motor spirit to Transjordan through the pipeline

(c) The Iraqi Government would obtain royalties again(? . omitted) H.M.G. are ~~seriously~~ seriously concerned by the effect on the European recovery(l) programme (? and the omitted) interruption of supplies from Haifa(? . omitted) It is of course the (labour - Sic ? latter intended) reason and not out of any desireto help the Jews that they attach importance to resumption of these supplies. I leave it to the discretion of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires Baghdad whether or not to use this argument if he supports I.P.C.'s proposals.

7. There seems to be no inconsistency between the proposals outlined above and the Mediator's suggestion for a

free/...4

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

free port in Haifa which H.M.G. continues to support. Moreover the supervision of these arrangements by the Mediator might help to establish the authority of the United Nations at Haifa.

(HLM/JFS/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

38

Cypher ID/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

WC

From:— H.M.Ambassador, CAIRO. ***To:—*** H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 1/8/48 (12.05) **Received** 1/8/48 (12.05)

No. 213 **of** 31st July, 1948.

TOP SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram 1134 of July 31st.
Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, UKDEL New York and Washington.

Your telegram No.1267: Palestine.

There is no evidence(TW) at present available here that the provisional civil administration referred to in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference is yet operating as an effective ORGANISM.

2. Although it is true that some Jewish Colonies in the NEGEB have been holding out it seems doubtful whether their resistance can have been quite so strong as paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference seems to imply. During the first truce some of those colonies had to be supplied by the Jews by road convoy for the movement of which Egyptian agreement had to be obtained. This argues that they(1) were cut off before the truce and to that extent there seems to be some(1) case for maintaining that the Egyptians were in control of their occupied area even though there may have been small packets of Jews inside it.

3. I would however submit that there might be some danger in using the proposed argument since the northern (1) part of what I assume to be included in the rather general term "Negeb" is under Jewish(1) control, although an Arab allocation. To claim that the Negeb should remain Arab because occupied by subjects might therefore become somewhat of a BOOMERANG if the same arguments were(1) applied by the Jews to the area between for example ARTUF and BEIT JALA, the profitable land (bordering - Sic ? borders intended) of the(1) Jerusalem ENCLAVE, and allocated to the Arabs.

F.O. please pass Jerusalem, UKDEL N.Y. and Washington as my telegrams 132, 132 and 124 respectively.

(JFS/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

39

TELEGRAM.

Cypher — MOST IMMEDIATE TO F.O. & UKDEL NEW YORK.
OTHER POSTS NO PRIORITY.

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

LJC

&

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To :—*S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 2/8/48 (12.40) Received 2/8/48 (11.45)

No. 627 of 2nd August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.627 of 2nd August.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.122
Washington No. 81
Baghdad No.139
Beirut No.141
Cairo No.185
Damascus No.120
Jeddah No.108
B.ME.O. No.179
Jerusalem No. 10 SAVING.

33

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram No.575 to Jerusalem (of 31/7/48).

Following from Sir Hugh Dow.

Piric-Gordon and I called on the Mediator last night and talked to him over an hour. I spoke in the sense of your telegram under reference and put all the points. The Mediator did not appear to have realised the precarious nature of the present truce. He complained that the United States in particular had not given him the promised number of observers having only sent 30 instead of 120. Particularly had they been unwilling to let him have the essential security forces in spite of oral promises and he went so far as to complain that they had "cheated" him. He had been careful to point out that those forces would not be required to oppose either of the belligerent armies but might be called upon to engage in hostilities with the dissident elements of both sides. He said the French and the Belgians had been much more helpful but were unwilling to provide forces unless the United States also did so. He hoped each of the three nations would provide a battalion and he added that he had sent BUNCHE back to Washington to argue with the United States Government and to say that unless action was taken he would have to consider his resignation.

When we/...2

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

2. When we discussed Jerusalem the Mediator first of all produced his old argument that he could not make it h his headquarters until demilitarisation was well under way but after discussion he seemed impressed both with the urgency of an earlier residence and its feasibility.

3. It was put forcibly to him that the Red Cross conference could not justify his absence at this stage in the opinion of either Arabs or Jews and that unless some progress was made in Jerusalem immediately the situation would deteriorate still further and possibly irrevocably in his absence.

4. It was also suggested to him that the delay in sending ground forces could be mitigated to some small extent by the despatch of naval units to lie off shore at Alexandria, Tel Aviv and Beirut. He agreed to consider the idea but pointed out that the aircraft carrier was still without aircraft.

5. The Mediator seemed impressed with the argument that there was a real danger of both a Jewish attack by the Irgun in Jerusalem or of unilateral action by the Iraqi Army which might start a train of disasters in the whole Arab world of which the consequences could not be foreseen. We gave it as our opinion that the next three weeks would be a most critical time during which the Mediator's absence would be atragedy. The Mediator undertook seriously to consider what we had said and left us with the impression that his decision to go to Stockholm was at least shaken.

6. The gravity of the Arab refugee problem was also discussed and I informed him of your intention to have the matter raised in Security Council today. The

Mediator/...B

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No.

of

Mediator was fully alive to the necessity of showing the Arab Governments United Nation sympathy in this matter but was sceptical of the competence of U.N.E.S.C.O. to handle the question. He added he had already reported unfavourably on the attitude of the Jewish authorities to the problem and that in his opinion Arabs who wished to return to their homes in Jewish occupied areas should be permitted to do so without delay.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York Most Immediate and to Washington and Jeddah as my telegrams Nos. 122, 81 and 108 respectively.

(CMPG/JFS/HLM/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

40

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To :— H.M.Ambassador, CAIRO.

Despatched 2/8/48 (12.02)

Received 2/8/48 (11.40)

No. 186 of 2nd August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Please pass following Most Immediate to Doctor Azcarate United Nation Shepheards Hotel Cairo.

Mediator arriving Alexandria Tuesday 4 p.m. local time

M.A. Shamsee.

(DL/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 763

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

LSC

Date 1/8

41

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN 5/10/47

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
		2007
From :- Cairo	Originators No.	Number of Groups
		78

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority
	Most Immediate

1	21401	Following message sent			4
2	to MEDIATOR,	RHODES today			8
3	repeat	to HAIFA AND NIMMAN.			12
4	Quote	011920	UN plane landed		16
5	gaza	two days ago with			20
6	party	of observers and developed			24
7	carburettor trouble. Relief			UN	28
8	plane flew	to Haifa today with			32
9	party and owing	to delay effecting			36
10	repairs flew back	Haifa with			40
11	observers and then returned Cairo				44
12	for own	maintenance. Arrived			48
13	1830 hours today	and later telephoned			52
14	this information	from author.			56
15	Signed	PABLO AZCARATE			60
16	enquote				64
17			Cambell		68
18					72
19					76
20					80
21	Copy sent to Mr. Shawcross.				84
22			MWS 2/8/48		88
23					92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

11263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

BRITISH LEGATION
2 AUG 1948
SHORTHAND

411

XXXXX

XXXX

Clear Savingram Out

BEIRUT

FOREIGN OFFICE

43 31st July, 1948

Repeated to:-

UKDEL New York	No. 16
Cairo	No. 59
Bagdad	No. 53
Damascus	No. 81
Amman	No. 54
Jedda	No. 50
B.M.E.O.	No. 49

Addressed to Foreign Office Savingram No. 43 of 31st July repeated for information UKDEL New York, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, B.M.E.O.

Palestine - Press reactions week ending 31st July 1948.

Several papers, with Ash Sharq at their head, lay the whole responsibility for the Arab failure onto the Arab League. An appeal for the formation of an Arab peoples League to supplement the present Arab League appeared in several nationalist papers, who intimated that the Arab Governments were bound to be influenced by international affairs and were not therefore in a position to cope with the present situation in Palestine. While Ash Sharq was continually attacking the Arab Governments and calling on them to resign and make room for Governments whose policy would be to save Palestine by force of arms, Al-Hayat argued that as long as the policy of most of the Arab Governments was inspired by "a higher source" which nominated them, a change of Government would not help the Arabs at all.

2. A few papers alleged that it was Transjordan's attitude which forced the Political Committee of the Arab League to agree to the truce. King Abdullah's statement in which he outlined his conditions for continuing the struggle gave the newspapers the impressi that the Arab States were not working in as close a harmony as they should be and that while outwardly they appeared to be co-operating together, in reality every State was trying to make capital out of the present situation in Palestine for its own benefit.

3. Ben Gurion's threat to extend Jewish military

/operations

operations beyond the Palestinian borders appears to have opened Arab eyes to the endless ambitions of the Jews and the press generally have been stressing the necessity of the formation of a Pan-Arab military union under one high command. The proposal launched by Al-Hayat for a Syro-Iraqi union has received much comment this week and seemed to have gained ground.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. Chancery
2. Library
3-10 Saving copies

(W/T)

FILE NO.1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

43

~~Cypher~~

~~Code~~

Clear

From :— H.M.Chargé d'Affaires, AMMAN. *To* :— H.M.Con.General, JERUSALEM

Despatched 1/8/48 (17.33) Received 1/8/48 (17.15)

No. 163 of 1st August, 1948.

Sir Hugh Dow will not be returning until tomorrow morning.

(/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

13/7/48

Dear Mike bride

I attach for
your information
a copy of a letter
which I have given
to Tawfiq Pasha
before his departure
for Lebanon.

Yours sincerely

C. M. M.

عزيزي توفيق ا ش

اعتقد انكم تكرهون حانبي ولكن
الحالة حرجة لدرجة متناهية وقليل
كل البلاد العربية متوقفة على قراركم
لذلك ارجوكم السماح.

١ ان اليهود اظهروا نشاط وعدد جنود
وعدة بعد الهدنة غير ما كانت موجودة
لديهم قبل الهدنة وطبقا لما اليوم
وصاعدهم كل اقوى وغن كل يوم اضعف.

٣ اذا لم يتم الهدنة حالا اعتقد بان
بعد سبع ايام او عشرة نصيب
كل الجيوش العربية في فلسطين كرة
فضيعة وهزيمة غير منظمة للحدود.

٢ لم يبق وقت ابدا وغن اليوم
وبعد سوف نكون مجبورين على الزاحف
تدريجيا وكل يوم نخسر منطقة من
الاراضي العربية تنضم للمنطقة اليهودية

٤ في المحتمل ان نكون مجبورين بعد

٤

نوعش ان تترك اللطرون وباب الواد
والعرامشون يحتشون الهجوم على طوكرم
وقلقيلية وراس العين.

٥ اذا انكشف ضعفنا العسكري الى
هذه الدرجة ربما اليهود يرفضون
الهدنة و يأجلونها لمدة خمسة ايام
حتى يكملوا كسيرة الجيوش العربية

مولاي

[illegible]

١٩٤٨/٧/١٢

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

45

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M.Con.Gen. JERUSALEM *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 3/8/48 (17.00) Received 4/8/48 (08.30)

No. 180 of 3rd August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.340 of August 3rd.

Repeated for information to Cairo, B.M.E.O., Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, UKDEL New York, Washington and Saving to Haifa.

Your telegram No.12(1)67 to Cairo:

The Arab League Administration in Palestine.

Although well over three weeks have now elapsed since the announcement, none of the members of the projected administration with the exception of AHMED HILMI Pasha (who in any case (case - Sic) lives here) has made a move to come to Palestine.

2. The scheme of the Arab League administration thus appears to have been still born, largely due, I thinkx to there being too many midwives in attendance.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington and Jedda as my telegrams Nos.75, 29 and 41 respectively.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.43.

(JFS/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M.Minister, BEIRUT. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 3/8/48 (19.30) Received 4/8/48 (08.30)

No. 124 of 2nd August, 1948.

TOP SECRET.
GUARD.
Addressed to Foreign Office 566.
Repeated to Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Jedda, Jerusalem and Cairo (Office - Sic ? M.E. intended) Minister.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me in all probability the Lebanese Prime Minister will proceed to Amman on August 5th at the instigation of some members of the Transjordan Government in order to do what he can to ensure that King Abdullah shall take no rash decision about Palestine independently of his Ministers.

2. He also told me in the strictest confidence that RIAD Bey had received a letter from one ELIAS SASSOON to the effect that though Riad was well known to be among the most fanatical opponents of Zionism he was also a wise statesman (and)(2) (on his return) would(1) like to meet him in Paris for informal discussion. I do not know who this Sassoon is but it occurs(1) to me that this manoeuvre may mean one of two things; either

(A) the Jews are not in fact so strong after all or(1)

(B) that they may be contemplating an attempt(1) to buy over the Arab leaders(1).

Cairo please pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram 183.

(JFS/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 3/48.

MESSAGE FORM

47

W/T Office Serial No. 773

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 3/8

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
		1735
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups
Bagdad		40

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN 4 AUG 1948

Special Instructions			Indication of Priority		
1	14303.	Added	to FO tel 830		4
2	of august 3rd	repeated	fed w/o		8
3	to Beirut Amman and Bmeo.				12
4	My tel no 791,	REGENT	and		16
5	NURI SAID returned on July 31st,				20
6	2		KING arrived and		24
7	2nd was		given enthusiastic		28
8	welcome -				32
9					36
10					40
11					44
12					48
13					52
14					56
15					60
16					64
17					68
18					72
19					76
20					80
21					84
22					88
23					92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 784

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 4/8

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
A		1500
From :- Jerusalem	Originators No.	Number of Groups
		95

BRITISH LEGATION 5 AUG 1948 AMMAN

Special Instructions

P 1.0

Indication of Priority

1	18104	addsd important	to FOld		4
2	No 344	of aug	4th. Repeat important		8
3	to addel	N.Y W'ton and	routine		12
4	to Cairo	Bagdad Beirut	Damascus		16
5	Jedda	brto Haifa and	Amman		20
6	Mytel	No 328	of 28th July.		24
7	(Not to	W'ton).	according to		28
8	reports	heard on radio and			32
9	to other	sources MENAHEM			36
10	BEGIN	COMMANDER in chief			40
11	of the	IRGUN ZWAI LEUMI			44
12	addsd	makes meeting			48
13	held	on ZION SQUARE			52
14	last night. He	severely criticised			56
15	quote	provisional govt unquote			60
16	for their	dealings with the			64
17	mediator and	said that his			68
18	men	would fight for the			72
19	full LIBERATION	of JERUSALEM			76
20	regardless	of what ever decision			80
21	the Mediator	might take.			84
22	FO pass	passed important to			88
23	Wadel	New York and W'ton			92
24	and Routine	to Jedda as mytel			96
25	Nos 76,	30, 742	respectively	CAIRO	100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

We pass to BMEO as mytel No 42. CONSUL-GENERAL.

1263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

(W/T) FILE NO.S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

49

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— Memin, CAIRO. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 5/8/48 (14.15) Received 6/8/48 (08.30)

No. 82 of 5th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office(1) telegram No.284 of August 4

Repeated for information to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Jerusalem.

TOP SECRET.
GUARD.

46

Beirut telegram No.566 to you.

You will recollect SASSOON was the Jewish intermediary in the Zionist approach to SIDKI PASHA in the summer of 1946 when the Jews were trying to secure SIDKI's support for partition. He is apparently still handling Arab political work for the Jewish authorities.

(CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 5/8/48 (09.32) Received 5/8/48 (09.32)

No. 766 of 3rd August, 1948.

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Washington telegram No.8159 of August 3rd. Repeated for information UKDEL New York, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut(1), Damascus, Jedda(1), Amman, Jerusalem and B.M.E.O.(1).

My immediately following telegram contains the text of the first 14 paragraphs of the telegram from the United States Embassy to the State Department on the future policy as regards Palestine. It is understood that the remaining paragraphs of the telegram contain comments by the United States Ambassador recommending that urgent and sympathetic consideration should be given by the State Department and other United States authorities concerned to the ideas in the earlier part of the telegram.

2. To avoid duplication I think that it would be best for you not to make any approach to the State Department on the basis of this telegram but you should of course be (ready to)(2) discuss it with them if they wish to do so.

3. The United States Embassy's immediately following telegram referred to in paragraph 8 is not being repeated to you at present.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

(52)

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Cipher~~

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To :—* S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 4/8/48 (13.30) Received 4/8/48 (12.00)

No. 632 of 4th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.632 of 4th August.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.123
Washington No. 82
B.M.E.O. No.180
Baghdad No. 74 SAVING.
Beirut No.8 1 SAVING.
Cairo No. 78 SAVING.
Damascus No. 75 SAVING.
Jeddah No. 76 SAVING.
Jerusalem No. 12 SAVING.

CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

Palestine Mediator.

1. The Mediator had a long discussion with the Prime Minister on Monday about Palestine and subsequently saw King Abdullah who merely expressed his agreement with everything the Prime Minister had said.

2. The Mediator emphasised the point that any solution must take into account the existence of a Jewish state. He said that there were now three possible lines of action before the parties :-

(a) the resumption of fighting which could not fail to harm everyone,

(b) an indefinite truce which would enable the Jews to build up their strength by clandestine means and

(c) the acceptance of a realistic solution which was obviously the most sensible thing to do.

3/...2

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

3. The Prime Minister replied by pointing to Transjordan's long record as a peace loving country which had completed its political evolution without having suffered any of the disorders which had characterized other Arab countries. Transjordan was also in a special position as having a King and a Government which could control the people but even so the difficulty of Transjordan adopting on line of action different to that of the other Arab states should not be minimized.

4. The Prime Minister went on to say that Bernadotte should put forward a solution and Transjordan would do its best to secure its acceptance by the Arab League. If Transjordan secured the support of another Arab state such as Egypt for instance then it would be possible for the two countries to act against the wishes of the remainder. If Transjordan did not secure the support of another member it would have to acquiesce in the decision of the majority and in that event the only hope was for United Nations Organisation to impose a solution on both parties. He added that the decision of United Nations Organisation one way or the other should not be delayed beyond September.

5. Finally the Prime Minister endeavoured to impress upon the mediator the importance of United Nations Organisation doing something to assist the Arab refugees from Palestine who were becoming a sore burden on the neighbouring Arab states.

Any help which could be afforded in this connection would prepare a more favourable atmosphere for the reception of a solution to the general question.

F.O. please pass Important to UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.123 and 82 respectively.

(ASK/JFS/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 789

C[illegible]ffice Serial No. .....

LJC

Date 5/8/41

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
Amman	5 AUG 1941	0805
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups
Cairo		93

BRITISH LEGATION MMA

Special Instructions

Priority.

Indication of Priority

1	21604	Addsd	to Fo no 143,		4
2	repeated	for info	to Bagdad,		8
3	Beirut,	Damascus,	Tedcos,		12
4	Jerusalem,	Amman,	Haifa,	Ukdel NY	16
5	W'ton.	Amman	tel no	627.	20
6		Palestine.			24
7		Mediation	aimed at	ALEXANDRIA	28
8	on Aug	3rd,		and	32
9	as reported	to	be having discuss		36
10	ions there	with	NOKRASHI	PASHA	40
11	and	AZZAM	PASHA.	He is stated	44
12	to have	told	Jews	Palestinians	48
13	that he	would	discuss	the	Palestine
14	refugee	problem	and the	desirability	56
15	organisation	of	Jerusalem as		60
16	that order.	The	general	question	64
17	of	PALESTINE	would	take	their
18	place.				72
19					76
20					80
21	FO	for	info	UKDEL NY	and 84
22	W'ton	as	my	tels	133, 125. 88
23	respectively.				92
24				ANDREWS.	96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

/SR

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

9th July, 1948.

849/60/48

CONFIDENTIAL

J

RECEIVED IN C.B.
12 JUL 1948
SENT TO DEPT.
J

Dear Department,

Will you please refer to Embassy telegram No. 921 of June 30th dealing with the ban on night flying by the Royal Air Force over Egypt?

2. The Air Commander-in-Chief called on the Ambassador on June 29th to say that our telegram went rather further than what had really been in his mind. He had not intended to give us the impression that he wished to resume night training whatever the attitude of the Egyptians towards this, as he did not consider that the resumption of night flying at the risk of a serious incident was really necessary in all the circumstances of the moment. He wished rather to treat the matter on the basis of a continuation, and if possible an extension, of the co-operation already arranged with the Egyptians for day flying, and to see if we could not get them to agree to night flying also on this sort of basis, now that we have given them at any rate one Radar set, and are helping to train them with a Radar training set at Heliopolis. He did not, therefore, wish to confront the Egyptians with a peremptory statement that we would resume night flying. He did not think this would be wise, nor would he himself be prepared to advise the Chiefs of Staff that we should adopt such an attitude unless we intended to maintain it at all costs, and this he did not think necessary or good policy in present circumstances. He would prefer to continue to treat the matter on the basis of paragraph 9 of the telegram from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East to the Ministry of Defence, No. 235/CCL of May 19th. J3523/284/G

3. Another point was that he did not wish to use the existence of the truce as an argument for lifting the ban on night flying, since if he could get some arrangement about night flying, he wished it to be a continuing one, and not liable to withdrawal by the Egyptians on the plea that the truce had come to an end. In the circumstances he asked that the Air Attaché might follow up his written communication to the Egyptian Ministry of Defence with a personal interview, and try to get an arrangement about night flying on a practical co-operative basis, and to soft-pedal on the truce argument and, for the present at any rate, on any statement that the Royal Air Force proposed (irrespective of any Egyptian views and attitude to the contrary) to resume night flying. As you will have seen from our

telegram/. . .

Egyptian Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

J4739/284/16

telegram No. 1007, the Air Attaché has been successful in this and it is expected that night training flights will be resumed on July 12th.

Yours ever,

R. Speaight

530

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell
No. 1007
10th July, 1948.

D. 10.50 a.m. 10th July, 1948.
R. 1.50 p.m. 10th July, 1948.

IMPORTANT
SECRET

[gp. undec. analogous]

Your telegram No. 1123 and your telegram to Rhodes 26: Radar sets for Egyptian Air Force.

For the following reasons I venture to suggest that it is again unnecessary to consult the Mediator. As it seemed important that you should have time to consider these points before His Majesty's Consul at Rhodes acted on your telegram No. 26 I sent him my telegram No. 5 asking him to suspend action.

2. Egyptian Ministry of National Defence have now agreed to a limited resumption of night training flights by the R.A.F. in the Canal Zone. Subject to clearance of administration details between the R.A.F. and the Royal Egyptian Air Force night training on limited scale will be resumed on July 12th. Arrangements have been made on the basis of loan to Egyptians of one radar set which is installed in the Canal Zone and will be operated by the Egyptian Air Force; this conforms with instructions in Chiefs of Staff's signal to Commanders in Chief of November 16th COS (Middle East) 241. Air Commander in Chief is satisfied for the time being. Further details are contained in letter to Egyptian Department.

3. As regards civil aviation it appears that even if two further radar sets were supplied, installed and efficiently operated, B.O.A.C. would be reluctant to resume normal day and night services unless they had a reasonable guarantee that future events would not once again force them to cancel all night schedules. It is clearly impossible for anyone to give them such a guarantee and so they would prefer to continue for the present operating only by day regardless of whether or not additional radar sets are supplied. It is likely that other civil air lines would take the same view.

4. We should thus not be justified at present in claiming that additional radar set for Egyptians is necessary to enable either RAF to carry out essential night flying or civilian air lines to resume their normal services.

/5. On the other

5. On the other hand it may be possible to make out a convincing case that Egyptians are entitled to additional radar sets in order that they shall be in a position to fulfil their obligations for the defence of the Suez Canal under Article 9 of the Suez Canal Convention and Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. I am preparing a despatch on the implications of the Treaty obligations of both the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government in regard to the defence of the Canal with special reference to action of Egyptian Government in searching foreign ships in transit through the Canal and confiscating their cargoes. Meanwhile I would only observe that if we decide that we are entitled to supply Egyptians with equipemnt for defence of the Canal this might probably be regarded as something distinct from Palestine hostilites and for which Mediator's consent is not necessary.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

F F FF

53d

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

29th July, 1948.

(J 4730/284/16)

Confidential.

Dear Chancery,

In view of the information in the first three paragraphs of your telegram No. 1007 of the 10th July, and in your letter No. 849/60/48 of the 9th July, about the supply of Radar sets to the Egyptian Air Force, we agree that our claim that the supply of these sets was essential would have been justified.

2. We do not agree, however, that a case could be made out for providing these sets under the Suez Canal Convention or the Treaty of Alliance and, in our view, there is no question of the Egyptians being entitled to receive the two sets. The paramount consideration is that we have accepted and are applying a United Nations resolution against the supply of war material to Egypt amongst others; and the term "war material" includes, rightly or wrongly, radar equipment. The resolution which we have accepted overrides any treaty obligations which we may have to supply Egypt, amongst others, with war material.

3. Our argument in favour of supplying these sets was that an exception should be made in the case of this particular equipment, since it was required by Egypt to enable her to avoid interfering either with civil aircraft transiting Egyptian territory or with the facilities which our air forces enjoy in Egypt under the 1936 Treaty.

4. However, in view of the facts that the Air Commander-in-Chief is satisfied with present arrangements and that the British Overseas Airways Corporation are not anxious to resume normal services, we do not propose to take the matter any further meanwhile.

5. We are sending copies of this letter to the United Kingdom Delegation at New York, the Chanceries at Washington, Bagdad, Jedda, Amman, Beirut and Damascus, British Middle East Office, the Consulate-General at Jerusalem and the Consulate at Haifa and Rhodes.

Yours ever,

EGYPTIAN DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Cairo.

TELEGRAM "OUT"

CYPHER. OTP.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

BRITISH LEGATION
6 AUG 1948
5/1948/46
AMMAN

No. 347 of August 5th.

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 347 August 5th.

Repeated for information to Cairo No. 135.
BMEO No. 46.

Amman No. 10.)
Bagdad No. 5.)
Beirut No. 4.)
Damascus No. 4.) SAVING.
Jedda No. 7.)
Washington No.2.)
UKDEL New York 1.)

Your telegram No. 1267 to Cairo and Cairo telegram No. 1134 to you.

Egyptian control of southern Palestine, so far as I can gather, is strictly limited to the four civil administrative centres of Gaza, Hebron, Beersheba and Bethlehem with the narrow costal strip up through Gaza to Isdud and the only east/west line of communication being the Majdal-Hebron road. I am informed by a traveller of yesterday that almost all Jewish settlements in the Negev are intact and that the Gaza/Beersheba road is denied to Egyptian traffic by two Jewish settlements which sit astride it. Egyptian administrative efficiency is favourably commented on here, but their failure or unwillingness to occupy the settlements is frequently a source of ~~criticism~~ criticism.

Consul-General.

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL
JERUSALEM

CONFIDENTIAL.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

54B

30th July 1948

Major-General A.J.C.Pollock, C.B.E.,
Middle East Information Department,
Foreign Office,
London S.W.1.

Dear Pollock

Not knowing to whom I should address this letter, I am as usual sending it to you. If it is someone else's concern, would you please forgive me and pass it on to him?

L.P.S. transmission V of the 24th July contained Ewer's article "The Time for Reconciliation in Palestine". The Ewer article always reaches us on a Sunday morning, and is put out by the Press Officer on duty to all editors. This time the Press Officer, thinking the article out of line with our propaganda referred it to Main who suspended it until I could see it. I suppressed it altogether and so informed the Ambassador who approved my action.

It may be that this article is good propaganda for us in parts of the world with which I am not concerned. But in Egypt (and I imagine throughout the Arab world) its effect would be either to suggest that we had all along been tricking the Arabs into laying down their arms in order that the U.N. might peacefully deprive them of their rights, or at best to shew that we had given up our championship of the Arab cause. Surely our propaganda to the Arab countries must shew that we are putting up a magnificent show for the Arabs at "Lake Success", and that if a solution unfavourable to them has to be accepted (as it will) that is only because we and they are in a minority.and must together accept the will of the majority. So far at least as Egypt is concerned, we must try to appear in the light of the Arab's friend even when (in fact especially when) their luck is out.

The article would certainly have been suppressed by the censor here; but to have sent it out would just have annoyed editors and undone the work we put in trying to get them to have friendly feelings towards us.

I wonder whether it was necessary to include that article in the L.P.S. at all. (After all, it may be reported back to Cairo by some Egyptian diplomatic mission abroad, and be traced to its source.) If in future it is decided to include in a world-wide propaganda service an important item (for this is a weekly feature) bound to do harm in one part of the world, would it not be safer to warn the Information Officers in that part of the world to suppress it in case by an oversight such a thing got through and damaged us? Such a warning could perhaps be conveyed by a code word and the reference sent by immediate en clair telegram.

(..I am ..

I am sending copies of this letter to the
Information Officers at Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus
and Jedda.

CONFIDENTIAL

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

(55)

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

CJC

From :— Consul-Gen. JERUSALEM *To :—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 5/8/48 (16.50) Received 6/8/48 (08.30)

No. 183 of 5th August, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.

The Chairman of the Truce Commission has asked if the following may be passed to the Prime Minister and his reply transmitted to him here as early(l) as possible. New Paragraph - Begins.

Kindly confirm by telegraph through the British Legation, Amman, the three main points and conclusion(~~s omitted~~) of your Government's statement given verbally to me yesterday at 1.30 p.m. by FOUZI PASHA AL MULQI in the presence of the Financial Minister.

This statement conflicts with the undertaking given on Monday morning to the Mediator to whose efforts His Majesty payed tribute(~~l~~) at his recent press conference, and constitutes an intentional prolongation of unmistakable breach of the truce regulations.

I earnestly request that you telegraph the precise text together with the conclusions before I report to the authorities concerned the situation which will reflect unfavourably on Transjordan's(~~l~~) position in the international field, and which will undoubtedly cause the Security Council the gravest concern - Ends.

(CJB/HA).

(56)

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

E

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

pw

TRANSJORDAN

Demonstrations, Amman

13. **Dr. Segal** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the anti-British demonstrations in Amman.

Mr. Bevin: There were two minor demonstrations before the announcement that the Arab League had agreed to a new cease fire. There was some shooting and windows were broken, but there do not appear to have been any casualties or serious damage.

Dr. Segal: Would it not be more in keeping with the prestige and dignity of Transjordan as an independent State if the British taxpayer were relieved of all future responsibility in this matter?

Mr. Bevin: That is another question.

Mr. Gammans: Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that there seems something wanting in our handling of this situation when we appear to have fallen foul of Tel-Aviv, Amman and New York?

Mr. Bevin: Yes, the way of peacemakers is very hard.

21 JUL 1948

(S/1014/48).

PERSONAL

56

6th August, 1948.

Dear Fauzi Pasha,

1. I have been asked to transmit to you the following message from the Chairman of the Truce Committee at Jerusalem - Begins.

55

"Kindly confirm by telegraph through the British Legation, Amman, the three main points and conclusions of your Government's statement given verbally to me yesterday at 1.30 p.m. by Fauzi Pasha el Mulqi in the presence of the Financial Minister.

This statement conflicts with the undertaking given on Monday morning to the Mediator to whose efforts His Majesty paid tribute at his recent press conference, and constitutes an intentional prolongation of unmistakable breach of the truce regulations.

I earnestly request that you telegraph the precise text together with the conclusions before I report to the authorities concerned the situation which will reflect unfavourably on Transjordan's position in the international field, and which will undoubtedly cause the Security Council the gravest concern" - Ends.

2. I have no knowledge of nor am I ~~convinced~~ concerned with the point at issue but I shall be pleased to transmit any reply if you desire to use the communication facilities at my disposal.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

His Excellency,
Dr. Fauzi Pasha el Mulki,
Minister of Defence,
Transjordan Hashimite Kingdom,
AMMAN.

ASK/HA.

AMMAN 88 (C)

5-6A

/CM. SAVINGRAM.

FROM : CAIRO. DESPD: BY BAG.

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE.

NO. : 127. DATED: 31.7.48.

BRITISH LEGATION 6 AUG 1948 AMMAN

WEEKLY APPRECIATION.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office Savingram No. 127 of 31st July, repeated for information Saving to Amman 88, Bagdad 88, Beirut 89, Damascus 94, Jerusalem 37, Jedda 99, Alexandria 32, Port Said 30 and Addis Ababa 5.

Although the press in its comments on Palestine, remains in a mood of frustration, it is satisfactory to observe that for the most part its criticisms of Great Britain are at the moment less mischievous. In regard to Palestine the line mostly taken by the leading newspapers is to support the conditions laid down by the Arab League for its agreement to continue observance of the present cease-fire arrangement, namely, the cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, the re-admission to Palestine of Arab refugees and the fixing of a definite time limit for the duration of the truce. The pro-Government organ, "Assas", offered an interesting suggestion with regard to the demilitarisation of Jerusalem, namely, that the Vatican should be represented in the supervisory body since it had no political ambitions and also because representation of the Vatican would bring the Christian powers face to face with the arrogance of Zionism. In the past few days the plight of Palestinian Arab refugees has been prominently featured in the press, possibly with the object of underlining the Arab League's contention that they should be readmitted to Palestine. It is reported that the Egyptian Government has approved a modest credit of £E.5,000 to assist refugees from the Lydda and Ramleh areas but in view of the magnitude of the problem this is obviously only a token measure. In other respects there is a lull in Cairo so far as the major Palestine problem is concerned and it seems evident that the authorities are awaiting the next steps to be taken by the Mediator.

2. Apart from the milder tone of the press noted above there have been no significant developments during the past week in connection with Anglo-Egyptian relations. The news of His Majesty's Ambassador's forthcoming departure on leave inspired some speculation in the press about the possibility of his really going home for consultations with the Foreign Office with a view to a clear definition of British policy towards Egypt and other Arab States. The "Ahram" expressed the hope that Sir Ronald Campbell would convey to His Majesty's Government a conviction that there is a sincere desire in the Arab States for co-operation with Great Britain.

3. There was an air raid alarm in Alexandria on July 25th but no bombs were dropped and no serious incidents have been reported in connection therewith. It is reported by S.S.B. that members of the Moslem Brethren Society were distributing pamphlets in Cairo on July 22nd and 23rd exhorting the public

/ to boycott

to boycott Jews and generally to make life unbearable for them. The same source also states that Hassan Al Banna visited Alexandria on 19th July and at a meeting with his followers speeches made on the subject of Palestine alleged that British policy had been hypocritical and treacherous to the Arabs in Palestine and to Moslems in Egypt, India and the Sudan.

4. In accordance with a newly-issued military proclamation, Jewish families living in the immediate vicinity of Abdin Palace, Army establishments, the Arab League Headquarters etc. have been given three days' notice to quit their dwellings. This measure if strictly enforced will cause hardship to those evicted owing to the impossibility of finding other accommodation at short notice and at prices within their means. Only one British family is involved and the Acting British Consul-General has taken up their case with the Governorate.

5. With reference to paragraph 5 of Cairo telegram No. 121 Saving, it is reported that Hassan Rifaat Pasha, former Under Secretary for Interior and now a director of Cicurel, has written to the Parquet affirming that the explosion which occurred on July 19th could not possibly have been caused by a bomb dropped from the air. This assertion, coming from a man widely known for his experienced judgment, has created a considerable impression on the public but so far the result of the official enquiry into the incident has not been published, though it is reported in the press that the Government experts have concluded that the explosion was caused by a missile dropped from the air. On July 28th an explosion occurred in the drapery store of Messrs. David Ades & Son, Cairo, doing minor damage and causing only slight casualties. According to the press, a disgruntled ex-employee of the firm, stated to be a Jew, has been arrested on suspicion of being responsible for this incident but the truth is not yet known. The police succeeded in maintaining order in the street on this occasion.

6. The verdicts given by the Court of Assizes in the case of those accused of the murder of the late Amin Osman Pasha and other terrorist activities (see Sir Ronald Campbell's telegram No. 124 Saving) appear to have been received by the general public with equanimity though Wafdist circles are understandably incensed by their leniency. It seems evident that the protracted and often slipshod conduct of the case had engendered an expectation that the verdict would be a timorous compromise. The detailed judgements of the Court have yet to be made public but certain newspapers allege that the Parquet intends to appeal to the Court of Cassation against the verdicts.

7. Following a two-day visit to Cairo by Nahas Pasha nearly two weeks ago there have been persistent rumours that a change of Cabinet is again in the wind, possibly a coalition Government on a wider basis, including Wafdist elements. It is widely asserted that a senior Palace official had a talk with Nahas Pasha while the latter was in Cairo but the Government organ, "Assas", has vigorously denied reports that Nahas Pasha was called to Cairo for important consultations. It is believed in certain circles that the

/ recent

recent appointment of Serag Eddin Pasha as Secretary-General of the Wafd was destined sooner or later to lead towards the adoption by the Wafd of a more conciliatory attitude towards the Palace and vice versa. At the moment it is difficult to assess accurately the value which should be attached to these reports.

8. According to press reports, Nabil Abbas Halim has lately been endeavouring to seduce a section of the Cairo Tramway and Omnibus workers from their Trade Union on the pretext that the Union is subject to excessive control by the employers. He led a deputation to the Ministry of Interior to register a formal protest in this sense.

9. According to press reports, the Cultural Committee of the Arab League has met under the chairmanship of Sanhouri Pasha to counter alleged Zionist intrigues to change the venue of the UNESCO Congress which is due to meet at Beirut in the autumn.

CAMPBELL.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

57

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Cipher~~

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To* :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 6/8/48 (17.06) Received 6/8/48 (13.05)

No. 636 of 6th August, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.636 of 6th August.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.125
Washington No. 84
B.M.E.O. No.183
Baghdad No. 76 SAVING
Beirut No. 83 SAVING
Cairo No. 80 SAVING
Damascus No. 77 SAVING
Jeddah No. 78 SAVING
Jerusalem No. 14 SAVING

SECRET.

PALESTINE.

1. I have just resumed duty after three weeks sickness during which period I was entirely out of touch with current events. You may be interested in my impressions.

2. I am struck principally by the extreme precariousness of our position in Transjordan. Even at the moment we have reached a degree of unpopularity which I would have described as impossible six months ago.

The main danger now is that of a Jewish attack on the Arab Legion (see Jerusalem's telegram to you No.181 of the 4th August, 1948), which that force is in no position to resist being without artillery or mortar ammunition. The anti British outbreaks which followed the fall of Ramleh and Lydda for which the Arab Legion was not directly responsible is an indication of what would happer following a major defeat of that force.

3. The line that the Arab Legion is being prevented from using its full strength against the Jews both through the treachery of its British officers and the withholding of supplies by His Majesty's Government is being propaganded actively by the Syrian and Iraqi authorities and by

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

Azzam/...2

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

Azzam (the information about the latter is not from his Arab enemies but from British sources). The Iraqi army personnel operating in Transjordan are particularily hostile both to the British and to the Arab Legion and they have practically ceased to have any relations with the latter.

4. One cannot help feeling that many of the Arab leaders would rejoice in the downfall of Transjordan. Their motives vary, the Syrians regard Transjordan as a potential danger to their regime, others would like to be able to point to the object lesson of the uselessness of depending on His Majesty's Government and to the fact that Transjordan's long history of loyalty to Great Britain had counted for little at the end. Our arguments about international obligations could do little to counter the effect of such propaganda in the rest of the Arab world.

I have a growing conviction that if a disaster overtakes Transjordan whilst we are withholding supplies and ammunition we might as well abandon the present policy of building defensive alliances in the Middle East.

5. I realise of course that it is impossible to judge from here the importance of other major issues involved in the withholding of supplies but judged from a purely local point of view the policy is becoming increasingly difficult to justify. The Transjordan Government have complied with our wishes to the best of their ability both as regards the general conduct of the campaign and as regards truces. The restoration of the subsidy is an acknowledgement of this fact but it is difficult to explain away the fact that while paying the subsidy which enables the Arab Legion to exist we should also reduce

it to/...3

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched Received

No. of

it to impotence by denying it supplies of ammunition. The fact that the Jews are undoubtedly received ammunition arms and equipment from overseas renders the position all the more untenable.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.125 and 84 respectively.

(ASK/HLM/HA).

Ref: S/879/46.

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

BRITISH LEGATION
6 AUG 1948
S/1014/48
AMMAN

57A

Amman 86/5

Cypher/OTP
Restricted.
E.9926/4/31.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3205. D. 12.50.p.m. 31st July, 1948.
31st July, 1948.

Repeated to Bagdad No. 829,
B.M.E.O. (Cairo) No. 872

SAVING TO: Cairo No. 107,
Amman No. 86,
Beirut No. 104,
Damascus No. 105,
Jedda No. 98,
Jerusalem No. 37,
Haifa No. 126,
Washington No. 960.

IMPORTANT
RESTRICTED
GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 3205 July 31st, repeated for information to Bagdad, British Middle East Office (Cairo), Saving to: Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa, Washington.

Your telegram No. 1996 [of 22nd July: Alleged breaches of Palestine Truce]. Paragraph 1 (iii).

"Bardistan" left United Kingdom April 14th and arrived Basra June 15th with following cargo for Iraqi authorities: three breakdown lorries, three water tank trailers, signal stores, one case of binoculars and telescopes. "Derryheen" left United Kingdom April 27th and arrived Basra June 14th with one ton of inflammable stores (believed to be oil and grease) and a consignment of valves. Jewish allegation that supplies were sent to Iraq in these ships in violation of the Security Council Arms Embargo is unfounded for the following reasons:-

(a) none of this equipment is war material within the meaning of the arms embargo (in spite of Iraqi assertion in Bagdad telegram 814),

(b) in any case the ships left this country some time before the first Truce and arms embargo came into effect.

2. There is no (repeat no) Transjordan Air Force and there is no question of British aircraft having been supplied to the Transjordan Government. For your own information five civil aircraft, two Rapides and three Proctors, were recently supplied to Arab Airways (the Transjordan airline) for the maintenance of essential civil communications in the Middle East. Arab Airways state that Bonde of the Mediator's staff inspected these aircraft at Amman and raised no (repeat no) objection to Arab Airways having acquired them.

---oOo---

Amman
&
S7B

TELEGRAM FROM UKDEL NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE Political

EN CLAIR DESPATCHED: 29th July

No. 186 Saving

29th July, 1948

BRITISH LEGATION
6 AUG 1948
AMMAN

GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 186 Saving of 29th July, repeated to Washington No. 2301, Cairo B.M.E.O. No. 33, Cairo No. 14, Haifa No. 57, Jerusalem No. 12, Beirut No. 14, Damascus No. 14, Amman No. 13, Jedda No. 14, Baghdad No. 15. All Saving.

Palestine: Syrian draft resolution.

As reported in my telegram No. 2019, Security Council rejected on 27th July Syrian draft resolution proposing to ask International Court for advisory opinion on international status of Palestine. A Colombian amendment had been incorporated providing that request should "not delay or impair normal process of mediation".

2. In opening statement Syrian delegate replied to contentions put forward by Slav and French representatives at end of last meeting (see last paragraph of my telegram No. 1962 /of 15th July/), and argued that advisory opinion from Court would do much to mollify Arab public opinion.

3. Colombian delegate, while favouring Syrian resolution, stressed importance of not allowing procedure advocated therein to interfere with progress of Mediator's negotiations, and therefore proposed amendment mentioned in paragraph 1 above. This amendment was accepted by Syrian delegate.

4. Canadian and United States delegates spoke against Syrian resolution on grounds that it would delay and confuse negotiations for peaceful settlement now being conducted by Mediator. (They agreed, however, that during these negotiations Council might, at request of Mediator, seek advice of Court on specific questions). Malik (U.S.S.R.) also spoke in opposition, arguing that Syrian resolution was devised as means of circumventing General Assembly resolution and would merely prolong confusion and uncertainty in Palestine.

5. I indicated that United Kingdom would support resolution on understanding that this procedure would not impede any settlement that Mediator or parties concerned might succeed in devising. Chinese and Argentine delegates also spoke in support of Syrian resolution, contending, as I had done, that, especially in view of Colombian amendment, fears expressed by Canadian and United States delegates were likely to be groundless.

6. After Egyptian representative had discoursed at length on whole Palestine question, Jewish representative adduced following arguments against acceptance of Syrian proposal:

(a) present juridical status of Palestine arose from action of General Assembly; to question this status was to make International Court a court of appeal against decisions of the Assembly;

(b) juridical status of Palestine had no relevance in determination either of threat to peace or of act of aggression;

/(c)

(c) false impression about (b) might well be an incentive to certain powers to renew aggression;

(d) it was not within competence of International Court to determine existence or non-existence of Israel, which was a question of fact and not of law;

(e) in any event, Israel was the only State in history whose legitimate birth was certified by international community;

(f) slow procedure of Court would increase atmosphere of uncertainty in Palestine.

(g) Palestine question was anyway a uniquely political question.

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BRITISH LEGATION
6 AUG 1948
AMMAN

Amman 80

570

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No.2019
27th July, 1948.

D.8.11 p.m. 27th July, 1948.
R.1.55 a.m. 28th July, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem
B.M.E.O. Cairo
Washington
Amman
Beirut
Bagdad
Damascus
Jedda
Haifa
Cairo

Saving

IMPORTANT

GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2019 27th July repeated for information Saving to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Washington, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Haifa and Cairo.

My telegram No.1962 paragraph 9.

Palestine: Syrian Draft Resolution.

Security Council today rejected Syrian Draft Resolution by four abstentions (Canada, France, U.S.S.R. and United States) and one vote against (Ukraine) to six votes in favour.

Foreign Office please repeat Saving to Jerusalem B.M.E.O. Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, and Cairo as my telegrams Nos.10,25,11,12, 13, 12, 12 and 12 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda and Cairo]

B B B

REPEATED BY F.O. TO Amman No 80 Sav 28/7.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

58

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, ~~AMMAN.~~

Despatched 5/8/48 (12.00) Received 6/8/48 (08.30)

No. 767 of 3rd August, 1948.

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Washington telegram No.8520 of August 3rd. Repeated for information UKDEL New York, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Amman and B.M.E.O.

My immediately preceding telegram. (51)

Following is text of the first fourteen paragraphs of United States Embassy's Foreign Policy (? to omitted) State Department - Begins.

1. BEVIN and Wright have mentioned to me several times recently that the British views re the road ahead on Palestine in the best interests of world peace and the future of United Nations were being developed in the Foreign Office for early discussion with the United States Government(1) through this particular telegraphic channel. They indicated their hope that by clearing ideas beforehand, the United States and United Kingdom will be able to work together in bringing about a definite and last~~ing~~ ~~but~~ solution of the Palestine problem.

2. Broad outlines of the British thinking have now been conveyed to me personally and at my suggestion with which Bevin(TW) agreed ~~that~~ the details have been filled in at operating level. Lest ~~there~~ there be distortion through reporting errors this message through paragraph 14 has been cleared textually by Wright who asserts that it is an accurate presentation of the provisional thoughts of His Majesty's Government as developed by Bevin and the Foreign Office.

3. Notwithstanding the passions aroused in Palestine the presence there of the British gave the Palestine problem a comparatively STATIC quality on the world scene. Last

November/...2

Wt. 45504. D189. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

- 2 -

Clear

From:—

To:—

Despatched

Received

No. of

November United Nations (Commission)(2) delegates were confronted by a single entity known as Palestine. After May 15th however Palestine entered the DYNAMIC phase of Arab-Jewish fighting at the end of which the Palestine picture had altered radically in that

a) the Assembly resolution of May 14th relieved the United Nation Commission of its task of implementing the November 29th resolution and(1) appointed a Mediator to seek a peaceful solution without laying down on what lines he should act

b) the Jewish State is well(1) established behind its lines - of -(force - Sic) frontier

c) the Arabs are establishing authorities on their sidelines.

d) Jewish immigration has taken place on a considerable scale

e) Jewish forces have convinced the Arabs that the Jews cannot be driven into the sea

f) The establishment of the Jewish State has resulted in about 250,000 Arabs fleeing from their homes in the Jewish territory

g) The oil resources of Europe are threatened gravely by the (gp.undec.) Haifa(1) refinery

h) The United States and United Kingdom(1) (are)(2) confronted with the bitterness of Arab resentment against the West heightened by the circumstances in which the Security Council imposed the present truce

i)/...3

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

i) The Jewish military successes have increased in Arab eyes the likelihood that the Jews will not respect any frontier laid down for the Jewish state.

4. Uneasy as the present truce may be the present Arab-(1)Jewish frontier has PRAGMATIC reality elsewhere neither side can be dislodged from its present position without fighting. The British at one time entertained ideas of a Jewish national home very different from the functioning state of ISRAEL and we too have entertained at different times different ideas. However (gp.undec.) British view of the new facts (paragraph 3 above) must be faced as facts and taken into account in formulating a REALISTIC new approach by all parties concerned: Arabs Jews United States United Kingdom and especially United Nations. Provisional British thinking re the new realistic approach on which they hope for an early expression of United States views is as follows.

5. His Majesty's Government believe that the best solution of the Palestine problem in the circumstances would be one along thex lines of the Mediator's previous proposals minus the idea of union between the two states and including some form of international responsibility for Jerusalem by which Jerusalem possibly but not necessarily might be placed under Arab sovereignty. As the British see it such a solution would mean an independent sovereign state of Israel including most if not all of GALILEE and an Arab territory((TW) including AQ(1)(ABA)(2) the political future of which would be left to the Arabs. Haifa would be either a free port or under some form of international state. The future of Jaffa would have to be determined. The Arab Jewish frontier would be subject to some form of international guarantee to reassure both sides. (In this specific connection the British think that the best course would be for the Mediator to recommen

that the/...4

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From:— *To:—*

Despatched Received

No. of

that the United Nations should lay down that the frontier could only be changed by the United Nation and that any attempt to do so otherwise would be a breach of the peace). Amongst other factors which the British think might be involved are

(a) the solution of the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe and Arab displaced persons in Middle East.

(b) Some EQUATION(1) of outside economic help so that the neighbouring Arab states will not become depressed areas dangerous both from the point of view of communism and the economic well being of Israel.

6. His Majesty's Government gravely doubts that either the Arabs(1) or the Jews will accept for some time to come a settlement on these lines and believes that it would be more rational for the United States and United Kingdom to work(1) in the immediate future as they did in the case of the truce upon the problem of securing the Arabs and the Jewish acquiescence to such a ~~settlement~~ settlement: if need be this settlement might have to be imposed as the truce was by the United Nations.

7. If the Mediator is successful in securing agreement of both to any set of proposals the international problem will of course exist but His Majesty's Government do not believe that this will happen and when the Mediator towards the end of August presents to the Arabs and Jews a set of(1) modified proposals the second set will likewise be rejected. When this happens His Majesty's Government believe the Mediator will find it necessary to refer the matter to the United Nations (i.e. either the Assembly or the Security Council)

8/...5

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

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From:— *To:—*

Despatched Received

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8. The Foreign Office has given much thought to the character of the resolution upon which the United Nation might act. The resolution might be either positive (thus attempting to settle the question(1) once for all) or provisional designed to(1) smooth the way for a more positive solution later upon which the United Nations body might act at some future time. The Embassy's immediately following telegram contains the outline of the working paper prepared by the Foreign Office to clarify its(1) own thinking re the possible provisional solution.

9. The advantages of the positive solution are

(a) it would remove the possibility of further dispute over the location of the frontiers

(b) The United Nation guarantees of the frontiers could come into force at once

(c) it would obviate either side JOCKEYING to improve its position.

The disadvantage of the positive solution is that the Arab leaders would find it extremely hard in the face of Arab public opinion to give explicit recognition now to the existence of the Jewish state. The leaders would probably be unwilling to risk recommending this and the only result might be the renewal of fighting by the Arabs(1) or at least serious internal instability in the Arab countries. A provisional solution on the other hand would have dangers for the Arabs but the Arab leaders might prefer it for internal reasons. If so their choice re the form of the solution should probably be adopted(1) (see paragraph 14(1) below).

10. The British Government is most anxious to keep in step with the United States Government on this question

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

and/...6

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

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From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

and visualise that the OPTIMUM repeat optimum United States - United Kingdom co-operation in achieving final settlement along the above lines might embrace the following

(a) Once the United States and the United Kingdom can agree that the new hand has been dealt in Palestine and that the cards now available must be played to secure lasting settlement the United States and the United Kingdom(1) might make clear to the Mediator either in the Middle East or during his Swedish visit the similarity of their views re the settlement along the lines of his earlier proposals (see paragraph 5). This information might be extremely useful when he begins serious work with the two parties again

(b) the United States and the United Kingdom at the same time could urge the Mediator to produce the map showing clearly the lines of force which existed at the end of fighting because this line with such minor modification as might be agreed(1) to by the parties would be that which both sides must continue to respect. In the case of the positive solution the line would be the frontier between the Jewish(1) state and the Arab area.

(c) the United States and the United Kingdom could attend the United Nations with an agreed view as to the solution which should go before the United Nation on the basis of the Mediator's(1) new report and new proposals.(1) If the United States(1) and the United Kingdom could agree to work together(1) re the solution His Majesty's Government believes that there would be so much

support/...7

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

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From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

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support forthcoming for a Palestine settlement endorsed by both the United States and the United Kingdom and which at the same time reinforced the prestige of the United Nations that the agreed solution (either in positive or provisional form - see paragraph 8) would pass with ease.

11. The above represents the British views re the optimum United States - United Kingdom co-operation. The Foreign Office is aware of the special difficulties with which the United States Government may be faced in the next few months and if the United States cannot for variety of reasons undertake to advocate openly the imposition by the United Nation of "lines of force" in Palestine as the basis of a reasonable and workable settlement at very least the British would hope the United States Government would not repeat not oppose a British resolution to this effect and above all that the United States Government would not repeat not stimulate opposition of the other states to such a resolution.

12. The essence of the problem is that the British believe that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom can ignore the developments in Palestine since November 29th and they would like us to join with them in the efforts to get the United Nations to finalise as a reasonable and workable solution the de facto frontier in Palestine which has emerged out of the fighting. The British feel that the United States - United Kingdom co-operation is vital to the success of such an effort not only for the purpose of effective United Nations action but also because a divergence between United Nations and United Kingdom at this juncture before a United Nations FORUM would intensify the essence of the Palestine problem(1) itself. They believe that if the United States Government should elect to stand firm upon the November 29th partition plan (upon the acceptability of

which/...8

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

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From :—

To :—

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Received

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which the provisional Government of Israel recently has(1) cast out) and the United States Government should ignore (gp.undec.) partition which has taken place in Palestine this would encourage the Jews to make territorial demands beyond the areas which are under their control at present and in the circumstances can be enlarged only by renewed fighting. By the same token divergence between the United States and the United Kingdom would encourage the Arabs to believe by being more intransigeant they can induce the United Kingdom to secure for them a more favourable territorial settlement(1) by getting the United Nations to eject the Jews from at least part of the territory now under the control of the provisional Government of Israel. The British desire that the United States and the United Kingdom should attend the United Nation not repeat not as champions of either the Jews or the Arabs; they would like to see us appear(1) as great states whose joint interest is the achievement of a workable and permanent settlement of the Palestine problem His Majesty's Government cold-shouldered the Arabs in order to secure their acquiescence to the truce and His Majesty's Government are prepared to do this again to secure Arab acquiescence to the de facto situation in Palestine (see paragraph 13) provided the United States Government for its part is(TW) willing to base its own policy in the United Nations on realistics and if necessary cold-shoulder the Jews.

13. The task of His Majesty's Government in bringing about Arab acquiescence is delicate(1) and difficult(1) one because the Arab bitterness against the west is already deep and the imposition upon the Arabs of the Jewish state which they have committed themselves never to accept will intensify this bitterness. In the British view this feeling can be minimised only by giving the Arabs at the same time some concrete evidence of the

Western/...9

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

- 9 -

Clear

From:— *To:—*

Despatched Received

No. of

persons.

Western understanding of their position by such measures as the United Nations aid in solving the Arab displaced ~~people~~ problem; special guarantee that the Jews will not be allowed within a few years to enlarge their state economic and for the Arabs etc.. In the absence of such steps the British consider that revulsion of the Arab feeling against the West would face the spread of Soviet influence and at the very least would mean that the United States and the United Kingdom could not count on Arab co-operation of taking up their strategical requirements.

14. The evidence of British pre-occupation with ways and means to achieve Arab acquiescence to the Jewish state without the risk of internal disorders in the Arab states loss of British military facilities and loss for indefinite period of some if not all of Middle East oil is the fact that in connection with the resolution (paragraph 8 above) the British Government would wish to take the Arab leaders into their confidence at an early stage and privately consult as to whether the Arabs would acquiesce more readily to a positive or to a(1) provisional resolution - Ends.

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lgvd.
(HLM/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 8/48.

TELEGRAM.

Code

From: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, BAGDAD.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON.

No: 815 of 27th July, 1948 1000 28/

RESTRICTED.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.815 of July 27th.

Repeated for information SAVING to Amman, 40
Beirut, 44
Cairo, 47
Damascus, 48
Jedda, 58
U.K.Delegation New York, via F.O., 12

Cairo telegram No.1096 to you.

Director of political section of Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms that permanent Iraqi delegate to UNO (Naji al Asil) has been recalled. He pointed out that Iraqi consul-general in New York could act if necessary.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K.Delegation New York as my Savingram No.12.

RICHMOND.

PLC
JH/BDH
AD/MB

TOP SECRET

(S/1014/48).

BRITISH LEGATION,
AMMAN.
7th August, 1948.

Dear Wright,

Please refer to Foreign Office telegram No.8520 of the 3rd of August to Washington about Palestine.

Is not the reference to "Aqaba" in paragraph 5 of this telegram an error ? As you know Aqaba town and port belong to Transjordan and are not, therefore, part of the Palestine problem.

It may have been the intention to refer to that part of Palestine which forms a section of the shore of the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. If that was so, some amendment to the phraseology of the paragraph in question would seem to be necessary.

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

M.R. Wright Esq., C.M.G.,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

ASK/HA.

BRITISH LEGATION
6 AUG 1948
S/1814/48
AMMAN

AMMAN 87 (1)

59A

SAVING TELEGRAM

/SR (30) Copy No. . . .

FROM: CAIRO DESPD: BY BAG

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE

NO : 125 Saving DATED: 28.7.48

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 125 Saving of 28th July, repeated Saving for information to Damascus No. 93, Beirut No. 88, Baghdad No. 87, Jedda No. 98, Jerusalem No. 36, Amman No. 87, U.K. Delegation, New York No. 14 and Washington No. 14.

Damascus telegram No. 367 to Foreign Office.

United States Air Attaché told a member of my staff on July 21st confidentially that, according to a confidential report which his Embassy had received from the Associated Press, three flying Fortresses (B.17) had left the United States, of which one was presumed to have crashed after leaving the Azores, and the other two landed at Corsica, since when they have not been heard of. United States Air Attaché considers it possible that they have since reached Palestine, and gave it as his opinion that B.17s might have been purchased in America from United States Government war surplus agencies.

CAMPBELL

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

60

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— (DOW) JERUSALEM *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 5/8/48 (18.28) Received 6/8/48 (08.30)

No. 182 of 4th August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL(1)
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.345 of August 4th
Repeated to Washington, UKDEL New York, B.M.E.O., Amman.

You will be aware that DAYAN has replaced(1) DAVID SHALTIEL as the Jewish Military Commander in Jerusalem.

2. I know nothing of Dayan's history save that he is reported to be(1) a relation by marriage to Dr.JOSEPH the Jewish Military Governor of Jerusalem and to have been Commander of the PALMACH assault on RAMLEH and LYDDA The Chairman of the Truce Commission who has met him describes him as spoiling for a renewal of the fight, claiming to be indifferent to political considerations and to the amount of destruction which the resumption of hostilities must inevitably cause.

3. Shaltiel told the chairman that the reason for his dismissal was his failure to capture the whole of Jerusalem in his attack on the evening of July 17th and the morning of July 18th (when the truce was supposed to be operative). He said that he had launched the attack unwillingly as he was ill prepared and that it would have required a fortnight to conquer(1) the whole of Jerusalem

4. The appointment of a "victorious commander" taken in conjunction with SHERTOK's claims to Jerusalem repeated in Haifa telegram No.(1) 314 to you may indicate the change of attitude on the part of the "provisional government" in respect of Jerusalem and even an abandonment of the policy* of adhering closely to the terms of the resolution of November 29th in favour of a policy of force. It may be in fact indicative that they intend to steal (gp.undec. ? IRGUN)'s thunder by themselves playing a more active role in the capture of the town

*which they have pursued hitherto

than/...2

Wt. 45504. D1691. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched 18 Received 30

No. of

than that foreshadowed in my telegrams No.328 (not to Washington) and 344. The Mediator in conversation on August 1st commented that the Jewish politicians were "above themselves".

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, UKDEL New York and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos.31, 77 and 45 respectively.

(HLM/IL/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T).

FILE NO.S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

61

From:—S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*—H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 7/8/48 (11.40) Received 7/8/48 (11.50)

No. 775 of 6th August, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.
TOP SECRET.
Following received from Haifa telegram No.343 of August 6th Begins.

Before leaving for RHODES with Count BERNADOTTE STAVROPOULOS(1) the Political Adviser on the Mediator's staff called on me ostensibly to reply to your telegram No.374 (please see my telegram No.(343 - Sic) but really to warn me, I think, that the Jews were on the point of violating the truce not necessarily by open warfare but by the wholesale importation of fighting men and materials. In my telegram No.333 of August 4th I forecast that Jewish moderates might have difficulty in preventing wide-spread violations of the truce by the I.Z.L. and the Stern Gang and Stavropoulos agreed with me. He said that they had been told in Jerusalem and in TEL AVIV and SHILOAH had been sent to Haifa to tell them that as the Security Council was not(1) able to make the truce effective they had no choice but to take the law in their own hands.

2. SHERINGHAM has brought from Tel Aviv a copy of the official report(1) of SHERTOK's press conference on August 2nd of which I sent a summarised translation in my telegram No.334. The report from which I translated did not contain the following(1) statement by SHERTOK(TW) begins.

> It is quite clear that this state of affairs where the truce is continually being violated in a unilateral manner cannot be endured for long and we shall not tolerate it much longer Ends.

3. STAVROPULOS said that the Jews did not realise that the order to cease fire was an order to both sides and the Security Council would be obliged, if the United Nations

Organisation/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

Organisation was to continue to exist, to take action against them if they carried on their supposed intentions.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos.78 and 16.

(HLM/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 8/8/48 Received 8/8/48 (11.20)

No. 780 of 7th August, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.
SECRET.
Addressed to Jerusalem telegram No.614 of August 7th.
Repeated for information Haifa, UKDEL New York, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Cairo, B.M.E.O.(1), Washington and Rhodes.

Haifa telegram No.348 to me.

I shall be glad of your comments on this news and on Haifa telegram No.341. Meanwhile I should be glad if you and Mr. Marriott will take every opportunity of making clear to the Mediator (gp.undec. ? and) his staff that His Majesty's Government are not at present contemplating any step towards the recognition of a Jewish State or any confidential assurances of the kind suggested in paragraph seven of Haifa telegram No.341 and in Haifa telegram No.348. In particular Mr. Marriott should make it clear to the Mediator's staff that his(1) remarks in the last sentence of paragraph 1 of Haifa telegram No.348 represented a purely personal expression of opinion and are not confirmed by His Majesty's Government.

2. It is essential that we should not give the impression to either the Jews or the Arabs that we are about to modify our policy in this matter. The Jews would immediately think that we were condoning the aggressive intentions which they are at present giving so much evidence and that they had only to pursue this policy for a little longer and they would (? gp.omitted) us to grant Zionist recognition. This is only the major political card that we have to (? gp.omitted) with the Jews and it is essential that we should reserve it for use at the(1) appropriate (? gp.omitted) when we may

hope/...2

Wt. 45504. D1691. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

hope to get some ~~with~~ worthwhile and lasting(1)settlement in return. It is equally essential that the Arabs should not believe that we are about to take any such step. In order to reach a settlement of any kind we shall(1) almost certainly need to use all our influence once more(1) with the Arabs at the appropriate(1) moment. Our stock of influence is at present low and must be gradually built up over the next few weeks. If we take any step towards recognising the Jewish State or even if the Arabs(1) had good reason to believe that we were doing so. The exact reverse would happen and we should find ourselves without any influence at all on Arab policy at the critical moment.

Cairo pass B.M.E.O. 89707.

(/HA).

Wt. 45504. D!891. 30m 5/48.

SECRET

PERSONAL

(63)

BRITISH LEGATION,

AMMAN.

(S/1011/48). 7th August, 1948.

Dear Glubb,

I have been informed that Colonel Roscher Lund an ex Norwegian Officer who is the head of the United Nations Secretariat in Jerusalem has shown a strong anti-British bias and should be treated with reserve. No information should be intrusted to him in confidence nor should his word be trusted.

There is no objection to this warning being passed on in confidence to any of your officers who are likely to come into contact with Lund.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

Major General J.B.Glubb Pasha,
CMG., DSO., OBE., MC.,
HQ. Arab Legion,
Amman.

ASK/HA.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

27th July, 1948.

(E 10001/4/G)
SECRET

Dear Chancery,

Information received from Jerusalem points to the desirability of issuing the following confidential warning to British civilian and service personnel who are likely to have dealings with members of the United Nations secretariat in Palestine or neighbouring countries.

Colonel Roscher Lund, a Norwegian ex-officer, who is a senior member of the Secretariat in Jerusalem, has a strong anti-British bias and should be treated with reserve. He has shown this by his conduct not only in Palestine this year but also in Greece, where he was on the staff of the United Nations Balkan Enquiry Commission in 1946-47. No information should be imparted to him in confidence nor should his word be trusted.

Will you please ensure that a discreet warning is given to whom this may concern, in case Lund should pass your way.

We are addressing a similar letter to the Chanceries at Damascus, Beirut and Cairo and to the Consulates-General at Jerusalem, Haifa and Rhodes.

Yours ever,

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN 6 AUG 1948 S/1014/48

The [illegible],
British Embassy,
Amman.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

64

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 9/8/48 (11.30) Received 9/8/48 (11.35)

No. 783 of 7th August, 1948.

TOP SECRET.
Addressed to Washington No.8693 of August 7th.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York, Cairo, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, B.M.E.O., Jerusalem and Haifa.

I spoke to the United States Ambassador on August 5th about Palestine and the Middle East. I said that the British and American strategical objectives in the Middle East were the same and it was essential in the interests of both of us that the British position there should be maintained. I believed that this position was now threatened by Russia who might be expected to bring about a resumption of fighting in Palestine and tribal risings in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq and perhaps in Azerbaijan.

2. In this connexion we were seriously concerned at the accumulating evidence of Jewish acquisition of war material particularly aircraft while the Arabs had been able to obtain ~~more~~ none because of the British embargo.(1) I pointed to Jewish statements that the Jews no longer felt bound by the November 29th frontiers and that the IRGUN would fight for the full liberation of Jerusalem. In the light of these statements we were concerned to learn that the United States Government had not agreed to provide the Mediator witha(1) contingent of security forces to police Jerusalem.

3. I thought therefore that the Jews were likely to break the truce and if this happened the Arab Legion probably would be unable to maintain its position and Transjordan would be threatened. This meant immediate danger to(TW) the Royal Air Force based at Amman and in Iraq. If an attack was made on Transjordan territory we should be immediately involved owing to our Treaty promises and because we could not leave our bases unprotected. In Iraq the danger was not from a direct

Wt. 45504. D'891. 30m 5/48.

attack/...2

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

attack by Jews but from internal unrest following on Iraqi reversals in Palestine and from the fact that the Russians would seize the opportunity while the Iraqi forces(l) were involved elsewhere to cause trouble amongst the Kurds.

4. To meet these dangers we did not propose to hand war material to the Arab forces while(l) Truce continued but we felt it essential to move some additional supplies to our own bases which had hitherto been(l) equipped on "training" as opposed to "operational" basis. We had no intention of transferring any equipment or ammunition to the Arab Legion unless, as a result of the resumption of hostilities, Transjordan territory was threatened with an attack. In the case of Iraq we would only hand war material to Iraqi forces if they were(l) engaged in suppressing internal disorders. If as I strongly hoped the United States Government agreed with the above we would speak to the Mediator and we would not object to supervision by the Mediator to see that these conditions were carried out.

5. I also asked if the United States Government would warn the Jews that(l) aggressive action by them would lose them the sympathy of the United States(l).

6. Finally I(TW) impressed on the United States Ambassador the need to provide a Security Force for Jerusalem as requested by the Mediator. I considered that there was ample justification for the provision of such a force in the terms of the Security Council's Resolution of July 15th. Mr. Douglas suggested that as an alternative to providing the United States personnel that the United States Government might be able to provide equipment for French and Belgian forces.

7. The United States Ambassador has telegraphed a complete account of our discussion to the State Department.

8. Despatch follows.

(JFS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D.891. 30m. 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48). **TELEGRAM.**

(65)

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 9/8/48 (12.10) Received 9/8/48 (12.10)

No. 785 of 7th August, 1948.

(64)

SECRET.

Addressed to Baghdad telegram No.860 of August 8th.
Repeated for information to Amman and B.M.E.O.

My telegram No.8693 to Washington.

Pending the United States Government's reply it is impossible to give any answer to the Iraq Prime Minister's approach to you recorded in your telegram No.828. If you think it desirable you can however inform him that I have received your report(1) and am giving serious and (? gp.omitted) consideration to the difficult questions involved.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

COPY NO...

BRITISH LEGATION
- 9 AUG 1948
BEIRUT

XXXXXX

XXXX

Clear Savingram Out.

From: BEIRUT To: FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 46 SAVING of August 7th, 1948.

Repeated SAVING to U.K. Del., New York No. 17.
Cairo No. 61.
Bagdad No. 55.
Damascus No. 83.
Amman No. 55.
Jedda No. 51.
B.M.E.O. No. 51.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 46 SAVING, repeated Saving to U.K. Del., New York, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman, Jedda and British Middle East Office.

Palestine: Press comment week ending 7th August 1948.

1. At the beginning of the week a certain change of tone was noticeable. The increasing number of pro-Soviet articles, Azzam Pashe's statement that Anglo-Arab treaties only served British interests and Fares el Khouri's appeal to the Arab Governments to change their foreign policy gave a definite pro-Soviet note in the papers.

2. A number of papers stressed that the Arabs should not tie themselves to one side only but should deal equally with all international powers. Al Hayat on several occasions reminded the Arab Governments that they should not offer their natural resources to the Anglo-Saxons only, but should deal with every one and sell to the highest bidder. As Sharq was very bitter and warned Arab Governments not to follow blindly the Anglo-Saxon lead at the next United Nations meeting, as the Arab peoples were watching to see whether their Governments really represented them or were just "yes" men to the Anglo-Saxons. Through following the West so far, the Arabs had lost Russian friendship but had not properly gained the friendship of the Western powers, since the Anglo-Saxons had never let an occasion go by without opposing Arab interests.

3. Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement on the refugee problem

/which ...

BRITISH LEGATION
BEIRUT

which was reported in full in several French and Arabic papers, brought a better tone to the press and was well received generally. One paper, Sada el Ahsal, said however that the British attitude could be compared to a person "attending the funeral of his victim."

DISTRIBUTION:

1. Chancery.
2. Library.
3 - 10. Saving copies.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

67

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 8/8/48 (13.00) Received 9/8/48

No. 774 of 6th August, 1948.

Following received from Haifa telegram No.341 of August 6th - Begins.

TOP SECRET.

I saw Count BERNADOTTE last evening and he has promised to give me his views on the supply of aircraft to Middle East air lines and to cause his office to furnish(1) a list of equipment (your telegrams Nos.374 and 367).

2. I asked(TW) him whether he had formed any ideas as to the near future of the I.P.C. terminals and the C.R.L. refinery at Haifa. He said that he had discussed this question with SHERTOK that afternoon. Shertok had made it plain (increasingly and emphatically) that the "cabinet of ISRAEL" would not repeat not permit anything in the nature of manifest control of the refinery or terminals. Count Bernadotte had formed the opinion that during the truce the Jews would not repeat not allow one ton of refined products to reach an Arab State.

3. I urged that the restarting of the refinery was a world interest and that it was certain that if we should go to the Arab States on this ground and enquire if they were prepared to allow oil to flow through the pipeline for their and the Jews and the world's benefit against a Jewish guarantee that the oil would be distributed in ratios of the existing agreements the Arabs would demand at least supervision of the output from the pipeline and the refinery because they do not trust the Jews. He agreed and thought the Jews might accept (possibly for the benefit of Abdullah) some kind of free port(TW) at Haifa but would (gp.undec.) accept supervision even by him of exports through(1) the pipeline or of distribution of the refinery's products. Either would be regarded as infringing the sovereign rights of the Jewish State.

4/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

4. Count Bernadotte ended by suggesting that the Government of Iraq should make proposals for the resumption of the flow of (? gp.omitted) through the pipeline to Haifa either

(a) to the Government of ISRAEL or

(b) through His Majesty's Government or

(c) through the United States Government whose representative will shortly be in TEL AVIV(TW).

5. I cannot agree that this would be wise. My experience of the Jews makes me confident that if the first approach came either directly or indirectly from the Government of Iraq they would regard it as a moneylender regards a plea for loan and impose terms which they would find it hard to modify in any subsequent negotiations. I think that our line should be to help the Jews to appear to the world as generous.

6. SHERINGHAM arrived from TEL AVIV whilst I was with Count Bernadotte and later told me that the Jews are insistent on WRAPPING up oil and detainees in Cyprus and three hundred thousand Arab(1) refugees(1) and two hundred(1) and fifty thousand or more Jews in Arab countries in one parcel. I think that there are enough bargaining points to make three parcels the one of prime importance being oil.

7. REUBEN SHILOAH (ZASLANY) who went to Rhodes as one of the Jewish experts and is now an adviser in "the Ministry ror Foreign Affairs" complained to Sheringham that(1) while there had been indications(1) (e.g.(1) the articles in the Times) that we accepted the existence of (tel - Sic ? ISRAEL intended) these had not at any time been (amplify - ?ed by omitted) any

authoritative/...3

Wt. 45504. D1691. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

authoritative spokesman of His Majesty's Government in either Palestine or London. Until confirmation were(TW) given the Jews had no alternative to considering us as(1) supporters of their enemies. It could be given in confidence and was more important than recognition at the moment. If it were given the Israel authorities could take "certain steps" to tone down anti-British propaganda. I do not believe that confidence would be respected if this confirmation were given in London but would it be possible for Sir Hugh Dow or me to be instructed to convey to the Government of Israel that there was a most important communication to be made to them ? It would be to the effect that His Majesty's Government had recognised that the State of Israel had come to stay but that there were reasons which Shertok would readily understand why we could not at present declare(1) to the world our recognition of his Government(1). There were however considerable over riding differences between one country and another. To the end of raising world properity from its present low level we were not likely to use all our influence on the Arab states to enable Haifa Refinery to go into full production at the earliest possible moment and suggested (gp.omitted) (mut.gp.).

8. The next question would be the 11,000 Jews detained in Cyprus and I think that our best bargaining counter is the supply of aircraft etc. to the Middle East Airlines. I am not convinced that the moderate Jews really want these people in Palestine and they may be as afraid of them as the British here will be when they arrive. But the question(1) is one which the moderates in the "Government" are forced to press and to let them come in will at least remove some of the Soviet pressure. (Shertok is drafting separately in this connexion). As for the supply of aircraft to Middle East Airlines I think that even if the Jews never have themselves any intention of fulfilling an undertaking they will accept our guarantee that such aircraft will be for civil purposes.

Sherttok

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 3/48.

9/...4

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

9. This leaves the refugee Arab problem(1) to be dealt with against the displaced persons in Europe and the Jews in Arab countries.

10. I believe an appeal now repeat now to the Jews to show their statesmanship would have effect.(1) They are proud to be the founders of a nation and if we could after they have just expressed willingness to meet the Arabs with a view to peace show them that to accept reasonable terms for the disposition of the refinery and the resumption of the export of oil through Haifa would be a demonstration(1) of their concern for world (and not only ZIONIST) prosperity they would I think play.

11. I took the occasion to point out to Count Bernadotte the danger of Haifa refinery becoming a real issue between Western Europe and Russia. He had not realised that it needs one 10,000 tons tanker ~~necessary(1)~~ (regular) to keep the refinery(1) working to capacity without the pipeline and that 10 such tankers a month are needed to keep the present single unit operating. (? Shertok ? Sheringham) tells me that these difficulties are realised in Tel Aviv where the Russian tanker shortage is as may be. It would however I think be(TW) (gp.undec. ? dangerous) for us to allow "the state of Israel"to be able to operate the refinery on Russian controlled imports of crude oil even for one month which may or may not be possible. I have therefore marked this telegram most immediate since there is no more crude oil in Haifa.

12(TW) It is not too much to say that Count Bernadotte complained when he put to the Security Council the world need for the products of Haifa refinery he had no repeat no support from the British French or United State

representatives./...5

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

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Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

representatives. In fact a spectator might have said how clever MANUILSKY had been in discovering that Bernadotte was a representative of capital interests.

13. Our interview took place in Count Bernadotte's bedroom where I was interested to see his bedside book is a much used BIBLE.

Foreign Office pass Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., Beirut, Amman, Baghdad and Damascus as my telegrams 70, 14. 72, 21, 17 and 16 respectively.

(JFS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 10/8/48 (09.28) Received 10/8/48 (09.30)

No. 773 of 6th August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Received from Haifa 342 (gp.undec.)

Repeated for information UK(1)DEL New York, B.M.E.O., Jerusalem, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Washington and Saving to Rome, Paris and Brussels.

Your telegram No.374.

The Mediator's(1) views are still that aircraft should not repeat not be supplied to the Middle East Airlines owned by Jews or Arabs. He hopes that we shall concert action with the United States Government. He authorises me to say that he is giving further consideration to this(1) matter.

Foreign Office please repeat Damascus telegram 17 and Amman as my telegram 22.

(HLM/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

(67)

see folio 62

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 9/8/48 (17.55) Received 10/8/48 (17.55)

No. 778 of 7th August, 1948.

Following received from Haifa 348 of August 6th. Repeated to Jerusalem(1), B.M.E.O., UKDEL New York, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda - Begins.

TOP SECRET.

During my conversation with STAVROPOULOS this morning he mentioned that the Jews had asked the Mediator yesterday to arrange for them to meet the Arabs to talk peace terms. The Mediator demanded that the Jews put this gesture(1) in writing. Stavropoulos' comment was that the Arabs would refuse to meet the Jews(1) as they could not withdraw their repeated declaration that they did not and would not recognise the State of ISRAEL. I said that perhaps the only thing(1) which would help the Arabs to recognise Israel would be prior recognition

2. The Mediator this morning(TW) sent two(1) of his staff REEDMAN and Dr. MOHN to say that if His Majesty's Government is contemplating recognition of Israel it would greatly facilitate his task if recognition came quickly. He had now received(1) the written request of the Jews to arrange for them to talk peace terms with the Arabs.

3. They thought that my suggestion that Sir Hugh Dow or I should be instructed to make the approach outlined in my telegram No.341 would probably meet the Mediator's (1) requirements. The mere fact that one us had been received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(1) would be construed as our having accorded recognition in some form. This would be different from the capital that would be made of a press report from London if the communication were made to SHERTOK's representative there

4/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

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From :—

To :—

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4. They thought it would be for the general good if the United States Government recommended the Jews to moderate their(1) tone(1) especially in public statements. These are made for home consumption and they are storing up trouble for themselves when the time comes that they have to compromise.

5. They pointed out that the Jewish political gains had been small by comparison with their military achievements for which I.Z.L. take the credit.(1) It would be for the general good if the other countries did what they could to help the moderate in their effort to control the extremists. A political achievement such as securing its(1) recognition would greatly strengthen the hands of the moderates.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Amman as my telegrams Nos. 80, 17, 19, 18, 74 and 23 respectively.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1[redacted]/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:—S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 10/8/48 (10.00) Received 10/8/48 (10.00)

No. 784 of 7th August, 1948.

SECRET.

Addressed to Amman(1) telegram No.784 of August 7th.

Repeated for information to Baghdad and B.M.E.O.

My telegram No.8693.

Pending the United States Government's reply it is impossible to give any answer to the message from the Transjordan Prime Minister in your telegram No.613. If you think it desirable you can however inform him that I regret the delay in sending him a reply and that I am giving serious and urgent consideration to the difficult questions involved.

Copy to:- S/1058/48.

(JFS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

TELEGRAM.

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FILE NO. S/1014/48.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— (Con.Gen). JERUSALEM *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 10/8/48 (18.55) Received 11/8/48 (08.30)

No. 189 of 10th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.364 of August 10th
Repeated for information to Haifa, UKDEL New York, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Cairo, B.M.E.O., Washington and Rhodes.

62 66 67 69

The Mediator arrived here yesterday and I called on him last evening at his request. At that time I had(1) received Haifa telegram No.341 to you and your telegrams Nos.614 to me and 54 to Rhodes but(1) had not received Haifa telegram No.348(1) to you on which you have asked me to comment. I was not therefore clear to what extent Mr. Marriott had committed himself in conversation with the Mediator or whether your instructions in telegram No.614(1) were the result of inferences from the rather confused narrative in paragraph 6 of Marriott's telegram No.341(1). However, the Mediator at once introduced the subject by telling me that he had been informed by His Majesty's(TW) Consul at Rhodes that His Majesty's Government were not repeat not contemplating recognition of a Jewish state at present, but that the Consul had not been able to give him reasons for this, as he had not yet received a copy of your telegram No.614 to me in which they were given. I found the Mediator had indeed gathered the impression, either from his own conversations or those members of his(1) staff with Marriott, that His Majesty's Government's recognition of the Jewish state was imminent and he expressed to me the opinion that if this course had been decided upon, the sooner it was announced the better, as it would(1) lead to an immediate slackening of the tension here.

2. As instructed in your telegram No.(1) 614 I informed the Mediator that no such decision had been made and of ~~th~~ the reasons why it would be particularly inappropriate at this juncture to encourage the Jews(1) to believe that

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

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such a decision was imminent. I(1) said that if he had gained a different impression from his talks with Marriott, those must be taken as an expression of(1) Marriott's personal opinion and not as the views ~~of~~xx(1) of His Majesty's Government. I expressed some surprise, in view of the Mediator's own admission to me last week that the Jews were now feeling a bit above themselves(1), that he should now think the local situation would be improved by such an announcement, since it would inevitably elate the Jews and correspondingly depress the Arabs. It was in my opinion more likely to lead to action by the extremists of both sides, the one FLUSHED with success, and(1) the other(1) driven by despair(1).

3. The Mediator will leave here on the 11th afternoon. He informed me that he will leave Rhodes for Sweden on Friday the 13th, but would only be paying a very short visit. He also referred to the proposal that he should make his Headquarters at Jerusalem and said that he thought this impossible at present owing to the difficulties of freedom of communication with the Jews and Arabs, he would be practically a prisoner, and would not be able to get on with any other work than the demilitarisation of Jerusalem. I did not think it wise to press him further on either of these matters, beyond suggesting that he would find practical difficulties in making His(1) headquarters here to be less than he supposed, and that it would be quite possible for him to ~~xx~~ take up his headquarters in the King David hotel,(1) and to insist at once on the road thither from the Arab quarter to be kept open and demilitarised so as to allow freedom of access to him (?Fullstop New Para 4 intended)

4. The gist of further discussions with the Mediator

at this/...3

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

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From :—

To :—

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at this interview is given in my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Haifa, UKDEL New York, Washington, Jedda and Rhodes as my telegrams Nos.47, 81, 35, 43 and 5 respectively.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.50

(HLM/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48). **TELEGRAM.**

(65)

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 9/8/48 (12.10) Received 9/8/48 (12.10)

No. 785 of 7th August, 1948.

(64)

SECRET.

Addressed to Baghdad telegram No.860 of August 8th.
Repeated for information to Amman and B.M.E.O.

My telegram No.8693 to Washington.

Pending the United States Government's reply it is impossible to give any answer to the Iraq Prime Minister's approach to you recorded in your telegram No.828. If you think it desirable you can however inform him that I have received your report(1) and am giving serious and (? gp.omitted) consideration to the difficult questions involved.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 9/8/48 (17.50) Received 9/8/48 (09.00)

No. 781 of 7th August, 1948.

SECRET.

Addressed to Rhodes telegram No.54 of August 7th.
Repeated for information Haifa, Jerusalem, UKDEL New York, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, B.M.E.O., Cairo and Washington.

My telegram No.614 to Jerusalem.

Please inform the Mediator and Mr.STAVROPOULOS with reference to the conversation which they had in Haifa that His Majesty's Government are not contemplating recognition of the Jewish State at present and do not intend to give any confidential assurances to the Jewish authorities on this subject. You could indicate confidentially the reasons for our attitude as set out in the opinions of my telegram under reference.

Cairo pass B.M.E.O. 89807.

(CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

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SECRET

(S/1014/48).

BRITISH LEGATION,
AMMAN.
10th August, 1948.

To Sec 1st Sec 2nd Sec CJC

Dear Eastern Department,

We enclose herewith the translation of a report dated the 29th July, 1948, by a senior Iraqi officer on the Lebanese army and on the forces commanded by Fauzi el Kaoukji.

We are sending copies of this paper to the British Middle East Office, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jeddah and Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

AMMAN CHANCERY.

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN

(A.S.K.)

The Eastern Department,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

ASK/HA.

REPORT ON THE LEBANESE ARMY AND ON THE FORCES OF FAUZI PASHA KAOUKJI.

THE LEBANESE ARMY.

STRENGTH.

The Lebanese Army now consists of four regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery one of 105 m/n and one of 75 m/n, with six armoured cars and nine small Renault tanks.

This force is occupying a very wide front, from Ras el Nakurah to Merj Ayun in the east (120 kilometres).

It cannot be used as a offensive force, on the contrary, it is on the defensive and in a weak position as it has no reserves with which to deal with a Jewish defensive.

ARMS.

The Lebanese army is armed and equipped with French material which is difficult to renew at present. The ammunition supply only amounts to 500 rounds for each rifle and 5,000 rounds for each machine gun. The artillery possess about 250 rounds for each gun. The ammunition situation does not permit the Lebanese army to undertake even a local offensive.

POSSIBLE USES.

The position of the Lebanese army must be considered to be one of defence and it could not undertake an offensive in conjunction with the Iraqi army unless it was first reinforced with both infantry and artillery.

I suggest that it should be re-organised on a divisional basis in order to facilitate command and to enable the regiments to work together - Each two regiments should for the moment be constituted a division, with the intention of adding a third regiment to each division in the future. Each division should include a battery of detachments of 105 m/n and 75 m/n guns which, in the future, should be made up to a full battery of each calibre.

The armoured cars and tanks should remain under higher command and be used in the manner called for by the military situation.

The regiments should be mobilised (or at least one in each division) and heavy transport for this purpose should be acquired at once.

SHORTAGES/...2

SHORTAGES.

(Reserves).
A reserve force of at least two regiments and two batteries of artillery should be formed as without this reserve, the Lebanese army cannot go over from the defensive to the offensive; in fact one might say that its absence places Lebanese territory in danger if the enemy should stage an attack in the future.

(Training).
Better training facilities should be provided for all ranks and arms of the Lebanese army in the use of their weapons and provision made also for trained personnel to replace casualties and to fill the new cadres proposed above.

(Ammunition).
The ammunition in hand is insufficient and every possible step should be taken to obtain supplies of ammunition as, without these, it will be impossible to continue the fight even for a short period.

(Financial provision).
The above proposals cannot be given effect without funds. I suggest, therefore, finding the necessary sum for the proposed expansion and for the maintenance on an active footing of all forces in view of the danger of future fighting.

FAUZI KAOUKJI's FORCES.

THEIR CONDITION.

Fauzi's forces cannot be depended upon at all at present. They are neither regular forces or guerillas and they require basic technical re-organisation in order to make them capable of playing any useful part on the battlefield. To retain them in their present form would be a waste of money and men to no useful end. In fact, their abolition would be better than their retention as at present.

WEAPONS.

Fauzi's forces used weapons of a great variety; German, French, British, which makes their supply and maintenance very difficult. I learn that supplies of ammunition for French and British arms are exhausted and until new supplies are found the units bearing these arms cannot be used and are, therefore, serving no purpose by their existence.

USES.

The forces are neither regular nor guerillas and, as was shown recently at Nazareth, they are unable to hold areas, which they occupied without fighting, when attacked by the Jews. They should, therefore, be reorganised as mobile guerillas, and used for raids and demolitions ahead of the regular armies or on the flanks of regular armies of these are advancing.

SHORTCOMINGS/...3

SHORTCOMINGS.

Fauzi's forces should be organised as follows :-

(1) Rear command.
(2) Forward command.
(3) Field kitchens and supply bases.
(4) Ordinance and clothing depots.
(5) The opening of training centres for existing personnel and for reinforcements.
(6) Transport vehicles.
(7) Medical services.

COMMAND.

I recommend that there should be a single high command for the forces operating in northern Palestine; that is to say the Syrian and Lebanese armies and Fauzi's forces, so as ensure :-

(a) A united command.
(b) Co-operation between themselves.
(c) Common objectives.
(d) Cooperation with other Arab armies.

29th July, 1948.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

73

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :—H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

To :—S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 11.8.48 (22.15) Received 11.8.48 (12.15)

No. 642 of 11th August, 1948.

DONKEY.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.642 of 11th August
Repeated to UKDEL New York No.126
Washington No. 85
Cairo No.188
B.M.E.O. No.185
Baghdad No. 77 SAVING
Beirut No. 84 SAVING
Damascus No. 78 SAVING
Jeddah No. 79 SAVING
Jerusalem No. 15 SAVING

CONFIDENTIAL.

PALESTINE.

1. Glubb met Mediator in Palestine yesterday and latter gave him following information about his recent talks with Nokrashi and Shertock about future of Palestine.

2. The Egyptian premier had said that Egypt could not in any event agree to a Jewish state and when he was asked how in practice he would prevent its existence he explained that what he meant was that Egypt would ignore the Jewish state's being in all manners possible.

3. The Mediator expressed the opinion that United Nations would inevitably confirm the existence of the Jewish state and went on to ask the premier which of the three possible solutions for the Arab remnant of Palestine he would prefer to see adopted.

The three choices were :-

(a) the partition of Arab Palestine between Egypt, Transjordan and Syria

(b)/...2

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

TELEGRAM.

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From :—

To :—

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(b) the formation of an Arab Palestine state and

(c) its union with Transjordan.

The Premier said that in the first place there could be no question of Egypt taking over any part of Palestine. On the whole he would prefer to see a Palestine Arab State because the union with Transjordan would upset the balance of power in the Arab League. If however the Security Council ordered that the Arab parts of Palestine were to be annexed to Transjordan he for one would not raise any serious objection.

4. Apparently the Mediator then put the same question to Shertock who also expressed preference for an Arab Palestinian State but did not rule out the possibility of Jewish agreement to Arab Palestine being annexed to Transjordan.

In fact the Mediator sensed that the Jewish authorities violent antagonism towards Transjordan which was so much in evidence at the end of the Mandate had been modified considerably.

5. The Mediator asked Glubb if the Transjordan Government would take over Arab Palestine if ordered to by the United Nations. Glubb declined to express an opinion.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.126 and 85 respectively.

(ASK/HLM/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/+1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

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From:— (Con.Gen) JERUSALEM *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 11/8/48 (21.12) Received 12/8/48 (07.00)

No. 190 of 10th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.365 of August 10th
Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, B.M.E.O., UKDEL New York, Washington and Haifa.

My immediately preceding telegram.

I referred constantly to sustained rifle and machine gun fire from the Jewish side during the current truce and expressed the opinion that its object was to provoke the Arabs to reply on such a scale as would give the Jews an excuse(1) for the resumption of open warfare in Jerusalem area. The Mediator said that he fully agreed with this since it summarized the situation and that he was at the moment drafting a stiff note which he proposed to give to the Jewish authorities here today, warning them that he was not deceived by these tactics and that it would do them no good if such provocative action resulted in a renewal of hostilities. He would also see SHERTOK today and speak to him very strongly on this matter. I explained to him that the local Arab Commander here,(1) although he was satisfied that the Observers correctly appraised the situation, felt some difficulty because he did not know what reports were made to the Mediator, and was indeed under the impression that such reports were only made when breaches of the truce resulted in some known incident such as the wounding of an Observer. Personally he was unaware of any action(1) taken by the Mediator as a result of reports received. I suggested that the Mediator might consider giving some prompt publicity to his findings on these reports.

2. The Mediator referred to the fact that the Jews were now generally putting up(1) their demands, and showing an increasing disposition to reject out of hand any suggestions that he himself brought forward. He was

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unperturbed by this, as he was convinced that attempts to cold-shoulder him were doing the Jews no good in world opinion and that his own position was all the stronger beçause(1) of their intransigeant attitude.

3. I enquired what progress if any he had made in the matter of securing an adequate number of observers and a force to secure the observance of the demilitarisation in Jerusalem. He said that he expected by today to have 50 observers available for Jerusalem. For the enforcement of the demilitarisation he had now put up his demand, and said that he was asking for a force of 6000, repeat 6000 men, and that these should be heavily armed with the latest weapons and should be prepared to use them remorse(1)lessly against any(1) DISSIDENT elements attempting by force to (? gp.omitted) demilitarisation. He considered that it would be completely hopeless to rely on a mere civil(1) police force of a thousand men or so only lightly armed, as they would inevitably be attacked by the I.Z.L., encouraged by the fact that "ISRAEL(1)" did not now want the demilitarisation. If on the other hand a strong well armed(1) international force were in position(1), there was no likelihood that it would be attacked at all(1). He said that BUNCHE was still in America, and was to see Mr. Marshall on the matter today. The Mediator said that if his demand were refused, the matter would have to be brought up before the Security Council, and he would have to explain that his mission had been rendered hopeless by the lack of co-operation shown by the United States Government in this matter. A very difficult and dangerous situation might(1) then arise, as the Russians would certainly express their own willingness to send 5000 men at once in order to secure the enforcement of United Nations Organisation decision. I was left uncertain whether the Mediator really hoped to get 6000 men, and whether this increased demand was the result of a new appreciation of the

situation,/...3

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

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From :—

To :—

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situation, or merely a tactical move to ensure his (gp.undec.) at least the smaller force of 2500 men that he had originally asked for, The Mediator said that he thought that election politics were still playing too great a part in shaping United States policy in this matter, and mentioned the curious fact that the American public should look with surprising(l) indifference on the death in action of civil policemen while they would be raised to indignation by the slay(l)ing of a single soldier.

Foreign Office please pass UKDEL New York, Washington, Haifa and Jedda as my telegrams 82, 36, 48 and 44 respectively. Cairo please pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.51.

(HLM/JS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/43.

(W/T)

TELEGRAM.

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

Cypher ID/OTP

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~~Clear~~

From:— (Con.Gen.) JERUSALEM *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 11/8/48 (17.43) Received 12/8/48 (07.00)

No. 191 of 10th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.366 of August 10t
Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus(1),
Jedda, Haifa, B.M.E.O., UKDEL New York and Washington.

I have now received your telegram No.613 repeating telegram No.348, on which and on Haifa telegram No.341 you have asked for my comments. To some extent I have(1) already given my(1) views in paragraph 2 of my telegram No.364, of which this telegram may be considered as an amplification.

2. In the first place, if there were(1) any(1) question of imminent recognition by His Majesty's Government of the Jewish State, I should be strongly averse (from - Sic) its being conveyed either by me(1) or by Marriott in any such indirect way as Marriott has suggested. There is not the slightest hope that such a confidence would be respected, and you would immediately be confronted in London with the necessity of either publicly confirming recognition or of disowning your local representatives.

3. (Secondly)(2), I do not believe recognition at this stage would strengthen the hands of the moderates. Marriott is perhaps only(1) thinking of Jews in this connexion, but there is no difference between the moderate and the extremist Jew in their insistence on recognition, and if it is admitted (see paragraph 5 of Haifa telegram No.348) that "Jewish(1) political gains have been small by comparison with their military achievement, for which I.Z.L. take the credit"(1) then clearly the obtaining of recognition (cyphered twice) which is a prime objective of "ISRAEL", would be attributed to the success of I.Z.L. action rather than to the less successful political pressure of the moderates.(1) It would

therefore/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

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From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

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therefore encourage the extremists rather than the moderates if indeed the latter term can still be appropriately applied to any section of the Jewish political set-up. The present indications are that "Israel" is moving fast in the direction of the Revisionists. The effect on the Arabs would certainly be to encourage those elements who, in the present rather depressed state of military outlook, argue with the courage of despair that it is better to go down fighting than to face political defeat without the hazard of a blow.

4. Thirdly, on the main merits of the situation I see no advantage in according recognition at this stage, when the only QUID PRO QUO suggested is that "Israel" might then take certain steps to tone down anti-British propaganda. I concur in the view that recognition is still an important card by the play of which at the right time we may hope to gain substantial advantages. On any long term view, the British Government is immensely more powerful than any Jewish(1) state, and our goodwill is infinitely more important to "Israel" than is theirs to us(1). There is no reason why we should allow ourselves to be blackmailed into according it for such shadowy advantages as are now offered.

5.(1) It seems possible that Mariott's views are coloured by the fact that in Haifa he has been entirely cut off from Arab contacts, and he may have been unduly swayed by SHERINGHAM, whose ability to present the Jewish side of the case I have hitherto considered and shall still consider to be an advantage to me. I trust that my own conclusions have not been too much influenced by opposite considerations, but I must leave you to assess this.

6/...3

Wt. 45504. D'691. 30m 5/48.

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From :—

To :—

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6. On the oil question I am commenting in a separate(1) telegram. Here I will only say that I see little advantage in trying isolated discussions on particular subjects, or as Marriott put it, in attempting to tie up bargaining points in separate parcels. My experience in(1) other complicated negotiations has been that the inevitable result of such attempts is that agreement on one matter is always made subject(1) to a satisfactory agreement being reached on another, which means that at a later stage everything is again thrown into the melting-pot(1).

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram 52.

Foreign Office please pass Haifa, UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.49, 83 and 37 respectively and to Jedda as my telegram No.45.

G.S.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(WW/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48 · **TELEGRAM.**

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Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 11/8/48 (21.35) Received 12/8/48 (09.00)

No. 787 of 10th August, 1948.

Addressed to Jerusalem, Washington, UKDEL New York, Haifa(1), Amman.

Following received from Rhodes telegram No.34 of August 9th - Begins.

MOST SECRET.

Your telegrams Nos.54 and 55. I made the communication contained in the first telegram to the Mediator yesterday morning. Your telegram No.614(1) had not reached me then. But as the Mediator especially asked if I knew the(1) reasons for your decision I suggested Sir Hugh Dow could furnish this(1) information when the Mediator was in Jerusalem on August 9th.

2. In the ensuing conversation the Mediator referred to the transfer of his headquarters to Jerusalem. He still considered the move impracticable. Neither the United States Government nor the French Government(1) could provide a force to police the town and the suggestion made to him to raise a mixed Arab/Jewish police force for the purpose he considered UNWORKABLE. The small airfield(1) in the neighbourhood was unserviceable unless adequately guarded. He would be cut off from contact with both sides, security was deficient and he feared that there were infiltrations into (gp.undec.) of some of the worst elements of the I.Z.L. In present conditions his time at Jerusalem would be fully taken up with petty complaints from both sides.

3. Emphasising that his(1) remarks were completely "off the record" the Mediator then spoke of the difficult attitude of the Jewish authorities. They were placing obstacles(TW) in the way of his observers. Recent(1) complaints against the Arabs gun-running (infringement)(2) s of the truce had(1) proved (gp.undec.) foundation.

4/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

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From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

4. The Mediator had before him a telegram from Mr. AZCARATE reporting(l) that the last charge against the Egyptian forces was baseless. It is probable that this report had caused (gp.undec. -? him intended) in his irritation to be(l) unusually outspoken.

5. The pretentions of the Jews he continued, were increasing and they now claimed both the NEGEV and West GALILEE. This attitude he thought was detrimental to their cause. It would lead to loss of some of their friends[redacted]p and eventually to the formation(l) of a Jewish state of smaller proportions than the original proposals.

6. Their requests to him to arrange a meeting with the Arabs for peace talks(TW) he considered a manoeuvre. They were aware that the Arabs would not entertain the proposal since acceptance would be (interrupt - Sic ? interpret intended)ed as a step to recognition (gp.undec.) of the Jewish state.

7. The Arabs adhere to their declaration of non recognition of the Jewish state. AZZAM Pasha had upheld this view in(l) recent talks. When ask(l) (gp.undec.) the Mediator if this policy meant war in the eventuality of recognition of the state of ISRAEL by United Nations Organisation, AZ (ZAM or CARATE - only indicator given insert word already spelt beginning with AZ) that it would lead rather to(l) complete political and(l) economic boycott by the Arab Union.

(CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM "OUT".

(77)

CYPHER, OTP.

FROM JERUSALEM TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

No. 374.

CJC A L

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 374 of August 11th.

Repeated for information to Bagdad No. 53.
Cairo No. 146.
BMEO Cairo No. 54.
Washington No. 41.
Haifa No. 50.
Amman No. 11.)
Beirut No. 7.)
Damascus No. 5.) SAVING.
Jedda No. 11.)
UKDEL New York No.2)

BRITISH LEGATION 13 AUG 1946 AMMAN

SECRET. SECRET

(75)

My telegram No. 366.

Following are my comments, as requested, on remaining points raised by Haifa telegram No. 341.

1. I am hampered by insufficient data from expressing anything but a tentative view on the restarting of Haifa refinery but, as I have indicated in my telegram under reference, I consider it would be a mistake to tie this question up with any other specific problem. Nor do I consider our long-term position to be so weak as to justify policy suggested by Haifa.

2. Fundamentally, in fact, our position is strong. Firstly, the refinery does belong to the Consolidated Refineries Limited and whatever the Jews may seek to do with it they cannot get away from this. Eventually they have got to return it to the Company or face unpleasant consequences in an international court. Secondly, we, in conjunction with the Arabs, control the sole sources of oil which can make the refinery a paying proposition. Thirdly, although it would be a long and expensive process, the Company could presumably always reconstruct at Triploi and count on full Arab support. A refinery at Tripoli and using Kirkuk oil would, I imagine, render the Haifa refinery trying to run on Russian controlled oil, a poor economic propostiion. Nor can I imagine the Soviet Government wishing to work indefinitely a refinery which, in addition to being uneconomic, would be denied them immediately on the outbreak of war. Thus, although there might be political temptations for the Soviet Government to join forces with the Jews at Haifa, economic and military factors should make it unwise unless the "Government of Israel" are willing simultaneously to accord them military bases. If they are willing to do this, the sooner we know it the better but I think it excessively unlikely that they would be willing at a time when they are in need of political and financial support from the United States.

3. In dealing with the Jewish authorities, it is advisable to play from strength and though the above points would, I think, furnish us with strong lead, the hand cannot be played by HMG whose freedom of action is circumscribed by the fact that they do not recognise the 'State of Israel'. The Iraqi Government would be most unlikely to make proposals to the Jews at present, however much they might like to, and I doubt whether we could prevail upon the Security Council to take the matter up. It seems therefore that this must be done by representatives of the companies concerned (the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Consolidated Refineried Ltd.) on a business basis. If they put squqrely to the Jews the admittedly long-term factors cited in paragraph 2 above, the latter might be brought to see the weakness of their ultimate position and accordingly to attune their short-term policy to these factors by

/consenting to some.....

consenting to some arrangement which the companies could put to the Arabs with hope of success. The extent to which they could re-inforce a long-term threat to move to Tripoli (or elsewhere) by short-term factors depends on data which I do not possess, e.g. availability of temporary alternative refining facilities in the United Kingdom, France or Italy, the tanker position, the extent to which the refining capacity of the topping plants at Kirkuk and Tripoli can be enlarged to tide them over the emergency. If this is at all possible it is our strongest card. A boycott of Haifa, though unfortunately costly to the companies, would be obviously much more costly to the Jews and there seems very little liklihood of their allowing it to happen particularly because they will realise that alternative arrangements outlined by the companies would work whereas their own arrangements might not.

4. I restrict my comment on paragraph 8 to saying that to lump detainees and aircraft spare-parts into one parcel appears somewhat arbitrary and it would be most difficult ever to reach a satisfactory equation of two such disparate elements. It would indeed be pleasant if some means could be arrived at for liberating these people or at least sharing with the United States Government and the Mediator the odium of their continued detention. I am not able to judge from here whether the former would be prepared to shoulder their share of it and obviously if they do not, it would be both unfair and detrimental to his position to ask the Mediator to do so.

5. The Jews in the Middle East mentioned in paragraph 9 of the telegram under reference are really extraneous to any issue at present under consideration. They have been dragged in by Jewish politicians purely as a counter-balance to the Arab refugees. As stated in British Middle East Office telegram No. 28 saving, these Jews are on the whole attached to the countries of their abode. They have little active sympathy with Zionism and little desire to live in the Jewish state. Usually they tend to keep quiet or even to identify themselves with the state of their abode in politics and their only incursions into the Palestine problem have been periodical attempts to bring about a reconciliation between Arab and Jewish politicians. The Jewish state stands to gain very little from these people in their present homes and with their present attitude. They would be more useful to the Zionist cause in the world if they would agree to let themselves be massacred by the Arabs or driven from their homes. The Jewish politicians' attempt to drag them into the present conflict, when all that most of them wish is to remain as inconspicuous as possible, may well have (and may even be designed to have) precisely that effect.

H.M. Consul-General.

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 853

Cipher Office Serial No. [redacted]

Date 13/8

78

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
A	1657	
From :- Jerusalem	Originators No.	Number of Groups
		143

BRITISH LEGATION 13 AUG 1948 AMMAN

Special Instructions WC

Indication of Priority 1

1	1912	added to	the FO tel	No 377 of	4
2	aug 12th.	repeated to	Amman	Baodad	8
3	Beirut Cairo Damascus	Haifa Jeddah			12
4	BMEO Ankara N.Y. & Wton.	Reported			16
5	State collaps	explosives	are that		20
6	according to	latest	report received		24
7	by him	the pumping	station at		28
8	LOTRAN	on the Jerusalem		wadi	32
9	Sarfeh	like line	down RWSFK		36
10	Air was blown	up and	destroyed		40
11	Last night	shortly after	it had		44
12	been handed	over by	the arab		48
13	legion to	UNITED	NATIONS	care	52
14	accordance with	known	facts.		56
15	United States	consul	reports	that	60
16	the new	harbour	known		64
17	and most	Jewish	population	of	68
18	Jerusalem	short	water	position	72
19	is not	good.	Investigations	and	76
20	proceeding	to	ascertain	responsibility	80
21	for the	serious	breach	of truce.	84
22	F.O please	pass	to Jeddah	Ankara	88
23	N.Y & Wton	as	mytels	46, 88 & 42	92
24	respectively.	Cairo	pass	BMEO as	96
25	mytel 55.		DOW		100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

79

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

C5C

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 13/8/48 (16.35) Received 13/8/48 (16.45)

No. 793 of 13th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

Addressed to Jerusalem telegram No.646 of August 13th.

and to Amman and Haifa.

Repeated for information to Washington, UK(1)DEL New York and B.M.E.O.

Please telegraph any reliable information(1) you may have as to who was responsible for the explosion at LATRUN pumping station.

81

(JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

80

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN OFFICE & UKDEL N.Y.
NO PRIORITY TO OTHER ADDRESSEES.

From :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To :*— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 14/8/48 (12.35) Received 14/8/48 (11.30)

No. 652 of 14th August, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.
DONKEY.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.652 of 14th Augus

Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.127
Washington No. 86
B.M.E.O. No.186
Jerusalem No.172
Haifa No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

PALESTINE.

Transjordan authorities deny knowledge of authors of sabotage of pumping station at Latrun which they claim to have handed over intact to United Nations representatives.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York Immediate, Washington, Jerusalem and Haifa as my telegrams Nos.127, 86, 172 and 10 respectively.

(ASK/JFS/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T) FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To :—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 14/8/48 (10.00) Received 14/8/48 (10.10)

No. 791 of 12th August, 1948.

Following received from(1) Haifa - Begins.
Addressed to F.O. telegram No.379 of August 11th.
Repeated for information to Jerusalem, Beirut, B.M.E.O., Amman, Jedda, Baghdad, and Damascus.

Hopkins(1) of C.R.L. called this morning and told me that the firm would like a small British party to return to the Refinery as a safeguard against any action that might be taken under the abandonment of currency ordinance and the abandonment of properties regulations translations of which were enclosed in my despatch No.45. I have said that I have no objection in view of the interests involved and the uncertainty of my position (see my telegram No.365) provided that if the Jews made any effort to restart the refinery the British must leave at once so that the Arabs cannot accuse us of operating the refinery(1) for the Jews. I think too that it might be well to issue in the Arab countries an announcement to the effect that this small party could not operate the refinery which had now been left for six weeks without British personnel. In view of the value of the property the C.R.L. directors(1) felt it was time for a report on its condition to be made to them by two or three of their British personnel.

2. Hopkins(1) also received from HISTADRUT the representative(1) with whom they deal on labour questions a pressing invitation to go to Tel Aviv where it would be arranged for him to meet BEN GURION and SHERTOCK. Hopkins refused on instructions from Dix which he did not think came from London. I do not see any local objection to Hopkins who has the relevant powers accepting such an invitation if it is repeated but with the sole idea of listening to what they have to say(?. omitted) I had previously had a visit from SERVOISE the Economic

Adviser/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

Adviser to the Mediator who was hopeful of persuading the Jews when he goes to Tel Aviv tonight to accept some kind of outside supervision over the I.P.C. and the C.R.L. if the Arabs permit oil to flow through the pipeline.

(Beirut) F.O. Pass Beirut as my telegram 81.

(Damascus) F.O. Pass as my telegram 29.

(Amman) F.O. pass as my telegram 25.

(JFS/JB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 875

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 15/8

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
A	16 AUG 1948	1302
From :- London	Originators No.	Number of Groups
		29

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN Skotyl 16 AUG 1948

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority	
Priority	S	

1	80214	Your	letter	S 10 14/48	4
2	of august 7th	regarding			8
3	paragraph	5 of my	tel		12
4	No 832 to	Washington	repeated		16
5	probably	communications			20
6	for	Jaffa	and not		24
7	Rehoboth	Agaba	Beer		28
8					32
9					36
10					40
11					44
12					48
13					52
14					56
15					60
16	Correction.				64
17	MM.				68
18					72
19					76
20					80
21					84
22					88
23					92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

(W/T)

TELEGRAM.

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

CJC

84

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 14/8/48 (17.20) Received 15/8/48 (17.00)

No. 797 of 13th August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Following received from Haifa telegram No.386 of 13th August - Begins.

Your telegram No.422.

United Nations office here(1) has no repeat no information reliable or unreliable as to who was responsible for the explosion at LATRUN pumping station. They regret that publicity has been given to the pure conjecture that Arab irregulars were responsible.

(HLM/CJB/HA).

pp. 79 + 80

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 15/8/48 Received 16/8/48 (06.30)

No. 798 of 13th August, 1948.

SECRET.
Addressed to Washington telegram No.8(TW)957 of August 13.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York, Cairo, Jerusalem, Haifa, Damascus, Amman, B.M.E.O.Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut and Saving Jedda.

My telegram No.8(Gp.undec. ? 6 hundred)93.

On August 12th I again(1) spoke to the United States Ambassador regarding Palestine. Last week I had given him proof of how very serious the situation was and he had indicated that his(1) Government also were(TW) becoming gravely concerned at the Jewish activities. I felt that the only way out of the difficulty was for the Mediator to make reasonable proposals in which the Arabs could at least acquiesce though they might not accept them in principle and for the rest of us to denounce the frontiers and give as much assurance as possible to the Arabs. This was the only solution but the Americans must make up their minds to speak very frankly and firmly to the Jews about their aggressive actions. Otherwise there would be misunderstanding.

2. Mr. Douglas told me that his Government was in possession of pretty good evidence (? that omitted) arms were being sent in from(1) Czechoslovakia. I said that this confirmed our own information.

3. He also expressed great concern about the thousands of Christians: their precarious position(1) had received no attention at all from the Mediator the Churches and(1) the public. I said that I could not understand why the Church was completely silent now that Jerusalem was being bombed every day by the Jews whereas when Abdullah's (1) troops were firing on the Old City of Jerusalem to

recapture/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. . of

recapture it for the Arabs to whom it belonged the (gp. undec.)s. had SCREAMED in protest. With regard to the thousands of Arab refugees there seemed to be no indicatio anywhere that these unfortunate people should be the distracted victims of aggression. Could not public opinion in America be roused regarding their plight ?

4. The United States Ambassador said that he would again communicate with his Government on the whole question.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Copy to:- S/1082/48.

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 15/8/48 Received 16/8/48 (06.30)

No. 798 of 13th August, 1948.

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recapture/...2 -

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/43.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:—S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*—H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 15/8/48 (?) Received 16/8/48

No. 799 of 13th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.

Addressed to Rhodes telegram No.(87)(2) of August 13th. Repeated for information Haifa, Jerusalem, UKDEL New York, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut and Saving to B.M.E.O.(1) Cairo, Washington and Jedda.

Please inform the Mediator(1) confidentially on his return that as shown by the following information which we have received from a very reliable source(1) the Jewish Air Force as it now exists has been largely built up(1) in violation of the Truce of July 19th(1) (a) Messers_chmidt 109s. When the fighting broke out on May 15th the Jews possessed no(1) fighters of this type. During the period preceding the Truce of June 11th(1) they (1) acquired a few. Prior to June 5th the Egyptians claimed to have shot down three or four. Several of them (including some in the course of assembly) were observed on Jewish airfields from May 28th to June 9th the maximum number on any(TW) one occasion being five on the latter date. During the Truce they have not ceased to be imported. By July 8th there were as many as 13 M E 109s parked on Jewish airfields, while two other aircraft observed there were probably(1) of this class and two single-engined(1) fighters were being assembled at No.2 HERZLIYA landing ground near TEL AVIV.(1) This is the maximum(1) number (i.e.17) seen at any one time but further observation on July 10th, July 14th, July 17, July 21st and (gp.undec.) and August 5th which revealed from 7 to 10 certainly of fighter(TW) type and a further number probably of it, has amply confirmed that a large(1) -(1) scale violation of the Truce has been carried out. It is now estimated that the Jews have at least 20 fighters of this class.

(b) [redacted] Commandos [redacted]. On July 5th (i.e.3(1) days before a notable increase in the number of observable ME

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code — 2 —

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

109's) two Curtiss 92 transport aircraft (C-46)(1) were first observed at AQIR airfield. Since then the presence of this type has been regularly confirmed and their number is probably more than two. There is every reason to believe that such(1) large transport aircraft have been repeatedly used for ferrying in armaments from abroad. In particular M.E. fighters which are unable to fly long distances have been crated from(1) (? gp.s omitted) in by transport aircraft and reassembled in Palestine.

(c) On June 27th and July 30th(1) one Halifax was observed at(TW) TEL Aviv aerodrome and three flying fortresses (Boeing(TW) B.17) at(TW) RAMAT David(1). More Halifaxes(1) are believed to be in Palestine under (1) cover.

(d) A maximum of 8 DAKOTAS has also gradually appeared on Jewish airfields. Their number increased in the middle of June and again early in July but this may be due to the arrival of United Nations Organisation aircraft.

(e) 5 D.H.89's and up to (gp.undec. ? six) AUSTERS are also present but it is not clear whether they were brought in violation of the Truce.

(f) Complementary to the above there are clear indications that large(1) aircraft(1) have been leaving and attemtpting to leave North and Central America for Palestine(1). According to the United States Press 3 Flying Fortresses left(1) Miami on June 11th: one of them disappeared between theAzores and(TW) Corsica while the remaining two took off(1) from(1) Corsica headed for Palestine. Two CONSTELLATION transport aircraft(1) believed destined(1) for ISRAEL are reported to have been seized on July 13th by United States Federal authorities and a third in Rome at the request of (gp.undec.). In

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

Central/...3

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

- 3 -

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

Central America a new former PANAMANIAN refrigerator Company LINEAS AEREAS De Panama, believed Jewish owned, was reliably reported in May to be operating a bogus air line with the real object of flying KISCH and CURTISS C46 Commandos(1) (of which there will be(1) (gp. 9) to Palestine. A United Press correspondent reports that 2 Commandos belonging to this Comapny made a forced landing at BRNO in Czechoslovakia, but would proceed to Palestine on May 24th.

2. You should (gp.undec.) orally to the Mediator that in view of the small scale of the forces and operations in(1)Palestine the Jewish violations outlined above constitute a very considerable reversal of relative balance of strength which, according to the Mediator's declarations, may not be disturbed during the Truce. We cannot publish our information nor can we authorise him to do so or to divulge it to(1)other parties. But we are quite sure of its accuracy and suggest that his observers should be able to use it as a basis for their own investigations. We suggest they might enquire into the PROVENANCE and the date of arrival of the aircraft(1) at present(1) on Jewish(1) airfields and personnel and the type of cargo brought by them on arrival. They should at any rate be in a position to ensure that in the light of the above information a careful watch is kept(1) in future and that the arrival of any further military aircraft and airborne armaments is observed, investigated and denounced. The airfields in question are those at TEL AVIV, AQIR, Haifa, EIN SHEMER and RAMAT David and the following (ancillarie)(2)s: HERZLIYA numbers 1 and 2 and RISHPON near Tel Aviv and KEFAR HIAYIM near NATHANYA.

3/...4

Wt. 45504/ D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

3. In view of the Mediator's temporary absence in Sweden His Majesty's Consul-General Haifa should (pass)(2) (without)(2) delay a similar confidential communication to the S.O.s of the observer staff in the Jewish area and follow it up by discreetly reminding them at interval (? s omitted).(1) His Majesty's Consul General in Jerusalem may also at his discretion take parallel action in Jerusalem. The Mediator should be informed of the above instructions to Haifa and Jerusalem.

Cairo pass B.M.E.O. as my 24413 Saving.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

BRITISH LEGATION.

AMMAN.

17th August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL

(S/873/46).

Dear Burrows,

Please refer to my despatch No.49 (S/873/46) of the 15th August on the subject of regular British Army officers seconded to the Arab Legion.

Since that despatch was sent off, I have received a letter from Glubb in the following terms :-

"Dear Sir Alec,

Your No.S/873/46 of the 12th August, 1948.

On receipt of your letter, I sent an officer to Palestine to check up. Two officers are being employed as liaison officers with U.N.O. No regular officers have returned to their appointments.

What happened apparently was that once or twice officers who have got bored sitting doing nothing in Zerka, and, during the truce, have gone over for a night or two to see their friends. They have been told not to do it again.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J.B. Glubb"

No further action on the subject seems called for.

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
The Eastern Department,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

Copy to:- S/1014/48.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH LEGATION,
AMMAN.
15th August, 1948.

874

DESPATCH NO. 49.
(S/873/46).

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with my telegram No.424 which I addressed to you on the 31st of May, 1948, on the subject of the service in Palestine of regular British Army Officers seconded to the Arab Legion.

2. On the 12th August information reached me that one or two of these officers had returned to Palestine and I addressed a letter in the following terms on the subject to Major General Glubb.

"Dear Glubb,

Please refer to the instructions from the Foreign Office that all officers seconded from the British Army were to be withdrawn from Palestine. It was later agreed that these officers could be used for purposes of liaison with the United Nations Observers provided a formal request to this effect was received from the Mediator in writing.

I have no information as to whether the Mediator in fact ever made such a request but I am now given to understand that numbers of seconded officers are now serving in Palestine and in positions other than that of liaison officers to the United Nations Observers.

I would be grateful if I could be informed urgently of the exact position. I have no need to emphasise the seriousness of the situation that would arise were it to be publicly discovered that the Foreign Office instructions in this matter which have been repeatedly stated in the House of Commons had been disobeyed.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) A.S. KIRKBRIDE".

3. As I received no reply to this letter prior to Major General Glubb's departure for the United Kingdom on the 14th of this month, I mentioned the matter to the Prime Minister at a meeting which we had on that date and the promised to issue orders to the Arab Legion that any officers of this category who were serving in Palestine should be recalled to Transjordan.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect, Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

SK/HA.

C.R.O. S/1014/48.

PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH LEGATION,
AMMAN.
12th August, 1948.

878

(S/873/46).

Dear Glubb,

Please refer to the instructions from the Foreign Office that all officers seconded from the British Army were to be withdrawn from Palestine. It was later agreed that these officers could be used for purposes of liaison with the United Nations Observers provided a formal request to this effect was received from the Mediator in writing.

I have no information as to whether the Mediator in fact ever made such a request but I am now given to understand that numbers of seconded officers are now serving in Palestine and in positions other than that of liaison officers to the United Nations Observers.

I would be grateful if I could be informed urgently of the exact position. I have no need to emphasise the seriousness of the situation that would arise were it to be publicly discovered that the Foreign Office instructions in this matter which have been repeatedly stated in the House of Commons had been disobeyed.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) A. S. KIRKBRIDE

Major General Glubb Pasha,
CMG., DSO., OBE., MC.,
Chief of Staff,
HQ. Arab Legion,
AMMAN.

Copy to:- S/1014/48.

CMPG/HA.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— Consul-Gen. JERUSALEM *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 17/8/48 (12.45) Received 17/8/48 (12.50)

No. 198 of 17th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.394 of August 17th.
Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Amman, Haifa, Jedda, UKDEL New York and Washington.

Early rumours this morning, now confirmed by the Arab Legion Headquarters, Jerusalem, indicate that during the past 12 hours the Jewish forces, disguised as United Nations Organisation and or Red Cross officials have gained entry into Government House(1) and now occupy it together with Arab houses(1) on the Northern and Eastern slopes of Government House hill.

2. This means that a considerable stretch of the Jerusalem JERICHO road can be brought under effective machine gun fire, which will reduce my road communications with Amman to a hazardous might operation.

3. I am not aware of what steps the (Arab)(2) authorities are taking, but I will keep you informed of new developments. They appear much concerned with the internal security measures in view of this development and the same anxiety is felt by us.

4. Please repeat most immediate to Amman and Haifa.

F.O. please pass to UKDEL New York, Washington and Jedda as my telegrams Nos.92, 45 and 47 respectively. and most immediate to Haifa as my telegram 58.

Cairo pass B.M.E.O. No.61.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D.891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— Consul-Gen. JERUSALEM *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 17/8/48 (17.10) Received 17/8/48 (17.30)

No. 199 of 17th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.395 of August 17t
Repeated to Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Cairo, B.M.E.O. Cairo, UKDEL New York, Washington, Haifa and Jedda.

In continuation of my telegram No.394.

Occupation of Government House by the Jewish forces. So far as I am able to ascertain no action is being contemplated by the Truce Commission(TW). The Belgian member informs me that he presumes that the United Nations Organisation observers will have taken steps to inform the Mediator who will be now faced with a still more cogent argument of the futility of Mediation without a backing of force. I have no means of discovering what action has been taken by United Nations Organisation observers.

2. The unreality of the "truce" is now quite apparent. The occupation of the hitherto demilitarised Government House ridge has closed the last gap in the front line through which the observers and the Red Cross officials have been passing and there is now every indication that the next few hours will bring a renewal of hostilities on grand scale, and the fate of Jerusalem may be decided(1) within the next 24 hours.

3. Foreign Office please pass to Amman and Haifa as Most Immediate.

F.O. please pass to UKDEL, Washington, Jedda as my telegrams Nos.93, 46 and 48 respectively and Most Immediate to Amman and Haifa as my telegrams Nos.199 and 59 respectively.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram 62.

(HLM/JS/HA)

Copy to:- S/1027/48. ----------

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. 1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

90

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

CJC

K

PA C* 18.8 ??

From :—H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To* :— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 17/8/48 (18.15) Received 17/8/48 (12.50)

No. 660 of 17th August, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.660 of 17th August
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.130
Washington No. 89
Baghdad No. 79 SAVING
Beirut No. 86 SAVING
Cairo No. 82 SAVING
Damascus No. 80 SAVING
Jeddah No. 82 SAVING
B.M.E.O. No. 76 SAVING
Jerusalem No. 18 SAVING

TOP SECRET.

PALESTINE.

1. On the initiative of the Jewish authorities a meeting took place in Paris recently between the Transjordan Minister in London and SASSOON who was in the past head of the Oriental Section of the Jewish Agency.

The Jewish representative said that his principals did not wish to go beyond the original partition scheme and that if the Transjordan Government would agree to give it effect they could have the rest of Palestine and the financial subsidies from the Jewish state for which the original scheme had provided.

2. He had a number of proposals for putting the scheme in effect all of which involved Transjordan in the betrayal of the other Arab states in some way or other.

For instance the one particularily recommended by the Jew was that the Arab Legion should engage not to attack the Jewish forces and these in return would concentrate on clearing Palestine of the Egyptian and Iraqi armies after which Palestine could be partitioned at leisure.

3/...2

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

3. King Abdullah is suspicious and remarked that there was no guarantee that once the other Arab armies were out of the field there was no guarantee that the Jews would not turn all their forces against the Arab Legion.

He has arranged for a reply to be sent that the wholesale expulsion of the Arab population from the Jewish areas and the Jewish pretensions on the subject of Jerusalem have altered the original position. He went on to say that the return of the Arab refugees to their homes and the exclusion of Jerusalem from the Jewish state are necessary preliminaries to any settlement.

4. The King realises his inability to come to any independent agreement with the Jews but does not wish to say so openly in any contacts with the latter.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.130 and 89 respectively.

(ASK/JFS/HA).

W30057. D1350. 55M. (3 sorts). 10/45.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 17/8/48 (22.15) Received 18/8/48 (07.00)

No. 810 of 17th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

Addressed to Jerusalem No. 685 of August 17th.

Repeated for information Haifa, Washington, UKDEL New York Amman and B.M.E.O.

Your telegram No. 395.

I presume that this development has been brought urgently to(1) the attention of the Mediator's representatives.

You and Mr. Marriott should press them to inform the Mediator himself immediately.

2. His Majesty's Minister at Amman might also suggest to the Transjordan Government that they should report the matter directly, or through another Arab state, to the Security Council. Full publicity should also be given.

Copy to:- S/1027/48.

(HLM/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 8/48.

(W/T)

TELEGRAM.

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

92

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 17/8/48 (16.45) Received 17/8/48 (17.00)

No. 806 of 17th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following received from Jerusalem - Begins(1)

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.394.

(Remainder of telegram the same as Jerusalem telegram No.198 to Amman).

(EP2/HA).

Copy to:- S/1027/48.

Wt. 45504. D189i. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

LSC 0 (93)

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 17/8/48 (17.25) Received 17/8/48 (17.30)

No. 809 of 17th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following received from Jerusalem - Begins.

SECRET.

(89)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.395.

(Remainder of telegram the same as Jerusalem telegram No.199 to Amman).

Foreign Office please pass to Amman as my telegram No.199.

Copy to:- S/1027/48.

(EPS /HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

94

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

CSC

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 18/7/48 (09.43) Received 18/7/48 (10.00)

No. 804 of 17th August, 1948.

Following received from Haifa - Begins.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.404 of 16th August.

Repeated for information to Jerusalem, UKDEL New York B.M.E.O., Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut(1), Washington and Jedda.

Your telegram No.422.

United Nations office here has strong suspicion that the explosion at LATRUN pumping station was caused by Jews. There is however no repeat no evidence against one side or the other. Whoever did it knew(TW) his job. The pumps are irreparable but the engines can be made serviceable. The probability is that those responsible had previously been employed in the erection of (2 mut. gps.) the station.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., Amman, Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad and Beirut ~~repeated~~ as my telegrams 110, 34, 27, 40, 22, 21 and 86 respectively.

(JS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 3/48.

(W/T) FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

(95)

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— H.M. Minister, AMMAN. *To:*— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 18/8/48 (10.55) Received 18/8/48 (10.30)

No. 662 of 18th August, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 662 of 18th August

Repeated to UKDEL New York No. 132
Washington No. 91
B.M.E.O. No. 78 SAVING
Jerusalem No. 20 SAVING
Haifa No. 2 SAVING

CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

(91)

PALESTINE.

Your telegram No. 685 to Jerusalem (of 17th August, 48)

I have urged the Transjordan Government to make representations through the Mediator's local representative. They are extremely perturbed by the recent developments in Jerusalem and yesterday the Prime Minister said that he could not understand why His Majesty's Government who had pressed the Arabs so strongly to accept the truce did not react to the repeated breaches of its terms by the Jews.

Foreign Office please pass Most Immediate to UKDEL New York and Washington as myntelegrams Nos. 132 and 91 respectively.

(ASK/JFS/HA).

Wt. 27078. D1749. 75m In 3 sorts 10/47.

96

Telegram OUT.

From: Damascus. To: Foreign Office.

Disp: 1740 11/8/48. Cypher.

Telegram No. 397 of 11th August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 397 of 11th August repeated Saving to:

Cairo No. 21.
B.M.E.O. No. 31.
Beirut No. 30.
Bagdad No. 25.
Jedda No. 29.
Amman No. 29.
U.K.Del at New York No. 16.
Washington No. 175.

BRITISH LEGATION
16 AUG 1948
AMMAN

I called on Prime Minister yesterday prior to my departure on leave and found him in a rather surprisingly reasonable frame of mind about Palestine and there was none of that bravado which I encountered when truce was being discussed. Nor did I sense any bitterness towards ourselves: indeed at one moment he said that we were the only people who understood the problem. I expressed the hope that when Mediator presented his proposals Syrian Government would enter negotiations in the spirit of trying to find a solution rather than of having war as an objective.

2. Prime Minister professed to be rather bewildered about our attitude towards King Abdullah and I reminded him of the article in the treaty regarding obligations under Charter of United Nations. He then asked what we would do if Jews invaded Transjordan. I said that that situation had not arisen and that personally I was not able to answer his question.

3. Prime Minister asked me if I had any objection to Syrian Government employing a British airman who he said was no longer a serving officer. I said that as it was a question of a private individual I did not wish to say anything one way or the other; but I suggested that to engage anyone at this moment might be regarded as a breach of the truce. He did not think that that would be the case.

4. Prime Minister also told me that a consignment of clothing and other material for the army excluding arms and ammunition had just arrived at Beirut from England.

5. To-day I saw President of the Republic who gave me impression of taking rather a resigned view of things, but I did not trace any bitterness towards ourselves. He was naturally very bitter about refugee problem, a feeling which was certainly not diminished by a report in this morning's press that President of United States was studying a 100 million dollar loan to State of Israel. President also commented on fact that no other country had followed up our offer of financial assistance conveyed by Sir A. Cadogan.

BRITISH LEGATION
16 AUG 1948
AMMAN

96A

Clear Savingram Out.

From: BEIRUT To: FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 48 SAVING of August 14th, 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation, New York, No. 18.)
Cairo No. 62)
Bagdad No. 56.)
Damascus No. 86.) SAVING
Amman No. 56.)
Jedda No. 54.)
B.M.E.O. No. 52.)

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 48 SAVING, repeated for information SAVING to U.K. Delegation, New York, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman, Jedda and B.M.E.O.

Palestine: Press reaction week ending 14th August 1948.

1. The Palestine question slipped off the front pages of the local press this week and was replaced by internal affairs.

2. There was however a certain amount of news about the Arab refugee problem. The papers noted that while Britain, America and the Arab States were suggesting that the refugees be repatriated, the Arab Higher Committee opposed this on the grounds that repatriation would amount to tacit recognition of the State of Israel by the Arabs and would place repatriated Arabs at the mercy of the Jewish authorities. Al-Amal did not believe that repatriation would help the refugees because, as the paper pointed out, they were now homeless and penniless and it would be a long time before they could stand on their own feet again, especially under a Jewish régime.

3. The weekly Beirut el Masaa referred to America's attitude towards the Arabs and said that after the Presidential elections, if the Arabs knew how to be patient, there was sure to be a change of policy in favour of the Arabs.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. Chancery.
2. Library.
3-10. Saving copies.

BRITISH LEGATION
BEIRUT

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

97

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 18/8/48 (11.30) Received 18/8/48 (11.45)

No. 805 of 17th August, 1948.

Following(1) received from Haifa - Begins.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.405(1) of August 16th.
Repeated for information Jerusalem, UKDEL New York, Cairo, B.M.E.O., Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, Washington, Jeddah and Rhodes.

Your telegram No.429(1)

Captain MOMM was grateful for the information which confirmed not only his suspicions but information(1) from another source. He hopes to be able to arrange for RADAR equipment to resolve this problem as the Jews insist on one hour's notice of visits to airfields other than TEL AVIV, AQIR and Haifa which gives the time to lock the aircraft in hangars which the United Nations Observers are not allowed to inspect(1).

Foreign Office repeat Amman as my telegram 26.

H.S.
(HLM/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

98

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

From:— H.M.Minister, BEIRUT. ***To:—*** H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 15/8/48 (15.00) **Received** 16/8/48 (06.30)

No. 130 **of** 14th August, 1948.

TOP SECRET.
LIGHT.
GUARD.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.588 of August 14t
Repeated for information to Baghdad, Jerusalem, Amman,
Cairo, B.M.E.O., UKDEL New York, Jedda and Damascus.

64

Your telegram No.8693: Palestine.

It is generally admitted that His Majesty's Government have lost a great deal of ground lately with the Arabs though it appears to be anticipated that we shall have to draw yet further on our warning influence with them in connexion with this vexed problem. The facts are obvious and need no recapitulation, the main reason for the present EVANESCENCE of the British influence being the strict application by His Majesty's Government of the arms embargo even against the States with whom we are in alliance while the other members of the United Nations are(1) generally believed to have also blatantly and deliberately if not officially gone out of their way to build up Jewish strength. This is a state of things which is not likely to enhance in Arab eyes the value any more than the alliances with the British as is clearly indicated in Amman telegram No.636.

2. A glance at the map shows that the area now under Jewish domination is (gp.undec.) now(1) greater than that envisaged by the General Assembly in its(1) recommendation of November 29th. That this is to a large (extent)(2) attributable to Arab DISUNITY and inefficiency is no excuse for blaming the Arabs nor for drawing invidious comparisons between them and the Jews. They made it clear from the outset that they did not want a Jewish State and so they resisted its initial formation when it was imposed on them to the best of their poor ability. The result is that His Majesty's Government by withholding recognition from ISRAEL and(1) arms

from/...2

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

from the Arabs thereby EMASCULATING their allies have earned the cordial resentment(1) of both sides and gained nothing. While(1) the Jews flushed with success and employing the world oil shortage in an attempt to induce you to judge those most ardent and notorious Zionist leaders who describe(1) themselves as "models" but who are (gp.undec.) of their responsibility for all that has happened it has not been possible for His Majesty's Government to do anything very(TW) concrete to help the Arabs beyond giving them a full measure of unpalatable advice, however sound. But now if I am not mistaken I see a ray of hope in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference in which you state that "if an attack were made on Transjordan territory we should be immediately involved owing to our Treaty obligations".

3. The main obstacle today to the pursuit of His Majesty's Government's normal(1) traditional policy of friendship with and assistance to the Arab States and to honouring their Treaty obligations is the transcendence of their duty to United Nations Organisation. As I suggested in paragraph 2 of my telegram No.506 Palestine being a RES NULLIUS there seems to be no reason why what little remains of Arab Palestine should not be annexed forthwith by Transjordan or any of the other Arab States. If(1) such annexation were to be effected, any further Jewish aggression would entail an attack, probably on Transjordan territory(1) which would automatically furnish His Majesty's Government with an admirable excuse for doing no less for the Arabs than our fellow(1) members of United Nations Organisation (United States, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and the Union of South Africa, for example) have for some(1) time(1) been doing for the Jews.

4/...3

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48..

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

4. This suggestion may at first sight strike you as involving considerable risks and I have hesitated somewhat to submit it to you. But on reflection though (gp.undec.) without full knowledge of all the factors involved(1) I have decided to do so because(1) unless His Majesty's Government can find some way to circumvent the arms embargo and to show which side they are really on we are in very serious danger of loøsing our essential strategical communications and the oil(1) which apparently all the world including even the United States so urgently requires. It will not be easy even now to regain our former position as the trusted friend of the Arabs unless we furnish substantial and early proof that our friendship is worth something to them (gp.undec.) purely selfish. The American method of friendship by purchase does not command respect or loyalty and is accepted only at its cash value.

Foreign Office pass New York as my telegram 72.

Cairo pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram 192.

LJS.
(HLM/JS/ILA).

Wt. 45504. D'891. 30m 5/43.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

99

TELEGRAM.

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— Con. General, JERUSALEM *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 18/8/48 (18.10) Received 19/8/48 (08.40)

No. 200 of 18th August, 1948.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.399 of August 18th
Repeated to Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Cairo,
B.M.E.O. Cairo, Haifa, UKDEL New York, Washington and
Saving to Jedda.

89

In continuation of my telegram No.395.

Occupation of Government House by Jewish Forces.

Following is the summary of the Arab news broadcast from RAMALLAH (radio)(2) yesterday evening August 17th.

Jewish armoured car and infantry units occupied the grounds of Government House and the Arab College last night after diversionary MORTAR barrage on ZION hill(1) at ten thirty p.m. Later, a number of Jews disguised as United Nations Organisation observers descended to SILWAN village "to investigate Arab violations (? of omitted) the Truce",(1) capturing twelve Arabs and killing six. The Jews then advanced in force occupying SUR BAHIR village and(1) DEIR ABU(1) TOUR(1) and wounding 20 civilians in SILWAN. The Arab Legion and irregulars supported by Egyptian artillery, counter attacked this morning August 17th driving the Jews back to the perimeters of Government House and recapturing the villages named above.

2. It was also announced that the Arab Legion and Iraqi commands are now unified.

3. I have been unable to confirm this account of the fighting. The American Consulate on the Jewish side appeared to be completely without information. They stated that United Nations Organisation observers sent to Government House to investigate were turned back(1)

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

by a Jewish armoured car.

4. I am informed by the Arab Legion Headquarters this morning that negotiations between United Nations Organisation observers and the Jews succeeded yesterday evening in clearing Government House and the Arab College grounds and restoring the situation to normal. There was sporadic shooting and mortar fire during the night.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.65.

Foreign Office please pass to Haifa, UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos.61, 94 and 47 respectively.

Copy to:- S/1027/48.

(HLM/CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 3/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

100

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— (Houston-Boswall,) BEIRUT. *To:—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 19/8/48 . Received 20/8/48 (07.00)

No. 132 of 19th August, 1948.

RESTRICTED.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.603 of August 19th
Repeated for information Damascus, Baghdad, Amman,
Jerusalem(1), Cairo, B.M.E.O., UKDEL New York, Washington
and Saving to Jedda.

99

Jerusalem telegram No.399.

Jewish occupation of Government House.

As the British and probably the World press does not see its way to produce much Palestine news from any but Jewish sources I submit that this disgraceful incident should be given as wide publicity as possible at any rate over the B.B.C.

2. I have seen the report of it from the Senior Observer (Arab(1) side) at Jerusalem which was passed through me for communication to General RILEY. There seems to be no doubt that the Jews definitely did commit a particularly mean and spectacular breach of the Truce of which a good deal might usefully be made.

Foreign Office pass UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams 73 and 65 respectively.

(HLM/CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. E/1027/48.

TELEGRAM.

(101)

Cypher

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

IMMEDIATE TO F.O. & JERUSALEM
NO PRIORITY TO OTHER POSTS.

From:— H.M.Minister, AMMAN. *To:—* S.OF S. F.O. LONDON.

Despatched 19/8/48 (12.30) Received 19/8/48 (12.00)

No. 672 of 19thbAugust, 1948.

IMMEDIATE.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.672 of 19th August.
Repeated for information to UKDEL New York No.133
Washington No. 92
Baghdad No.141
Beirut No.148
Cairo No.192
Damascus No.123
Jeddah No.109
R.M.E.O. No.190
SECRET. Jerusalem No.176

Persistent rumours in Amman allege that a general attack by Arab irregulars in the Old City of Jerusalem is contemplated in the next few days. The irregulars owe their allegiance in general to the Mufti and it is stated that the attack is to take place without the knowledge of the Arab Legion and in defiance of the Transjordan authorities.

I have drawn the attention of the Transjordan Minister of Defence to the rumours and impressed on him that such an attack would be regarded by the Jews as a direct answer to prayer.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York, Washington, Jeddah and Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos.133, 92, 109 and 176 respectively.

Copy to:- E/1014/48.

(CMPG/HLM/HA).

Wt. 27078. D1749. 75m in 3 sorts 10/47.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

(102)

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— (Andrews) CAIRO.

To :— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 19/8/48 (10.15) **Received** 19/8/48 (10.40)

No. 222 **of** 18th August, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Haifa telegram No.98 of August 18th. Repeated for information to Foreign Office, Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus.

According to a Cairo Broadcast the Jews announced on August 4th that they could not allow British subjects to fly over their territory, that they would arrest any British air crews operating aircraft for the Mediator if they landed in Jewish territory, and that the Mediator had been so informed. Can you confirm this ? We are directly concerned here since both the R.A.F. aircraft and private British aircraft sometimes fly near or over the Jewish held territory en route to Amman or Damascus and might have to make forced landing there.

(JFS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

103

From :— H.M.Ambassador, BAGHDAD *To :—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 19/8/48 (11.53) Received 19/8/48 (12.00)

No. 144 of 18th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.865 of August 18th. Repeated for information to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, B.M.E.O., Jerusalem and Saving to Jedda.

The Regent is leaving Baghdad for Amman on August 21st He will be accompanied by the Prime Minister and possibly by Nuri Pasha.

2. I have not been able to find out the precise object of this visit but I understand from the Prime Minister that it is likely to be concerned with the arrangements for unifying the Iraqi and Transjordan command in Palestine. The Prime Minister told me he himself is very unwilling to go but that King Abdullah has personally asked for his presence.

(HLM/JS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM "OUT".

CYPHER/OTP.

104

JERUSALEM TELEGRAM No. 388 TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 388 of August 16th.

Repeated to: Bagdad No. 55.
Beirut No. 69.
Cairo No. 149.
Damascus No. 62.
BMEO Cairo No. 59.
UKDEL New York No. 91.
Washington No. 44.

Haifa No. 14.)
Jedda No. 12.) SAVING.
Amman No. 12.)

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
5/1014/48
AMMAN

No. 388. SECRET. SECRET

74

I reported in my telegram No. 365 on the provocative Jewish sniping that was characterizing the present "truce" and on the restraint that was being exercised by the Arab forces. I stated that this view of things was shared by the Mediator. You may wish to take note of the sequence of events in Jerusalem as they have appeared to me since the Mediator's departure and as they are generally confirmed by U.N. observers ~~xxx~~ with whom I have come into contact.

2. (a). Night of 12th/13th August Jewish forces are reported by Arab sources to have attacked Arab positions in Deir Abu Tor and Nebi Dahoud between 8 pm and 2 am and been beaten off with heavy casualties.

(b). The night of 13th/14th was comparatively calm.

(c). Between 6 and 7 pm on the evening of the 14th. August the Arab Legion Commander received a written communication from the Jewish Commander expressing agreement of the latter to observe the Mediator's non-retaliatory cease-fire proposal, made just before the Mediator's departure.

(d). At 3.30 am the following morning the Jews put in a heavy attack on Arab positions in the Sheikh Jarrah area with smaller co-ordinated attacks at Deir Abu Tor and Nebi Dahoud. The major attack was supported by heavy mortar fire and was made with the apparent intention of passing infantry units under cover of smoke screens through Sheikh Jarrah into the Wadi el Jouz. It continued until 4.30 am. The attack was answered by Arab artillery. Jewish casualties were again reported as heavy and I am informed that there dead were removed from in and near 'no-man's-land' under U.N. supervision. This makes it fairly clear that Jews were not on the defensive.

(e). Early this morning at 1.45 am Jewish artillery mortared Arab positions in Sheikh Jarrah with a co-ordinated mortar attack at Nebi Dahoud. No infantry attacks developed. Heavy Jewish mortar bombs feel close to this consulate during this engagement and one in St. Georges' Cathedral compound damaging the library.

3. A member of my staff has spoken to a British officer of the Arab Legion this morning who states that last night's engagement and that of the night before were without any doubt planned and co-ordinated Jewish attacks against which his own troops only took defensive action. An American U.N. observer confirms that large co-ordinated attacks took place on both nights in question but declined, in conversation with same member of my staff, to fix responsibility without seeing evidence available to his colleagues on the other side. There is little doubt that he shared our general impression but, in view of paragraph 5(a) below, evidence is not likely to be available.

4. So far as I can see, Arab forces in this part of Jerusalem have been sniped at persistently since the beginning of the present "truce" until approximately the 14th. August since which date

/Page 2.....

Jewish daylight sniping has abated. They have restrained their own forces, amongst which are considerable irregular and therefore undisciplined elements, in a manner that is wholly praiseworthy and should have been given its due publicity. In addition, I am under the strong impression that the Arab Legion has sustained three major attacks at night during the past week against which they have taken only normal defensive measures.

5. The chief sources of Arab complaint, as reported to me are as follows:

(a).U.N. observers are not allowed into the Jewish front-line at night when all the recent fighting has taken place. The American Consulate confirmed this information by telephone this morning.

(b). Reports from the Arab and Jewish sides are collated on the Jewish side and sent to Haifa. Arab military authorities have no opportunity of seeing what is said nor is any subsequent publicity given to these reports or of action taken by the Mediator.

(c). There is no effective liason between observers on the Jewish side and observers on the Arab side.

DOW.

105

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 914

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 20/8.

To :- A	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
		0900
From :- London	Originators No.	Number of Groups
		340

BRITISH LEGATION 20 AUG 1941 S/10144/41 AMMAN

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority
Priority	WJC X/VB R

1	81719	Following	recd from Uhdel		4
2	New York	tel No	2189 of 19/8 begins		8
3	Repeated for info to Jerusalem Cairo Ammon				12
4	BMEO Beirut Damascus Baghdad Jedda				16
5	Haifa & Wton. Palestine Consul. Following				20
6	text of telegram dated 18th Aug.				24
7	from mediator to secretary general				28
8	concerning present situation in				32
9	Jerusalem (Doc. 5/gen). Begins				36
10	In pursuance of recently council				40
11	I am very concerned about increasing				44
12	situation in Jerusalem. Owing to				48
13	mutual distrust of Jewish and				52
14	Arab authorities of municipal				56
15	services and of movements of				60
16	and daylight many constant clients				64
17	and danger of armed nationalists				68
18	elements not under Jewish practically				72
19	every casual or Jerusalem half-				76
20	witted gangster can settle				80
21	out of hand. If it proves				84
22	reported to me that general				88
23	tension is locally increasing				92
24	Under prevailing conditions				96
25	it is difficult to avoid				100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No.....

Cipher Office Serial No. ..... Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

Indication of Priority

2

responsibilities and I have
accordingly directed of late the
movement & disposition of the fleet
have come deliberately to
express authority of council
actions. Selection of appropriate
& local character to one
fate stirring across the ether
ribbon. Nevertheless it should
be borne in mind that further
deterioration of situation in
Jerusalem may lead to general
resumption of hostilities. Intervention
request that security council
take prompt action with
view to giving effect to its resolution
of 15 July. Should present
action of security council take
form of warning I suggest
that it should clearly be pointed
out & particularly (1) that responsibility
will be assessed whether
violations are due to members
of opposing armies or to

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

11263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No.....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions			Indication of Priority			
		3				
1	dissident elements or irregulars					4
2	(2) That each party has					8
3	duty to bring to justice its					12
4	own dissident elements and					16
5	irregular's when they violate					20
6	truce (3) That reprisals and					24
7	retaliations are not permitted					28
8	(4) That no party will be allowed					32
9	to gain by any violation					36
10	of truce. Ends. Please repeat					40
11	to Jerusalem immediate and					44
12	to Cairo Amman BMEO Beirut					48
13	Damascus Baghdad Jedda Haifa					52
14	as my tel 119, 69, 65, 118,					56
15	51, 54, 50, 53, 12, respectively					60
16						64
17					Bevin.	68
18						72
19						76
20						80
21						84
22						88
23						92
24						96
25						100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

11263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

106

From HQ

To His Excellency
the British Resident

Time 1800 — 18th.

Ref No. 28/1
129

Following is summary of events as they occurred on the night and day of Tuesday 17/8/48:

the Slipping

1. At 0430 hrs in the night of Tuesday, a section of Jewish forces slipped into the forest around the High Commissioner's house which is a no man's land in protection of the International Red Cross. they made positions in the forest in view of its importance as a war position. It cannot be told whether the Jews have entered the house itself or not.

Strength of the enemy

2. It is difficult for us to know the number of people who entered into the area but we have seen 3 tanks and one armoured Troop Carrier

Beginning of the attack

3. The Enemy begun the attack at 0130 hrs on the morning of Tuesday. They attacked the positions of the Egyptian forces to the south of the High Commissioner's house. they also attacked the strugglers of Sawahra tribe disguising on both occasions in U.N.O's Observers' uniforms. At 0900 hrs on Tuesday the enemy attacked Arab Legion and strugglers' positions at Nabi Dahoud and Touri area employing armoured cars, bow guns and all kinds of automatic weapons including hand grenades.

the Results

4. the attack has failed completely and 9 persons were taken prisoners. We destroyed one enemy tank and took many arms and ammunition.-

The enemy sustained big casualties

Withdrawal

5. At 1600 hrs on the same day the enemy began withdrawing from the High Commissioner's house area. At 1900 hrs we saw the last enemy party leave the area in a Westwood direction.

Other measures

6. We have asked deputy Comm't Bernadotte to inspect the High Commissioner's house area, ~~and~~ let us know if the enemy has in fact left there and take his international action

Lt. Kais ___

3rd Engineer Post.

من القيادة الكتيبة الاردنية ب الوقت والتاريخ ١٨٠٨٠٠

الى . جماعي المراقبين العسكريين المختصين

٢٨/٢/٨١

١٢٩

BRITISH LEGATION
18 AUG 1948
AMMAN

فيما يلي تفاصيل حوادث ليلة ويوم الثلاثاء الموافق ١٧/٨/١٩٤٨ .

التسلل

١ - في الساعة ٠٩٣٠ من ليلة الثلاثاء دخل جماعة من القوات اليهودية الى الحوض المحيط بدار المندوب السامي سابقا والتي هي منطقة حيادية وتحت حماية الصليب الاحمر الدولي واتخذت منه مراكز هجومية بالنسبة لاهمية هذا الموقع الحربية ولا يمكن الجزم فيما اذا دخل العدو الى الدار نفسها ام لا .

عدد قوة العدو

٢ - يتعذر علينا معرفة العدد الذي دخل الى المنطقة الآنفة الذكر ولكننا شاهدنا ثلاث مدرعات وسيارة ناقلة واحدة مصفحة .

بدء الهجوم

٣ - لقد بداء العدو هجومه في الساعة ٠١٣٠ من صبيحة يوم الثلاثاء على مراكز القوات المصرية المرابطة جنوبي دار المندوب السامي المذكورة وعلى المناضلين العرب من عشيرة السواحرة بخدعة استعملوا فيها البسة مراقبي الامم المتحدة . وفي الساعة التاسعة من صباح يوم الثلاثاء بداء هجوم العدو على مراكز الجيش العربي والمناضلين في منطقة النبي داود والطورى مستخدمين المصفحات والمدافع القوسية والاسلحة الاوتوماتيكية على اختلاف انواعها والقنابل اليدوية .

النتائج

٤ - فشل الهجوم فشلا تاما واسرنا من العدو ٩ اشخاص ودمرنا مدرعة واحدة من مدرعاته وغنمنا اسلحة وذخائر كثيرة واوقعنا به خسائر فادحة في الارواح .

الانسحاب

٥ - بداء العدو بالانسحاب من منطقة دار المندوب السامي في الساعة الرابعة من بعد ظهر اليوم نفسه وقد شاهدنا اخر جماعة منهم يغادرون المنطقة متجهين غربا في الساعة السابعة مساء

الاجراءات الاخرى

٦ - طلبنا الى وكيل الكونت برناد وت تفتيش منطقة دار الهدوب السامي واعلامنا فيما اذا تم جلاء العدو عنها ام لا واتخاذ اجراءات الدولية .

الرئيـــــس

الركـن الثالث للاستعـــــلامات

MESSAGE FORM

107

W/T Office Serial No. 917

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 20th August

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
Amman.	(08.20)	1730
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups
London		711

BRITISH LEGATION 21 AUG 1948 AMMAN

Special Instructions

Priority.

Indication of Priority

1	81820	SIPNT.	Following received		4
2	from repeated New	York tel no 2197			8
3	of 19/8	Repeated	to Cairo		12
4	to Jerusalem, Cairo Beirut,		Amman.		16
5	Beirut,	Damascus,	Baghdad, Jedda,		20
6	Haifa,	and Saana to be	Ten.		24
7			Tilly tel	2187 and	28
8	MIFT.		PALESTINE		32
9			Security	Council,	36
10			Palestine	question	40
11	was placed on		security	councils	44
12	agenda	at last	moment today		48
13	on recn	of MEDIATORS	telegram of		52
14	18th August	about	situation in		56
15	Jerusalem	(my tel 2189)		105	60
16	2.		United States	del	64
17	- spoke with	introduced	draft resolution		68
18	(text) of	which is	contained in		72
19	mist	submitted	jointly	by rep	76
20	entatives of	Canada,	France,	etc.	80
21	and United	States.	Results	urged	84
22	prompt	adoption	of resolution		88
23	which	might be	considered		92
24	non - controversial	since			96
25	(A) Paragraph	relating	to	this	100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No.....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

2

Indication of Priority

1	subject	on July	15 resolution			4
2	was adopted unanimously.					8
3	(B) Five	points in	resolution were			12
4	in direct response to Points raised					16
5	in Rhodesian cable					20
6	(c) Task of Council was not to					24
7	apportion blame for events			in Rhodesia.		28
8	but only to ensure accordance of					32
9	hostilities there with all Parties					36
10	had agreed was		desirable.			40
11	3/		Canadian and			44
12	Chinese representatives associated					48
13	themselves with United States statement					52
14	Jewish representative agreed that					56
15	resolution was non-controversial					60
16	but secured assurance from Russia					64
17	that para (D) of		resolution was			68
18	not inconsistent		with paragraph			72
19	2 of Rhodesian		force misconceptions			76
20	(DOCUMENT	S/9553).				80
21	4.		Malik (USSR)			84
22	accepted	paragraphs (A) and (B)				88
23	of resolution but declared that					92
24	para (C)	violated	article	2 (7) of		96
25	charter and that		paragraphs (D) and			100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions 3

Indication of Priority

(£) were unnecessary since they were already received by previous recol 8
which and modifying instructions 12
5/. Referring to SOVIET 16
objections to paragraph (c) inserted 20
and that according obligations laying 24
on authorities concerned could 28
hardly be described as intervention 32
under article 2 (7) as regards 36
paragraph (5) is reminded again 40
that council had sometimes found 44
it necessary and desirable to 48
resort to resolutions. I expressed 52
hope that council would adopt 56
unanimously resolution whose 60
provisions follow almost exactly 64
what Polish delegation had requested. 68
6/. I SUGGESTION delegate 72
declaring that public conscience 76
was clear as regards Polish prisoners 80
announced that by his own 84
to motives of two phases. 88
Italy expressing doubt whether 92
force would succeed if reason 96
tendencies continued and asserting 100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

Indication of Priority

1	Had paid	resolution did not			4
2	Sir Cadogan he	asked whether			8
3	council	now withdrew to	despatch		12
4	withdrawal	even word of concern (except			16
5	from UK	and Belgium) about	Japan,		20
6	of refugees.				24
7	7.		Joint resolution		28
8	was adopted by	council viz			32
9	vote by	paragraphs.	UKRAINE		36
10	and USSR	abstained on last			40
11	three paragraphs	(Colombia) on			44
12	para's	(3) and speech on all			48
13	para's.				52
14	8.		Chinese representative		56
15	then expressed anxiety about				60
16	Mediators last cable	(see my tel 2196)			64
17	concerning demobilization of				68
18	Jerusalem. Parodi	(FRANCE)	associated		72
19	himself with	Chinese statement			76
20	and suggested	that President in			80
21	acknowledging	Mediators cable			84
22	should express	hope that latter			88
23	would continue	his efforts in			92
24	His mother.	President said			96
25	that he	would leave chair	Wang		100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. ..... Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

Indication of Priority

5"

1	of this	communication is secondary			4
2	9.	Likewise networkers			8
3	then natural refugee problem				12
4	big concern lest	council should			16
5	decisions without	doing anything			20
6	and nothing	that be trusted			24
7	this question would be taken up				28
8	in general assembly.				32
9	10.		UK delegate took		36
10	opportunity of making		brief statement		40
11	many which concluded		Regions		44
12	but it should		like now to		48
13	urge that council		should not		52
14	lose itself in all		ramifications		56
15	of this problem		before taking		60
16	action. need for		relief is clear		64
17	and urgent and it is		no less		68
18	clear that if		relief does not		72
19	come soon to		both arab and		76
20	Jewish displaced		persons.		80
21	Security councils task		is		84
22	Palestine will		to that extent		88
23	be aggravated.		We do not need		92
24	many Regions of		much investigation		96
25	to prove this		and I submit that		100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No.....

Cipher Office Serial No.....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

Indication of Priority

6

1	re	association of	concern with	this	4
2	problem	with	have already		8
3	been	heard in	secrecy	council	12
4	are	sufficient to	indicate	their	16
5	bodys	interest	to	other	of 20
6	international	organs	which	are	24
7	active	in	this	field	I would 28
8	suggest	therefore	that	record	of 32
9	councils	discussion	in	this	36
10	respect	should	be		40
11	at	once	transmitted	to	such 44
12	bodies	for	any	action	which they 48
13	may	be	able	to	take ends. 52
14	II.			This	last suggest 56
15	can	was	accepted	by	council 60
16	which	then	proceeded		64
17	F.O.	see	seas	uniform	to 68
18	Jerusalem	and	to	Cairo	Bonn 72
19	Amman	,	Basra	,	Baghdad 76
20	Jedda	and	Haifa	as	my tels 80
21	121		70.	119	66 84
22	52		52	51	54 88
23	13		respectively		92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. 923

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

(10.15)

BRITISH LEGATION
S/1014
21 AUG 1946
AMMAN

CJC

Date 21/8

109

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
Amman		0800
From :-	**Originators No.**	**Number of Groups**
London		163

Special Instructions

Priority

Indication of Priority

1	8202	Following received from			4
2	UKDEL NEW YORK	telno 1199	of 20/8		8
3	acted to inform Jewish Agency				12
4	Bunche Secretariat United Nations				16
5	Darlan Tel Aviv and Jerusalem				20
6	for info.		PALESTINE TRUCE		24
7			Possible plotting		28
8	18 August to Secretary General				32
9	(documents sent)	mediator's	transmit		36
10	text of communique about	from			40
11	SHERTOK about Taking	of arab Legion			44
12	to evacuate positions in	NORTH ISLAND			48
13	in Jerusalem occupied during truce and				52
14	about other arab truce violations				56
15	in that area. Shertok states that				60
16	these incidents indicate how	mediator's			64
17	arrangements about non recurring				68
18	have work in practice.				72
19	2.	Mediator's	agents		76
20	that he has now	been informed			80
21	by observers that	parts have evacuated			84
22	houses and removed	fortifications			88
23	in no man's land at	Deir Abu			92
24	Tor and that he	is investigating			96
25	observers in case	other positions			100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Ciphe[redacted]ice Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	**Originators No.**	**Number of Groups**

Special Instructions			Indication of Priority		
1	ri still	held by Legion	to request		4
2	rimmediate	withdrawal.	Please		8
3	refer	emigration	to Jerusalem.		12
4	to my	tel no 123	and to	Cairo Ammon	16
5	Brico	Beirut	Jews	Baghdad	20
6	Jedda	and Haifa	as my	tele	24
7	nos	72	68	121	28
8	5°4	5°4	5°3	5°6	32
9	15°	weekdaily.			36
10			Deuri		40
11					44
12					48
13					52
14					56
15					60
16					64
17					68
18					72
19					76
20					80
21					84
22					88
23					92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

11263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

110

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

CSC

From:—H.M.Minister, BEIRUT. ***To:***— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 20/8/48 (19.45) **Received** 21/8/48 (08.20)

No. 133 **of** 20th August, 1948.

SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office 607 of August 20th.
Repeated for information to Baghdad, Cairo, B.M.E.O., Amman, Jerusalem, UKDEL New York, Washington and Saving Jedda and Damascus.

Palestine.

I heard it announced on the B.B.C's General Overseas Service at 1600 and 1800 G.M.T. August 19th that the Mediator had reported to the Security Council that it was "idle to decide whether the Jews or the Arabs were to(1) blame" for breaches of the Truce(1). If that in fact represents the Mediator's attitude it is defeatist and is not calculated to convey(1) a very serious conception of his duty and responsibilities. It was my impression that he had been entrusted with the task not only of doing what he can with the limited means at his disposal to prevent breaches of the truce but meticulously to investigate and report upon them determining which of the disputants was at fault.

2. However now that he is in Sweden he must be quite out of touch with the situation and is probably unaware of the substance of your telegram No.64 to Rhodes. On the other hand he may feel that it would be waste of time to attempt to present a well-documented case against the Jews.

Foreign Office pass UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams 74 and 66 respectively.

Cairo pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram 196.

(JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

111

Cypher ID/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

CTL

From :— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. ***To :—*** H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 21/8/48 (11.04) **Received** 21/8/48 (11.10)

No. 814 **of** 19th August, 1948.

SECRET.
Addressed to Washington telegram No. 9200 of August 19th. Repeated for information to UKDEL New York, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jerusalem, Haifa, B.M.E.O. and Saving to Jedda.

64

My telegram No. 8693.

The United States Ambassador told me on August 17th that while he had not yet received a final reply from the State Department (1) they had indicated that they (1) did not care for the proposal (1) that we should put war material into British Bases in Iraq and Transjordan. They felt that reaction in the United States would be strong (1) and unfavourable.

2. I pointed out that if trouble started and our troops were (gp. undec.) through lack of equipment this would (1) be a very serious position for His Majesty's Government. I asked him what choice would the United States Government make if the War Department found themselves in a similar position. Mr. Douglas admitted the difficulty but asked me whether we could not manage without having to take this action at the present time. I said that I (? would omitted) re-examine the problem.

3. Later in the day on receipt of Jerusalem's telegrams Nos. 394 and 395 I (1) told the United States Ambassador that (1) news of a flagrant Jewish violation of the Truce which might lead to large scale fighting followed possibly by defeat of the Arab Legion and a direct threat to Transjordan made the position even more difficult. I pressed him to telegraph urgently to the State Department pointing this out and asking whether the United States Government would use all their influence with the Jews to stop their aggressive action and prevent the situation developing in the way that we feared.

88

89

4/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

4. I added that in any case I felt strongly that we ought to move the necessary ammunition now and I asked the Ambassador to find out immediately whether this was acceptable to the United States Government. I agreed(1) at his request to do nothing until I received their reply which he hoped might be given the next(1) day.

5. The United States Ambassador has telegraphed in the above sense to the State Department.

6/5.

(JFS/CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T).

FILE NO. S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

112

Cypher M/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

C/C

From :— H.M.Minister, DAMASCUS ***To :—*** H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 21/8/48 (10.20) **Received** 21/8/48 (11.10)

No. 124 **of** 20th August, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.421.
Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Jerusalem, Cairo, Memin and to Jedda Saving.

Beirut telegram No.566 — 46

TOP SECRET.

GUARD.

The Syrian Minister of the Interior last night showed me a letter from ELIAS SASSOON(1) to LUFTI HAFTAR the Syrian personal (gp.undec.) 1947 which I imagine to be in much the same terms as the letter referred to in the telegram under reference.

2.(1) Summary follows (from - Sic ? by intended) Saving telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York and Washington if considered worth while.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram 196.

GJB

(JFS/CJB/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48. **TELEGRAM.**

118

Cypher ID/OTP

~~**Code**~~

~~**Clear**~~

CJC

***From*:—** Con.Gen. JERUSALEM ***To*:—** H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 21/8/48 (09.10) **Received** 21/8/48 (09.15)

No. 202 **of** 20th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.407 of August 20th
Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Cairo,
B.M.E.O.Cairo, UKDEL New York, Washington and Haifa.

Conversation with the Senior American United Nations Organisation Observer on the Arab side convinces me that the Observers are conscious of the disadvantages arising from the absence of any European Press representative on the Arab (? gp.omitted) in Jerusalem. He informs me that the existing instructions do not permit any direct communication of the results of observation to the press. The difficulty is increased by reports from both sets of observers being collated only on the Jewish side line in a United Nations Organisation office which can only be accessible to correspondents who are not on the Jewish side, and who have no means of access to the Arab side. Crossing the line becomes more difficult every day even for Consular representatives.

2. The situation could be remedied to some extent if the B.B.C. and a leading daily could be persuaded to send correspondents to Arab Jerusalem. The present policy of the British Press seems to be to give no news about Jerusalem and then(1) to say that Jerusalem has no news value. Correspondents could with reasonable safety be accommodated in the American School, a pension which forms an operational Headquarters for United Nations Organisation observers on the Arab side, and between which and United Nations Organisation office on the Jewish side they have now established radio communication.

3/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :— *To :—*

Despatched Received

No. of

3. The most practical (gp.undec.), of course, which I have already pointed out to the Mediator, would be for him to establish his Headquarters in the centrally situated King David Hotel and to insist on avenues of approach from both sides being demilitarised. He could still do this if he would take his courage in his hands and insist on it being done,(1) but the longer it is deferred the more difficult it will become.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York, Washington and Haifa as my telegrams 95, 48 and 67 respectively.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.65.

---

k/ps.

(JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1000/47. **TELEGRAM.**

Cypher M/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~ See 28A (15th)

115

From:— S. OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:—* H.M. Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 21/8/48 (18.30) **Received** 22/8/48 (11.00)

No. 822 **of** 20th August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.

Addressed to Amman telegram No.822 of August 20th.
Repeated for information Saving to Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, B.M.E.O., Jerusalem, Haifa, UKDEL New York, Washington and Jedda.

My immediately preceding telegram. 45

Following is text of King Abdullah's letter. Begins.

GLUBB Pasha is the bearer of this letter which conveys to you my compliments and respects. In it I wish to put before you certain matters which affect your interests as much as ours.

I informed you directly about the Arab(1) League at our last interview at the Foreign Office. I followed the advice you gave me on that occasion.

The Jewish question which has given both you and us so much trouble will not be solved through the Arab League. All concerned must understand and appreciate the dangers inherent in this problem and seek for a remedy. I think we have reached at least a partial understanding with you on this subject, according to information submitted to me by my Prime Minister, who actually met Your Excellency and discussed this problem(1).

The abominable massacres committed by the Jews and the driving of Arab civilian population from their homes led however to a real and bitter emnity. Then it became apparent to us that what had at first appeared to be merely a Jewish movement was in reality a Soviet design. We are now trying to remedy this critical situation in precisely the same(1) manner as the Greeks are using to(1) deal with an identical threat.

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

This/...2

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

This state of affairs must be brought to an end. It is essential that we be able to stamp out Soviet influence but our power to do so is crippled by the lack of the most essential means to this end.

We do not wish to render Britain's position more difficult in United Nations Organisation but on the other hand we have to weigh the relative importance of avoiding trouble with the United Nations on the one hand and the absolute necessity of preventing a further strengthening of Soviet propaganda in Arab countries on the other.

I feel that it is our duty(1) to obtain the means to resist this(1) Soviet expansion and I am also persuaded that it is the duty of our friends to help us in(1) this whatever may be the consequences.

This seems to me to be a reasonable measure which it is essential to carry out if necessary without it becoming publicly known.

Glubb Pasha will also explain to you all the activities which our jealous Arab rivals have been engaged in against us with even more alacrity than our enemies the Jews.

With my best compliments and good wishes' - Ends.

2. The following is the text of my reply - Begins.

I have received your Majesty's letter through Glubb Pasha, and am grateful for this expression of Your Majesty's views.

I have been giving constant thought to the situation in Palestine and to the great difficulties to which(1) Transjordan is exposed. I should like to assure

Your/...3

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

- 3 -

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

Your Majesty that the friendly feeling(l) s of(TW) His Majesty's Government towards Transjordan are in no way changed and that we continue to feel the greatest interest in Transjordan's welfare and in the establishment of peaceful conditions and security throughout the Middle East. I am sure that the continued close co-operation between the United Kingdom and Transjordan is an essential factor in establishing these conditions.

I have asked Sir A. KIRKBRIDE to give Your Majesty an account of the conversation I have had with Glubb Pasha and which I hope you will find satisfactory and(TW) the latter will be able to(l) amplify this on his return. If Your Majesty has any further thoughts on the manner in which we can co-operate towards the achievement of our common object of re-establishing peace and security in the Middle East you will no doubt communicate them to Sir A. Kirkbride and I will be very happy(TW) to consider them and give you our views in return - Ends.

(JFS/HLM/ILA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO.S/1014/48. TELEGRAM.

116

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From:— S.OF S. F.O. LONDON. *To:*— H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 22/8/48 (13.12) Received 23/8/48 (08.15)

No. 824 of 21st August, 1948.

Following received from Haifa - Begins.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.448. Please repeat to Cairo as my telegram No.45, Jerusalem 139, Amman 29, Beirut 99, Baghdad 23 and Damascus 24.

Your telegram No.456.

Please see my telegrams Nos.333 and 437.

I can confirm that no repeat no British subject may fly over Jewish territory without permission and that at least 24 hours notice is necessary for permission to be sought repeat sought. Permission is not sought (? gps. omitted) not given for British subjects to operate United Nations aircraft. (2 gps. undec.) any aircraft landing on a Jewish airfield is liable to be fired on unless permission to land has been obtained. United Nations aircraft have to give 1 hour's notice. Four hours notice is required for other aircraft at Haifa and EIN SHEMER.

2. I will seek further details but there will be(1) ~~dix~~ delay(1) as tomorrow is the SABBATH. Meanwhile I can only advise all repeat all British aircraft to avoid Jewish territory.

116.

(JFS/HLM/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

(W/T)

FILE NO. S/1014/48.

TELEGRAM.

(117)

Cypher ID/OTP

~~Code~~

~~Clear~~

From :— (Con.Gen.) JERUSALEM *To :—* H.M.Minister, AMMAN.

Despatched 22/8/48 (13.32) Received 23/8/48 (08.15)

No. 203 of 22nd August, 1948.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.411 of August 21st.
Repeated to Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Haifa, Cairo, B.M.E.O. Cairo, UKDEL New York, Washington and Amman.

(99)

Reference paragraph 4 of my telegram No.399. The occupation of Government House by Jewish Forces.

I am informed by a member of the Red Cross on the Arab side that Jewish forces did in fact retire from the Government House grounds, but have remained in the Arab college and grounds which is included in the area handed over to the Red Cross by the Mandatory Government. So far as I can ascertain Arab forces occupy forward positions to the East of but consistent with the Red Cross area. It is possible that they are in no man's land as fixed by the Mediator, but I have no reliable information.

2. Following complaints from the Red Cross the Jewish forces refuse to evacuate the Arab College area unless the Arab forces retire from their forward position. The Red Cross delivered an ultimatum to the Jews which has now expired and they have formally withdrawn their protection from the Arab College area. They have asked the Jews to remove the Red Cross flag which however still remains presumably so that the Jews may(1) represent this as an Arab attack on International Red Cross neutrality. The Egyptian army have also delivered an ultimatum which has now expired and it is reported that they shelled Jewish positions in the Arab College area this morning. The Red Cross official who supplied this information stated that the matter is now in the hands of United Nations Organisation observers.

3/...2

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

TELEGRAM.

Cypher

Code

Clear

From :—

To :—

Despatched

Received

No. of

3. Colonel Abdullah Tel views this occupation of the Arab College as an adequate excuse for threatening to occupy the HEBREW University which us under United Nations Organisation protection. I will report further developments.

Foreign Office please pass Haifa, UKDEL New York and Washington as my telegrams 68, 96 and 49 respectively.

Cairo please pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram 66.

(HLM/JFS/HA).

Wt. 45504. D1891. 30m 5/48.

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
S/1014
AMMAN

51/118

YQ 2830

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W. 1.

12th August, 1948.

Dear Chancery,

Your telegram No. 629 of 3rd August contained no request to us to repeat to Jerusalem. It was reported to us as a missing telegram by Jerusalem and we have now arranged for repetition.

Yours ever,

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

10.

The Chancery,
British Legation,
AMMAN.

To note.

Cypher Staff 31/8. G.J.S.

1/9. Ltr/Note.

BRITISH LEGATION
13 AUG 194
CAIRO

Amman 88(3)

119

En Clair, ~~WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION~~

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No.2062
2nd August,1948.

D. 1.26 p.m. 2nd August,1948.
R. 1.32 p.m. 2nd August,1948.

Repeated to Cairo,
Amman,
B.M.E.O.
Beirut,
Bagdad,
Damascus,
Jedda,
Jerusalem,
Haifa,
Washington.

S A V I N G

IMPORTANT

GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2062 of 2nd August, repeated for information Saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa and Washington.

My telegram No.2009.

Palestine Truce.

Telegrams from Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Transjordan to President of Security Council (circulated as documents S/932 and S/935) charge Jewish forces with violating truce on 25th July by bombarding and attacking villages of Jaba, Ein Ghazal and Ijzim, brutally maltreating local Arab inhabitants and driving them from their homes.

2. Telegram dated 30th July from Mediator to Secretary General (circulated as document S/934) reports that arrival of first contingent of Observers has permitted him to start investigations of alleged truce violations and settlement of local incidents. In particular investigation of allegations in paragraph 1 above disclosed no evidence to support charges of massacre and capture. All three villages were found to be deserted, four buildings had been wholly or partially destroyed by bombardment and two bodies were found in Ein Ghazal. Jews admitted that four Arabs in village of Jaba were prisoners and nine in village of Ein Ghazal were dilled during "police" raid on 25th July. Further report will be made later.

3. Mediator also mentioms/...

3. Mediator also mentions in same telegram:

(a) Report by United Nations Observers on 28th July that (with regard to allegations in my telegram under reference) there ha been no incident on Syrian frontier for the last 48 hours.

(b) Report that first Jerusalem convoy since renewal of truce was turned back at Latrun on 29th July by Arab soldiers and civilians. (Matter is being investigated).

(c) Note from Egyptian Prime Minister received 30th July alleging departure from Bari (Italy) on 26th July for Palestine of two landing craft loaded with ammunition and war material. (Precautionary measures involving land, sea and air observers are being taken).

Please repeat Saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O., Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 17, 16, 37, 17, 18, 17, 17, and 14 respectively.

[Repeated as requested].

QQQQ

Amman 89(S) 120

En Clair (S/1014/48)

~~WORLD ORGANIZATION DISTRIBUTION~~

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2070 D: 2.00.p.m. August 3rd, 1948.
August 3rd, 1948. R: 7.15.p.m. August 3rd, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Saving to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, BMEO (Cairo),
Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Haifa and Washington.

IMPORTANT
GIANT.

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 2070 of 3/8, repeated for information Jerusalem and Saving to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, British Middle East Office (Cairo), Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Haifa and Washington.

Palestine Truce.

Telegram dated 31st July from Chairman Truce Commission to President Security Council (circulated as document S/938) draws attention to serious consequences (including possibility of Jewish attack) likely to result from Arab persistence in refusing to allow water and food supplies to reach Jerusalem and suggests that Security Council must deal urgently with this question.

Please pass Jerusalem as my telegram No. 104 and Cairo, Amman, Beirut, BMEO (Cairo) Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda as my telegrams Nos. 18, 17, 18, 38, 19, 18 and 18 Saving.

[Repeated to Jerusalem, and Saving to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, BMEO (Cairo), Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda]

---oOo---

BRITISH LEGATION
13 AUG 1948
AMMAN

Annan 91 (S)

121

CYPHER/OTP ~~WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION~~

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir O. Franks.
No. 3,772.
3rd August, 1948.

D: 5.00 p.m. 3rd August, 1948.
R: 10.23 p.m. 3rd August, 1948.

Repeated to: U.K.Delegation New York Saving,
Jerusalem Saving,
Amman Saving,
Bagdad Saving,
Beirut Saving,
Damascus Saving,
Cairo Saving,
Jedda Saving,
B.M.E.O.(Cairo) Saving.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3,772 of 3rd August repeated for information Saving to U.K.Delegation New York, Jerusalem, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Jedda, and B.M.E.O.(Cairo).

(39)

Amman telegram No. 627 to you.

Palestine.

We have passed on to the Head of the Near Eastern Division in the State Department the gist of paragraphs 2 to 5 of the telegram under reference, and have also indicated that the Mediator was somewhat disappointed by the small number of United States observers.

2. Head of Near Eastern Division suggested that it might be useful if the State Department were to stress to the Mediator the need for his continued presence on the scene and for his earlier residence in Jerusalem. They could point out that this should now be easier to arrange since 95 additional United States observers had been sent, whose senior member was a Brigadier in the United States Marine Corps; some additional equipment was also being provided. We encouraged this idea which the State Department will put into effect if their United Nations Division agree.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to repeated posts (excluding New York) as my telegrams Nos. 10, 13, 15, 17,17, 10, 15 and 23 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

@@@

BRITISH LEGATION
13 AUG 1948
AMMAN

Amman 92(S) 122

En Clair

~~WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION~~

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2089. D: 3.58.p.m. August 5th, 1948.
August 5th, 1948. R: 9.7. p.m. August 5th, 1948.

Repeated Saving to Cairo, Amman, BMEO (Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa and Washington.

IMPORTANT

GIANT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 2089 August 5th, repeated for information Saving to Cairo, Amman, British Middle East Office (Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa and Washington.

My telegram No. 2039.

Palestine truce.

In telegram dated 4th August to Secretary General (circulated as document S/945) Syrian Foreign Minister protests against Jewish occupation of Haifa refinery, which he describes as flagrant violation of cease-fire and defiance of legal principles, and requests Security Council to adopt adequate resolution and effective measures to end "these criminal acts".

Please repeat Saving to Cairo, Amman, British Middle East Office (Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem as my telegrams 20, 19, 40, 20, 21, 20, 20 and 15.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo, Amman, BMEO (Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem].

---oOo---

BRITISH EMBASSY
13 AUG 1948
SHORTHAND

Amman 94 (S)

129

Cypher/OTP
Confidential

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 8686

D. 7.00 p.m. 7th August, 1948.

7th August, 1948.

Repeated to New York U.K.Del. No. 3304

Cairo	No.	117 Saving
Bagdad	No.	105 Saving
Beirut	No.	112 Saving
Damascus	No.	113 Saving
Jedda	No.	106 Saving
Amman	No.	94 Saving
Jerusalem	No.	46 Saving
B.M.E.O. (Cairo)	No.	229 Saving

IMPORTANT
CONFIDENTIAL
GIANT

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 8686 of 7th August repeated for information to U.K.Del. New York and Saving to Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Amman, Jerusalem and B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

Palestine.

Mr. Trygve Lie informed Sir O. Sargent on August 4th, amongst other things, that one of the tasks with which Dr. Bunche has been entrusted by the Mediator in the United States is to ask the United Kingdom, French and United States representatives on the Security Council to obtain their Governments' views on the Mediator's existing plan for the settlement of Palestine. Mr. Lie was informed that we were glad to hear this as we felt that the time had come for His Majesty's Government and the United States Government and the Mediator to try to devise a plan which we could all recommend to the United Nations.
Count Bernadotte's instructions to Dr. Bunche would enable us now to exchange views for the first time with the Mediator.

2. You might bring this conversation to the attention of the United States Government and suggest to them that this development makes it desirable that there should be an early exchange of views between us on the basis of the United States Embassy telegram repreated to you in my telegram No. 8520 [of August 3rd].

///

125

BRITISH LEGATION
13 AUG 1948
AMMAN

EN CLAIR TELEGRAM

/SR (30) Copy No. . . .

FROM: CAIRO DESPD: BY BAG

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE

NO : 132 Saving DATED: 6.8.48

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 132 Saving of the 6th August, 1948, repeated for information Saving to Jerusalem No. 41, Beirut No. 92, Damascus No. 97, Amman No. 91, Baghdad No. 91 and Jedda No. 103.

Palestine.

The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported, in the local press of 3rd August, to have said to the representative of the Government paper "Assas" that there was still time for the Great Powers, who had not taken justice and right into consideration in the question of Palestine and who had taken up a position which the Arabs would not forget, to modify their attitude. He added that they would thus, by following their own interests and safeguarding their relations with the Arab world, safeguard peace.

2. Egypt and the Arab Powers, he continued, could not in any way reverse their decision about Palestine. Khachaba Pasha asked how Egyptians could have confidence in the Zionists as neighbours, when they had undertaken raids on Egypt even during the truce. Egyptians would be deceiving themselves if they thought that the ultimate aim of the Zionists was only to safeguard that part of Palestine territory which they are claiming. What Egyptians have done, and what they will still do, is only a sacred duty which has for its object the preservation of the future of Egypt and her children.

CHAPMAN-ANDREWS

Arabia 95 (Son) 126

(S/1014/48)

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION
DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From U.K. Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2110. D. 2.17 p.m. 9th August, 1948.
9th August, 1948. R. 7.19 p.m. 9th August, 1948.

Repeated Saving to Washington, Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and Haifa.

IMPORTANT.
GIANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2110 of 9th August, repeated for information Saving to Washington, Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and Haifa.

Palestine.

In cable dated 6th August to Secretary General (document S/954) Mediator reports that he has passed on to Arab Governments Shertok's proposal for direct peace negotiations between Arab and Jewish representatives.

Please repeat saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 21, 20, 43, 21, 22, 21, 21 and 17 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem].

O:O

BRITISH LEGATION
13 AUG 1948
AMMAN

96 (Saw) (127)

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2111. D. 4.40. p.m. 9th August 1948.

9th August 1948. R. 9.50. p.m. 9th August 1948.

Repeated to Washington,
Cairo,
Amman,
B.M.E.O. Cairo,
Beirut,
Bagdad,
Damascus,
Jedda,
Jerusalem,
Haifa.

Saving.

IMPORTANT

GIANT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 2111 of 9th August repeated for information saving to Washington, Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O., Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa.

Palestine Truce.

In cable to Secretary General dated 7th August (document S/955) Mediator reports that

(1) Owing to fact that less than half of promised observers have arrived, supervision system, proper functioning of which is all the more necessary in present atmosphere of declining confidence on both sides, has remained inadequate.

(2) In view of recent public statements by statesmen on both sides he has instructed observers that no party may take the law into its own hands and decree that it is relieved of its obligations under Security Council resolution because, in its opinion, other party has violated truce.

(3) Situation in Jerusalem is particularly tense and there are rumours of impending coups by irregular elements which are alleged to be uncontrollable or to be

/used as spearheads by regular

used as spearheads by regular forces. Agreement of both parties has however been given to proposal to start without delay conversations with view to arranging to keep Jerusalem out of the conflict.

2. Mediator also mentions that Arab opposition to relief measures for Jews in Jerusalem is increasing owing to bitterness caused by Arab refugee problem and unwillingness of Jewish authorities to cooperate in this matter. He promises to send shortly to Security Council requested report on refugee question.

Please repeat saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem as my telegrams 22, 21, 44, 22, 23, 22, 22, and 18 respectively.

[Repeated saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem.]

▲▲▲▲▲

Amman 97(S) (128)

Cypher/OTP ~~WORLD ORGANISATION~~ DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir O. Franks.
No. 3847. D. 10.49 p.m. 9th August, 1948.

9th August, 1948. R. 4.00 a.m. 10th August, 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York and Saving to Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Jerusalem and B.M.E.O. Cairo.

IMPORTANT.
CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3847 of 9th August, repeated for information to U.K. Del. New York and Saving to Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Jerusalem and B.M.E.O. Cairo.

Palestine.

In an article in New York Times of August 9th, otherwise devoted to a description of the Israeli case for acceptance into the United Nations, the newspaper's correspondent at Lake Success quotes a spokesman for the United States delegation as saying that the United States would support Israel's application.

2. State Department tell me that no official decision has been taken in this sense and that member of the United States delegation concerned was no doubt speaking on his own authority. On the other hand they say that there is no doubt that the United States will support Israel's application when it is made. They are hoping that some means can be found of securing the admission of Transjordan at the same time.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to repeated posts as my telegrams Nos. 12, 17, 19, 19, 15, 17, 12 and 24 respectively.

O:O

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
AMMAN

Amman 98(S) (129)

En Clair WORLD ORGANISATION ~~DISTRIBUTION~~

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2119 D. 2.53 p.m. 10th August, 1948

10th August, 1948 R. 8.04 p.m. 10th August,

Repeated to: Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, British Middle East Office, Damascus, Bagdad, Jedda, Haifa, Washington, } Saving

IMPORTANT
GIANT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 2119 of 10th August, repeated for information Saving to Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, British Middle East Office, Damascus, Bagdad, Jedda, Haifa and Washington.

Palestine truce.

In cable dated 9th August to Secretary General (document S/958) Secretary General of Arab League reports that after fall of Eltera, during present cease fire, Jewish forces carried away 28 Arab inhabitants who were then burned alive with petrol. Azzam claims to have names of 14 victims and one eye witness, and asks for urgent enquiry.

Please repeat to Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, British Middle East Office, Damascus, Bagdad and Jedda as my telegrams Nos. 20, 24, 23, 24, 46, 24, 25, 24 respectively, all Saving.

[Repeated Saving to posts as requested].

uuuuu

/HW.

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
AMMAN

130

CYPHER TELEGRAM. O.T.P.

FROM: CAIRO. DESPD: 1955 hrs. 11. 8. 48.

TO: GOVERNOR CYPRUS. DATED: 11th August, 1948.

NO: 53.

I M P O R T A N T.

SPACE.

Addressed to Governor of Cyprus, telegram No. 53 of the 11th August, repeated to Foreign Office No. 1160 and Haifa No. 93, and Saving to Beirut No. 93, Damascus No. 98, Amman No. 92, Baghdad No. 92 and Jerusalem No. 42.

Egyptian Director General of Civil Aviation Egypt has informed Civil Air Attaché unofficially that he has information that Cyprus Airways are operating into Haifa, which Egyptians regard this as trading with the enemy. He assured the Civil Air Attaché that Cyprus Airways must choose between services to Egypt or Haifa and in the event of their selecting the latter their temporary permit for services into Egypt would be withdrawn. To avoid embarrassment to us the Director General of Civil Aviation would prefer matter to be handled in this manner rather than that an official ultimatum be delivered.

2. For your information the Director General of Civil Aviation has warned both K.L.M. and Air France who have elected to withdraw their services to Haifa.

Foreign Office pass Haifa as my telegram No. 93.

CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
AMMAN

(131)

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

En Clair
By Confidential bag
Secret

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES AT:-

AMMAN
ANGORA
ATHENS
BAGDAD
BAHREIN
BEIRUT
BELGRADE
BERLIN
BERNE
B.M.E.O.(CAIRO)
BRUSSELS
BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST
BUENOS AIRES
CAIRO
COPENHAGEN
DAMASCUS
GENEVA (U.K. DEL)
THE HAGUE
HELSINGFORS
HOLY SEE
JEDDA
JERUSALEM
KHARTOUM
LISBON
MADRID
MOSCOW
NANKING
NEW YORK (U.K. DEL)
OSLO
PARIS
PRAGUE
RIO DE JANEIRO
ROME
SINGAPORE (Commissioner General South East Asia)
SOFIA
STOCKHOLM
TEHRAN
TOKYO
VIENNA
WARSAW
WASHINGTON

No. 336 INTEL

16th August, 1948.

SECRET

Recognition of the State of Israel

The following is for your confidential information on this matter about which speculation has recently increased.

2. It is essential we should not give the impression to either Jews of Arabs that we are about to modify our policy on this question. The Jews would immediately think that we were condoning the aggressive intentions of which they are at present giving too much evidence, and that they had only to pursue this policy for a little longer to oblige us to grant them recognition. This is our only major political card with the Jews, and it must be reserved for use at the appropriate moment when we may hope to get some worthwhile and lasting settlement in return. It is equally essential that the Arabs should not believe that we are about to take any such step. In order to reach a settlement of any kind we shall almost certainly need to use all our influence once more with the Arabs at the appropriate moment. Our stock of influence is at present low and must be gradually

/ built up over

built up over the next few weeks. If we take any step towards recognising the Jewish state, or even if the Arabs had good reason to believe that we were doing so, exactly the reverse would happen and we might find ourselves without any influence at all on Arab policy at a critical moment.

3. This background information is, of course, on no account to be divulged but you should take the opportunity when is offers of scotching any tendentious rumour that His Majesty's Government contemplate any step at present towards recognition of a Jewish state.

ØØØ

Cypher/OTP

~~WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION~~

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir O. Franks.
No. 3876.

D. 9.39.p.m. 11th August 1948.

11th August 1948.

R. 10.30.p.m. 11th August 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York,
Jerusalem,
Cairo,
B.M.E.O.,
Amman,
) Saving.

CONFIDENTIAL
GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3876 of 11th August repeated for information to U.K. Delegation New York, Jerusalem, Cairo, B.M.E.O., Amman, all saving.

My telegram No. 3847: Palestine.

Today's press makes much of a statement yesterday by the press officer of the State Department that, in addition to the question of admission of Israel to the United Nations, de jure recognition of Israel and the grant to Israel of a 100 million dollar loan by the export-import bank were "under consideration" by the United States Government.

2. This statement was made in reply to questions arising from a rumour that the President and Secretary of State were at odds on these matters - a fact which press officer firmly denied. The State Department tell me that while both matters have been and will continue to be under consideration in the normal course, the press officers remark does not (repeat not) mean that any new step is contemplated at present.

Foreign Office please pass saving to Jerusalem, Cairo, B.M.E.O. and Amman as my telegrams Nos. 13, 13, 25 and 16 respectively.

[Repeated saving to Jerusalem, Cairo, B.M.E.O. and Amman.]

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
AMMAN

S/1014/48

Amman 102 (S)

133

Cypher/OTP
Confidential

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO JEDDA

No. 711

13th August 1948. D. 4.45 p.m. 13th August 1948

Repeated to Washington No. 8933
U.K. Delegation New York No. 321
Cairo No. 125
Amman No. 102
Beirut No. 119
Damascus No. 120
Bagdad No. 112
B.M.E.O. No. 241

SAVING.

102
130

IMPORTANT.
CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT.

Addressed to Jedda telegram No. 711 of 13th August repeated for information to Washington and Saving to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad and B.M.E.O.

Your telegram No. 266 [of July 22: Palestine].

I regret delay in replying.

2. You should reply through the appropriate channel that while we fully share Ibn Saud's concern at the situation in Palestine and his desire that war should be avoided, we cannot agree with him that the method he proposes would render a settlement easier. We recognise that the Arab States are disillusioned with the United Nations but it must be appreciated that that organisation of which we and the Americans remain loyal members, is dealing with the situation in Palestine both through the Security Council's attempts to maintain the peace and through the agency of the Mediator, who is instructed to seek a peaceful solution without being tied as to the kind of solution he must impose. We believe that his efforts, if supported by all those concerned, provide the best hope of reaching a settlement without war. If and when there is further discussion in the United Nations of the settlement of Palestine, Ibn Saud can rely on our doing our best to ensure that a settlement is proposed in which the Arab States could properly acquiesce.

3. We appreciate the confidence which Ibn Saud has shown in us and the Americans by his proposal, but we do not believe that it is a practical one. Apart from the difficulty of securing authority from the United Nations for any such procedure, we do not feel that it is wise for us to play so prominent a part in the

matter in view of the

matter in view of the extent to which we were involved in quite different circumstances in Palestine up to the end of the Mandate. Moreover it seems by no means certain that even if we and the Americans could agree on a settlement to be recommended, this would be any more acceptable to the two parties than a settlement backed by the United Nations.

4. Provided this does not involve too long a delay you should wait to deliver this reply until your United States colleague has his instructions.

v v v

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
AMMAN

Amman 104(S)

134

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2157
13th August, 1948

D. 9.11 p.m. 13th August, 1948
R. 2.30 a.m. 14th August, 1948

Repeated to Jerusalem
Cairo Saving
B.M.E.O. Cairo "
Amman "
Beirut "
Damascus "
Bagdad "
Jedda "
Haifa "
Rhodes "
Washington "

IMPORTANT

GIANT

135

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2157 of 13th August, repeated for information to Jerusalem and Saving to Cairo, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Jedda, Haifa, Rhodes and Washington.

My telegram No. 2148: Palestine truce.

In cablegram dated 12th August to Secretary General (Document S/966) Shertok states that destruction of Latrun pumping station was work of Arabs and was culmination of deliberate Arab policy designed to force 100,000 Jerusalem Jews to capitulate by depriving them of water during hottest season of year. But for United Nation intervention Jewish forces would have secured control of station and ensured its working. Inability of United Nations to enforce its decisions was again demonstrated and Security Council should check at once this scandalous truce violation. Meanwhile Jews must withdraw permission for Arab villagers to return to their homes in this area (paragraph 4 of my telegram under reference) since this concession was apparently regarded as sign of weakness.

Please repeat important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 116 and to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Jedda and Rhodes as my telegrams Nos. 27, 26, 50, 27, 27, 28, 27 and 1 Saving, respectively.

[Repeated to Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O. Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Jedda and Rhodes.]

REPEATED BY F.O. TO Amman No. 104

PPP

No

No

BRITISH LEGATION
20 AUG 1948
AMMAN

Amman 1065 (S)

135

En Clair WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2148 D. 1.59 p.m. 13th August, 1948

13th August, 1948. R. 7.40 p.m. 13th August, 1948

Repeated to Washington)
Cairo)
Amman)
B.M.E.O.)
Beirut) SAVING
Bagdad)
Damascus)
Jedda)
Jerusalem)
Haifa)

IMPORTANT
GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2148 of 13th August repeated for information Saving to Washington, Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O., Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and Haifa.

My telegram No. 2111.

127

Palestine truce.

In cablegram dated 12th August to Secretary General (Document S/961) Mediator transmits report on Truce observance in Jerusalem, of which following is substance.

2. During visit to Jerusalem from 9th to 11th August Mediator delivered identical notes to Jews and Arabs, in which he asserted that present military activity in Jerusalem could not be entirely attributed to irregulars and could surely be checked by regular forces of authorities who were responsible for applying truce in their respective areas. Adequate number of observers had now arrived, who had been instructed, if necessary, to report on truce violations with view to investigation calculated to assess responsibility. If situation in Jerusalem did not improve, it would have to be brought to attention of Security Council.

3. 11th August, after night of heavy firing, Mediator forwarded further identical notes to Arabs and Jews arguing that present sporadic firing was pointless and requesting both parties to agree to order (valid for

/indefinite period)

indefinite period) that firing of any kind, even in answer to firing by other party, should be forbidden as from Friday, 13th August. This request was accepted by Arabs, but Jewish reply was still awaited. Mediator's action resulted from impartial reports that Jews had generally speaking been more aggressive party since truce renewal. Observers' reports about previous night's firing supported this appreciation, since firing began from Jewish side.

4. As regards water supply, Mediator had decided that repair work on Latrun pumping station now in United Nations hands should start at once. As result of visit to Latrun area, he had informed Jews that he now had sufficient proof that Jewish positions around Ajanjul were occupied and fortified by Jews after truce began and that he had therefore decided that, as from 12th August, Jewish lines must be withdrawn from this area and Arab inhabitants allowed to return to their homes unharmed.

5. As regards demilitarisation of Jerusalem, Arabs had submitted suggestions accepting demilitarisation in principle. No suggestions had been received from Jews, but negotiations would continue.

6. Mediator would leave on 12th August for Stockholm for one or two weeks, but would be kept daily informed of developments and would be ready at any time, if necessary, to fly back to Near East.

7. In second cablegram dated 12th August (Document S/963) Mediator reports that, according to preliminary investigation, Arab irregulars were responsible for completely demolishing Latrun pumping station during previous night, investigation is proceeding, but under circumstances Jews have been authorised to postpone compliance with Mediator's decision concerning withdrawal of Jewish lines in Latrun sector (see paragraph 4 above).

Please repeat to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O., Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 26, 25, 49, 26, 27, 26, 26 and 22 Saving respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Posts as requested].

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Annex to No. 106 (S)

F 13-8-48

Amman. 108 (Say)

(136)



Sinclair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2166 D. 1.44 p.m. 15th August, 1948

15th August, 1948. R. 7.07 p.m. 15th August, 1948

Repeated to: Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O.(Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa, Washington } Saving.

IMPORTANT

GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2166 of August 15th, repeated for information Saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O.(Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem, Haifa and Washington.

My telegram No. 2110. (126)

Palestine.

In cable dated 13th August to Secretary-General (document S/967) Mediator transmits text of Egyptian letter rejecting Jewish proposal for direct peace negotiations.

Foreign Office please repeat Saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O.(Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 30, 29, 53, 30, 31, 31, 31 and 24 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo, Amman, B.M.E.O.(Cairo), Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem]

zzz

MESSAGE FORM

(108)

W/T Office Serial No. 918

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 20th August

To :- Amman	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
		1730
From :- London	Originators No.	Number of Groups
		262

BRITISH LEGATION 21 AUG 1948 AMMAN

Special Instructions

Priority

Indication of Priority

1	$1920	GIANT	following received		4
2	from NEW YORK tel	no 2198 of	19/8 repeated		8
3	for info	to Jerusalem, Cairo Beirut,			12
4	Amman, Beirut,	Damascus, Baghdad.			16
5	Jedda,	Haifa	and Sauing to		20
6	D'Ton.				24
7			MIPT		28
8			PALESTINE	security	32
9	council				36
10			Following is		40
11	text of	joint draft resolution on			44
12	Jerusalem		Regins		48
13			Security	Council.	52
14	Taking into account communications				56
15	from MEDIATOR concerning				60
16	in Jerusalem declares				64
17	of governments and authorities				68
18	concerned to resolution of			security	72
19	council of 15th		July 1948 and		76
20	to inform govts		and authorities		80
21	concerned that.				84
22	(A) Each party is		responsible for		88
23	actions of both	regular and			92
24	irregular forces	operating under			96
25	its authority or	in territory under			100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

11263/PMEM/5-46-100.000

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No.....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :-	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :-	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions			Indication of Priority		
1	its control.				4
2	(B) Each party has obligation to use				8
3	all means at its disposal to prevent				12
4	action violating force by intervention				16
5	of ploits who are subject to its				20
6	authority or who are in territory				24
7	under its control.				28
8	(c) Each party has obligation to bring				32
9	to cessation and misuse of				36
10	connection to Government, any				40
11	and all persons within their juris-				44
12	-diction who are involved in				48
13	breach of force.				52
14	(D) No party is entitled to gain				56
15	military or political advantage				60
16	through violation of force. such				64
17	please refer Diplomatic to				68
18	Jerusalem and to Cairo Beirut,				72
19	Amman, Beirut, Damascus,				76
20	Baghdad, Jedda and Hafta as				80
21	my tels 122 71 120				84
22	67 553 553 552				88
23	555 and 14 respectively.				92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

MESSAGE FORM

61

W/T Office Serial No. 627

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date 17/7

To: A

From: LONDON

BRITISH LEGATION AMMAN 17 JUL 1948

TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
	1010
Originators No.	Number of Groups
	65-6

Special Instructions

Priority

Indication of Priority

1	70416	GIANT.	Following received from		4
2	DEL. N.Y.	tel No 1961 of 15/7 begins. Repeat			8
3	for info to	Cairo, BMEO, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad,			12
4	Damascus,	Jeddah, Jerusalem, Haifa & Saving			16
5	to W'ton.	begins. MIPT. Palestine.	Following		20
6	is text of	resolution adopted by	security		24
7	council on	15 July. Begins. The security council			28
8	taking into	consideration that the provisional			32
9	govt of	Israel has	indicated its acceptance		36
10	in principle of a	prolongation of the			40
11	truce in Palestine that	the states	members of		44
12	the Arab League have	rejected	successive		48
13	appeals of the united nations	mediator			52
14	and of the	security council in	its resolution		56
15	of 7 July	1948 for the	prolongation of the		60
16	truce in Palestine and	that there has	consequently		64
17	developed	a renewal of hostilities in			68
18	Palestine	determined that	the situation		72
19	in Palestine	constitutes a threat to the			76
20	peace within	the meaning of article			80
21	39 of the	charter orders the	parties and		84
22	authorities	concerned pursuant to			88
23	article 40 of	the charter of the united			92
24	nations	to desist from further	military		96
25	action and to	this end to issue	cease fire		100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

(E)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority
2	

orders to their military and paramilitary forces to take effect at a time to be determined by the mediator but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution declares that failure by any of the govts or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding para of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of article 39 of the charter requiring immediate consideration by the security council with view to such further action under chapter 7 of the charter as may be decided upon by the council calls upon all govts and authorities concerned pursuant to article 40 of the charter to continue to cooperate with the mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the security council on 29 May 1948 orders as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

(B)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To :	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

3

Indication of Priority

ceasefire in the city of Jerusalem
to take effect 24 hours from the time
of the adoption of this resolution and instructs
the truce commission to take any
necessary steps to make this ceasefire
effective instructs the mediator to
continue his efforts to bring about
the demilitarization of the city of
Jerusalem without prejudice to
the future political status of Jerusalem
and to assure the protection of and
access to the holy places religious
buildings and sites in Palestine.
Instructs the mediator to supervise
the observation of the truce and
to establish procedures for examining
alleged breaches of the truce since
11 June 1948 authorizes him to
deal with breaches so far as it is
within his capacity to do so by
appropriate local action and
requests him to keep the security
council currently informed concerning
the operation of the truce and
when necessary to take appropriate

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

(B)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To:	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions

4

Indication of Priority

1	action.	Decides	that subject to		4
2	further	decisions	by the security council		8
3	or the general assembly the truce				12
4	shall remain in force in accordance				16
5	with the present resolution and				20
6	with that of 29 may 1948 and the				24
7	a peaceful adjustment of				28
8	the future situation of		Palestine		32
9	is reached. Reiterates the appeal				36
10	to the parties concerned in		the last		40
11	para of its resolution		of 22 May		44
12	and urges upon the		parties		48
13	that they continue conversations				52
14	with mediator in a spirit of				56
15	conciliation and mutual concession				60
16	in order that all points under				64
17	dispute may be settled peacefully.				68
18	Requests the secretary general				72
19	to provide the mediator with				76
20	the necessary staff and facilities				80
21	to assist in carrying out the				84
22	functions assigned to him				88
23	under the resolution of the general				92
24	assembly of 14 May and under				96
25	the resolution	and requests			100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering

Cipher Clerks Initials

(B)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

MESSAGE FORM

W/T Office Serial No. .....

Cipher Office Serial No. .....

Date .....

To:	TIME OF ORIGIN	TIME OF RECEIPT
From :	Originators No.	Number of Groups

Special Instructions	Indication of Priority
5'.	

1	that the secretary general				4
2	make appropriate arrangements				8
3	to provide necessary funds to				12
4	meet the obligations arising				16
5	from this resolution. Ends				20
6	Please repeat to Cairo 5'0 Bilco				24
7	97 Amman 49 Beirut 36 Bagdad				28
8	36 Damascus 37 Jedda 39				32
9	Jerusalem 74 and Haifa 4.				36
10				Beirut	40
11					44
12					48
13					52
14					56
15					60
16					64
17					68
18					72
19					76
20					80
21					84
22					88
23					92
24					96
25					100

Time of Enciphering or Deciphering	Cipher Clerks Initials

(65)8754m/GHQP/200,000/8-46

Following is text of resolution adopted by Security Council on 15 July- BEGINS-

" The Security Council taking into consideration that the provisional government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine that the states members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7 July 1948 for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, orders the governments and authorities concerned pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military para-military forces to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution declares that failure by any of the governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with view to such further action under Chapter 7 of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council calls upon all governments and authorities concerned pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter to continue to cooperate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948 orders as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the city of Jerusalem to take effect 24 hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective instructs the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the city of Jerusalem without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places , religious buildings and sites in Palestine instructs the Mediator to supervise the observation of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce since 11 June 1948 authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action and requests him

...../2

to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action. Decides that subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948 until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached. Reiterates the appeal to the parties concerned in the last paragraph of its resolution of 22 May and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations with Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully. Requests the Secretary General to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May and under the resolution and requests that the Secretary General make appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations arriving from this resolution. ENDS "

PALESTINE SECURITY COUNCIL- 19TH AUGUST, 1948.

Following is text of joint draft resolution on Jerusalem.

BEGINS -

" Security Council taking into account communications from Mediator concerning situation in Jerusalem directs attention of governments and authorities concerned to resolution of Security Council of 15th July 1948 and so informs governments and authorities concerned that

(a) Each party is responsible for actions of both regular and irregular forces operating under its authority or in territory under its control.

(b) Each party has obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating truce by individuals or groups who are subject to its authority or who are in territory under its control.

(c) Each party has obligation to bring to speedy trial and in case of conviction to punishment, any and all persons within their jurisdiction who are involved in breach of truce.

(d) No party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of truce. ENDS "